

Appendix 9A

Some thoughts on unit organisation

Author James F Dunnigan notes that organising and reorganising Tables of Organisation and Equipment (TOE) is a favourite military preoccupation¹. Artillery batteries and infantry sections platoons are victimised in particular: Should a battery have eight guns or six? How should the rifle section be organised? How should platoon weapons be allocated? The Jane's Defence Weekly of November 4, 2005, announced that Australia had joined the club: "The Australian Army is set to make a major change to its infantry units by adopting a 'fire team' structure within its infantry sections, following extensive experimentation and analysis," it said. Up to now, the Australians, like the South Africans, organised their sections into a "light machine gun group" and a "rifle group", the former responsible for fire support and the latter for close assault.

A Canadian infantry captain addressed the issue some years ago, saying that when discussing establishments, two principal points arise - organization, and tactics.² While he wrote about the Canadian Forces, his message is applicable to the SA Army as the two share a Commonwealth heritage. "There is no simple solution to either, any argument to defend a specific structure or tactical approach necessarily requires a detailed preamble establishing roles of ... forces, organizations, available weapons, tactical situations, etc," Captain Michael O'Leary says. "The challenge is to present an argument which establishes a solution offering the best ability to meet the widest number of situations. Often, another nation's ... organization will be offered as a potential solution. While this at first seems a possible course, it may be fraught with hazards if only because the compromises that were made to develop it have not been published along with their tactical structure. Similarly, comparative effects of individual training, discipline, effectiveness and combination of weapons should be analysed to establish the potential effectiveness and applicability of another army's solution.

Restricting his argument to the infantry section, O'Leary added: "The infantry section, while a fundamental component, is only part of the platoon. The section is the manoeuvre element of the platoon, as the platoon is for the company, and so forth. But, given the relative ranges of the section's weapons in comparison to the platoon's area of manoeuvre, each section can also be employed as a fire support element, as strong or potentially stronger than the platoon's weapons detachment. The tactical direction and requirements of the section's superior commanders - the platoon and company commanders, dictate the section's employment, as well as any limits of reorganization.

¹ James F Dunnigan, *How to Make War, A Comprehensive Guide to Modern Warfare in the 21st Century*, 4th Edition, Quill, New York, 2003.

² Captain Michael O'Leary, CD, p.l.s.c., *The RCR, The Infantry Section*, http://members.tripod.com/RegimentalRogue/papers/sect_atk_part2.htm, accessed August 3, 2005.

“In the defence, it is well recognized that tactical sub-units are sited and tasked by the commander "two-up." Infantry sections are issued defensive positions and primary arcs of fire by company commanders, platoons by battalion commanders. Each subordinate commander then sites and directs remaining weapons and personnel to complement the superior commander's tactical plan. The degree of direction applied to task major weapons in platoons and sections indicates that these weapons, whether machine-guns, mortars or anti-armour weapons, actually belong (in a tactical sense) to the commander who directs their employment, not necessarily to the immediate commander responsible for the soldiers who fire them.

“Seldom, however, does the control of weapon systems within the infantry platoon achieve this level of detail, particularly in offensive operations. There has been a growing tendency to consider the section an inviolate organization, tasked as a single entity only and with an incorruptible internal structure. Alarming, the structure of the infantry platoon has not always even been preserved by its own commander. As dismounted manpower decreases due to leave, courses, casualties or other LOB³ causes, the tendency appears to be to distribute platoon support weapons to the sections rather than maintaining a full weapons detachment and surviving with smaller sections and an unreduced number of tactical elements.

“Any perception of advantage in simplifying the tactical structure of the platoon is false. The loss of tactical flexibility, both in the physical capability of the platoon's manoeuvre and fire support elements but also in the minds of its commanders is great.

“The infantry section has regularly changed its organization... Ranging from a singular group of riflemen (at the end of the Anglo South African Boer War), it gained options as it gained weaponry. The First World War saw the appointment of “bombers”⁴ and the creation of Lewis gun sections within the platoon to provide distinct fire support and manoeuvre sections. Later, the firepower of each section increased as machine-guns became lighter and more mobile and were incorporated as section weapons.

“Grenades became a weapon for every infanteer to carry, and the light machine-gun was incorporated into the TO&E⁵ of each infantry section. By the close of the Second World War, the infantry platoon was composed of three sections and a platoon weapons detachment. Each section was comprised of fire support and assault elements. But the location of light machineguns within infantry sections was not considered an inviolate structure. "The Bren gun should be made available-away from its section and the men of its section-if the Platoon or Company Commander has a definite use for it in some other way ... To tie the Bren gun to its section on all occasions may be to lose its usefulness whilst, on the other hand, it is likely to slow up and disorganize the action of the attacking rifle sections." In the late 1980's,

³ Left Out of Battle: During World Wars One and Two it was a formal requirement to retain a percentage of the unit's personnel out of combat to support its reconstitution after heavy casualties.

⁴ O'Leary: “Grenade throwers during World War One were called bombers after the British 'Grenade Hand No. 5,' more popularly known as the Mills bomb. Before the Mills bomb was patented in September, 1915, soldiers in the Allied armies devised home-made grenades from jam tins, gun cotton and metal scrap in a dried mud matrix for shrapnel with a rudimentary detonator and fuze.”

⁵ TO&E = Table of Organization and Equipment. The doctrinal structure for manning and equipment for a military unit.

Canada's infantry section organization made one further evolution from a fire support/assault element configuration to one of two balanced rifle groups, each group armed with one C-9 light machine-gun, and three C-7 rifle (one of which will soon mount the M-203 grenade launcher).

“There are situations where balanced rifle groups are a strong and effective section organization, but there are other situations where it may not offer the capability needed to meet the threat. The reorganization of infantry sections within the platoon is not an unfamiliar concept. It has been most commonly employed over the past few decades in patrolling. For platoon level fighting patrols, a significant reorganization of the platoon may occur, as each NCO and soldier is assigned tasks matched to individual skills and weapons carried.⁶ This flexible approach to task organization provides a good foundation for further examination of optional structures for the infantry section.

“The balanced fire group section organization with the groups in line for the assault provides good firepower in a narrow frontal arc. But the effectiveness of the balanced fire groups deteriorates over distance/duration of the attack, when the troops executing it lack the discipline of practiced infanteers, or when following the drill compromises potentially sound alternatives. For such situations, we need to offer small unit commanders options - options of organization and of tactics.

“With a dismounted infantry section of eight soldiers⁷, the following combinations are two possible alternatives to the balanced group structure: fire support and assault elements and heavy/light groups. In all cases, do not consider the section organization fixed. Dependent on the section's tasks and any direction received from the platoon commander, the section commander should retain the capability and freedom to rearrange not only the section's formation, but also its organization to best meet the anticipated threat. The fundamental requirement to achieve this degree of flexibility is that all section members must be trained and experienced in each configuration, thus enabling the section to shift organizations as easily as they do field formations.

“As alternatives to the section organization are discussed, keep in mind the concepts of time and space with respect to the section attack. Habitually, we train and practice section tactics over relatively wide spaces, rehearsing simplified battle drills in double quick time. Consider the likely effects of enemy rifle and supporting fire, friendly support fire and shrapnel, and the human instinct for self-preservation. Instead of executing section attacks over an expanse of two to four hundred metres length and similar width, section tactics in close assault may well be executed within a fifty metre range, with all movement executed at a low crawl. Even in such extreme cases, the tactical alternatives will not change, but the range and speed of manoeuvre of the section attack can change radically. Many readers will be familiar with S.L.A. Marshall's descriptions of the isolating effects of coming under effective fire: "The first effect of fire is to dissolve all appearance of order. This is the most shocking surprise to troops who are experiencing combat for the first time. They cannot anticipate the speed with which their forces become fractionalised or the extent to

⁶ Especially for ambush patrols and patrols in urban areas.

⁷ The dismounted South African section numbers 12 and the mounted section 10. This does not alter the validity of the argument.

which the fractions will become physically divorced from each other as the movement is extended and the enemy resistance stiffens⁸."

"In any tactical situation, the section commander must balance the platoon commander's intents and tasks against his (or her) own preferred tactical solution. At times, anticipated tasks may cause the platoon commander to direct the section to adopt a particular organization, otherwise it may remain open for the section commander to select an appropriate organization. This degree of flexibility is complemented by the requirement to assess each situation for assigned tasks, the threat, the personnel and weapons available in the section, the encountered enemy and the ground over which the section will execute its task. These conditions rarely result in repetitive circumstances, the section commander therefore needs alternatives to meet each situation with a tactical solution best suited to success.

Fire Support and Assault Elements

"Employed for decades before the integration of the C-7⁹/C-9¹⁰ weapon suite, the employment of a static fire support element ensured continuous suppressive fire on an objective while the section's rifle group executed a move under cover to a flank, preparatory to a short final assault. Consider that if this tactical organization was effective with two FN C-2¹¹ light automatic rifles in the support group, it must be equally or more effective with two C9 Light Machine Guns (LMGs). With current section strength, the section might be divided into a three-person fire support group containing two C-9 LMGs under control of the section second-in-command and an assault group of the section commander and four riflemen. Alternatively, when appropriately skilled and experienced machine-gunners are selected (in both weapon handling and the section's tactics), moving the section 2IC to the assault force becomes an option.

"On enemy contact and dependent on the ground and space available, the section commander might execute a right or left flanking, leaving his supporting machine-guns on or near the section's position after contact. Based on his combat estimate assessing the threat, the ground and his available forces, the section commander would select a line of advance for the rifle group. Closing with the enemy, ideally under cover, while the C-9 group provided suppressive fire, the section commander would launch a short intense assault on the enemy's trench from an unexpected direction. The assault would be launched once a covered approach was no longer viable or the continuation of fire support became a threat to the assault group.

"The support and assault group section organization gains even more flexibility when the assault group is considered to be divisible. One or two riflemen may be detached to guard a threatened flank on the approach of the assault group. Alternatively, the fire teams of the assault group may be directed by the section commander to approach on both sides of the supporting fire, threatening both of the enemy's flanks when the terrain does not offer a clear flanking approach. This may be a most effective tactic in

⁸ S.L.A. Marshal, *Men Against Fire*, Nebraska University Press, 1947.

⁹ C7: The Canadian version of the US M16 5.56mm assault rifle.

¹⁰ C9: The Canadian version of the FN Mimini 5.56mm light machine gun.

¹¹ C2: The Canadian version of the FN FAL Heavy Barrel 7.62mm battle rifle.

close combat when fighting through a heavily contested objective, establishing a suppressive crossfire under which at least one flanking fire team should be able to close with the targeted enemy trench. This tactical approach will be examined further below.

Heavy and Light Groups

“Maintaining balanced rifle groups with identical weaponry ensures that any rifle group can meet any assigned task with equal opportunity for success, omitting of course the potential effects of individual personalities, training, etc. Any change which gives the tactical elements of infantry sections radically different weapon suites also requires that commanders pay greater attention to situations and threats to ensure the best likelihood that each group will receive tasks best suited to its capabilities.

“The current eight-man infantry section could be organized into a light group under the section commander with four C-7 rifles, and a heavy group under the section 2IC with two C-9 LMGs and two M-203 grenade launchers. This may be less an alternative organization for a section commander to select than one likely to be ordered by the platoon commander as part of a platoon tactical plan. On the advance, a heavy group on the platoon's threatened flank ensures a strong fire support element can be deployed and brought into action quickly. In platoon patrolling and raiding operations, regrouping of two heavy groups with the platoon's weapons detachment can form a strong firebase, while combined light groups create a mobile and agile assault force.

Tactics

“It has become a common point of view that the infantry section is too small a combat unit to be considered divisible. The theory that the tactics of individual sections become irrelevant within a larger assaulting organization has not been supported by past analysts, including Liddell Hart¹²: Flexible section organizations must be complemented by a similar freedom of action to employ alternative tactics when the commander's combat estimate indicates their suitability. The foregoing discussion of section organization has, at times, touched on tactics, because organization and tactics cannot be easily separated. A given organization leads to tactical plans that capitalize on its capabilities, while a given tactic is best employed with a specific organization.

“Whether the scenario is the wide open spaces of a section alone in training, a lead section in close country, or a section in the centre of a battalion assault, isolated by fire and casualties, there are only a few basic tactical variations of the section attack. These variations are the frontal, the flanking, and the limited double envelopment.¹³ Each of these concepts will be covered below, the reader must always keep in mind

¹² Basil Liddell Hart, 1895-1970, journalist, activist, military historian.

¹³ O'Leary: “It is perhaps appropriate to reiterate here a footnote from Doctrine and Canada's Army, by Lt Col R.J. Jarymowycz, CD, published in The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin, Vol. 2, No. 3, August 99. ‘The complete trio of classical manoeuvres is: Arbela (Alexander the Great: an attritional frontal with envelopment of a flank), Cannae (Hannibal: the double envelopment) and Leuthen (Frederick the Great: the flanking attack).’ In simple terms, the choice of manoeuvre options between two discrete forces, whether they are ancient armies or modern infantry sections, remains limited to these basic elements and their variations.”

that these are not rigid formulas for success to be matched to specific battlefield conditions, they are options on which to base tactical planning at the section level.

Fire and Movement.

“Any consideration of the attack must be predicated by an understanding of the complementary roles of fire and movement. Fire is used to suppress the enemy, either the intended target¹⁴ or a secondary threat, and to destroy the target enemy. Fire is applied by one component of an attacking force to allow movement by another. Movement is employed to gain better fire positions and to close with the target enemy for the final assault. For every tactical element, from the two-man fire team upwards, the effective combining of fire support and manoeuvre is necessary to success in offensive operations. Notably, at the section level, once close battle has been joined, the relative usefulness of outside resources becomes nearly zero as the fratricide threat from outside fire support cancels its employability in close proximity with the enemy.

Frontal

“Even while the prevailing section assault tactic is to attack directly at the identified enemy location, we maintain a societal aversion to any consideration of the ‘frontal attack.’ Reminiscent of the First World War, we tend to skew our observation of this type of attack by imagining it to entail aligning the assaulting force parallel to the defenders and attacking into the face of their prepared defences, across their killing zones. The author (O’Leary) has seen this avoidance of the ‘frontal’ taken to such extremes in training as to see an enemy objective approached from its flank subjected to a flanking manoeuvre which, in effect, placed the assaulting element directly in front of the enemy's defences.

“Once engaged in close combat, and the section's area of operations becomes tightly constrained as discussed above, the section commander may be required to employ other tactics in the detailed fighting of the objective. The frontal will be used most often during the initial assault as part of a larger unit, but seldom will an ongoing attack allow sections to maintain such a simplistic parade square formation across a contested objective, and any expectation of such ritualistic execution of drills in training is erroneous. The frontal tactic's greatest advantage is that it allows the approach of an assaulting force with dispersion but, until close combat is joined, it will require outside fire support resources to suppress the enemy.

“Limitations of the frontal tactic include the exposure of all section members, the exhausting nature of the movement by every section member once fire and movement commences and the disruptive nature of internal fire support as each soldier in the

¹⁴ O’Leary: “I will use the term ‘target’ when it is necessary to differentiate between the object enemy of the assaulting force and either the ‘enemy’ as a general concept or complementary (supporting) enemy positions. Use of the term ‘target’ is not intended to infer a depersonalisation of the enemy as seen in our systematic retaliation of ‘the enemy’ by using classification range targets (‘figure 11’) during live field firing, to the nearly complete elimination of realistic target (or objective) representation. This failure to represent a realistic enemy has a number of consequences. These include the consistent training of soldiers to locate and identify range targets rather than realistic enemy targets, the likelihood that personnel will hesitate before engaging any other type of target in operations, and the presumption that these targets are a suitable training device for advanced field firing practices.”

section is required to repeatedly change fire positions. The frontal assault, with all section elements on line, should be employed when exposure to enemy fire can be limited to as short a time as possible, such as following the dismount of a mechanized infantry force. Commanders must assess the value and risk of outside fire support (artillery, air, aviation) in order to allow the closest possible approach by infantry before they are required to fight through the objective area using only internal fire support.

“As the reader can see, the applicability of the section frontal tactic is most effective as part of a greater whole, it is not as strong in isolation and commanders should examine its value in tactical situations in this light.

Flanking

“Before the balanced rifle group organization was adopted with a focus on the frontal, the flanking attack was the principal section tactic in training and operations. In training this tactic, a tendency existed to execute section flanking attacks over much wider areas than a section would normally employ. The desired requirement to achieve an optimum 90-degree angle between the supporting fire and the direction of the assault was generally given as an indication that this tactic was not applicable when participating as part of a larger assault force. But accepting this as a limitation assumes that the fire support is directed forward on the axis of approach and the complementary assault is perpendicular, i.e., along the attacker's line of troops. But, in close combat, even this optimum angle of support may be achieved without undue threat to flanking friendly forces. With both the supporting fire and the assault positioned up to 45-degrees either side of the original axis of advance, all firing continues to be directed safely forward of the attacking forces, making this an acceptable tactical option in close combat.

“For the section alone, whether it be a leading section in close country, a section isolated in close combat, or a non-infantry group of soldiers tasked with a security clearance operation, the flanking manoeuvre offers the best balance of fire and movement capabilities. Again, from the point of view of the section's configuration on the ground, the flanking tactic involves a static fire support element and a mobile assault element which, ideally, closes with the target enemy under cover. The flanking tactic is best employed when the section can readily deploy fire support and assault elements. This division of the section's strength is not necessarily dependent on a specific organizational structure and may be based on balanced fire groups, a fire support/assault, or heavy/light group configurations.

“The section commander, following a combat estimate, will place a fire support element in a location where it can suppress the enemy throughout the assault element's approach march (or crawl). Initial employment of a mutually supporting linear formation (the frontal) may be necessary before a flanking manoeuvre can be executed in order to achieve a better supporting fire position or location from which to initiate the flanking manoeuvre. The section commander can employ each element of the section to support the movement of the other until the fire support group has achieved the best possible fire position, and/or until the assault group can begin its approach movement.

“The strength of the flanking tactic lies in the stable and continuous fire support provided by the firebase, as well as in the relative strength of the assault element. When necessary, the section commander can detach one or more riflemen to guard an exposed flank on the approach to protect the execution of the original task. If this secondary target is the section's next objective, then this detachment then forms the initial foot-on-the-ground for the next assault.

Double Envelopment

“What is called the ‘Pepper Pot’ method of infiltration was used very frequently [by the Germans] and was carried out by four or five men in the light machine-gun group, all of whom carried rifles, and ammunition for the light machine-gun, with the exception of the gunner. This group would dash forward a few dozen yards and then from entirely different directions other small groups would do the same thing, all independently and all trying to get at least one gun to the rear of the objective. Their object being to cause confusion and to instil the fear of encirclement into the defenders¹⁵.

“Since the Second World War, ‘pepper-potting’ evolved into a common buzzword for individual fire and movement. It had lost its original connotation of multiple, mutually supporting groups of riflemen and light machine-gunners attempting to penetrate an enemy defensive position, threatening the encirclement of individual posts in order to cause the collapse of the entire defence. To describe this tactic more particularly from the perspective of one attacking section and a specific target enemy, the term double envelopment has been selected.

“Normally considered a formation level tactic leading to an attempt at encirclement, the double envelopment is seldom considered in Canadian infantry training as an option for section tactics. In close combat, the section commander may be able to establish a firebase but remain unsure of the best flank from which to effect an approach and assault. In select cases, it may be considered a viable option to split the assault element into two fire teams and attempt a flanking manoeuvre along both sides of the fire support. This tactic can readily be adapted in close combat from the frontal configuration. The mobile flanking fire-teams must be careful not to threaten one another. In this case, one or both assaulting fire teams may achieve a position from which to execute a final assault or one may reach a better fire position from which to support the final rush of the other.

“From a command and control point of view, the double envelopment is a high-risk option, to be adopted when other clear alternatives do not appear to be present. It should seldom be considered in open terrain as each element then lacks the combat power to neutralize new threats and continue the current mission. In close combat, the section may actually use variations on the double envelopment tactic most often. Adaptable as casualties reduce the section's strength, the double envelopment also offers the opportunity to maintain dispersion of the section's personnel while focussing its firepower on each enemy target trench in turn.

¹⁵ Notes From Theatres of War, Canadian Series, Number 1, "North Africa" December 1942 to March 1943, May 1943.

Discussion

“The foregoing discussion of section tactics has been intentionally brief. The effective application of section organization and tactics requires a fundamental understanding of the options and variations available, and an absence of any formulaic guidance, which might erroneously be considered a solution matrix. The prevailing theory of section attacks as taught by the Army has become more rigid with each generation of instructors. The evolution to a simplistic section attack drill may have allowed ease of instruction and assessment, but it does not ensure the degree of tactical flexibility essential for effective section leading in combat. Even in training, many commanders from section upwards are unperturbed at the sight of sections sweeping across objectives in live or dry training without regard for the detailed and mutually supported fighting of the objective.

“Every training event should reflect realistic consideration of the conditions of combat¹⁶. The design of training situations that anticipate the likely selection of alternative solutions is essential. Close combat tactics can change radically based on the perspective of the observer. Changing the scale of manoeuvre and reducing the virtual horizon effectively changes the problem. NCOs and officers should TEWT¹⁷ the fighting through of an objective under the presumption that no movement above crawling is possible. Current discussions about ‘fighting through the objective’ are reminiscent of officers siting trench lines from horseback early in the First World War. Changing the range of section assault training problems from 300 to 100 metres, or even 50 metres, so fundamentally alters the tactical considerations that an entirely new perception of problem solving must be applied. Simplistic drill execution can be suicidal, alternative solutions must be taught and allowed in training and operations.

“There's been a lot of talk in the Canadian Army lately about ‘getting out of the box.’ Encouragement of new approaches to tactical problem solving, to support a mission command or Auftragstaktik style of command, is prevalent. But before we can reasonably expect our young officers to exercise these practices we must similarly teach and encourage our NCO combat leaders to exercise a similar degree of flexibility. Emphasis must shift away from employing drills to execute tasks, to the application of tactical components applied logically to support achievement of the commander's intents: the platoon and company missions. Within the field force, the fundamental tactical building blocks are section organization, and section tactics. If

¹⁶ O’Leary: “It is notable that the Canadian Army has tactical training (e.g., Section and Platoon in Battle) and training safety (e.g., B-GL-304-003/TS-0A1 - Training Safety) publications but no reference providing comprehensive guidance on the design and conduct of small unit tactical training exercises. This shortfall is likely the principal cause of the overly simplistic and set-piece live fire training events we have seen in the past decade as well as the occasional catastrophic failure of such exercises resulting in injury or death (setting aside instances of accidents without attributable fault). One excellent example of a training guidance publication is Realistic Combat Training; and How to Conduct It, by Robert B. Rigg, Lt-Col, US Army (Military Service Publishing Company, Harrisburg, Penn., 1955). Realistic Combat Training, while dated, provides a detailed framework for designing training which balances risk and challenge with emphasis on maximizing training potential for participants, not on minimizing risk to the range officer's career.”

¹⁷ Tactical exercise without troops.

these are strong, the combat methods built upon them will have a basis of strength, which is essential.

“Only by demanding an understanding of intent driven operations and allowing freedom of action by junior commanders can we eventually evolve toward a coherent mission command structure. If we give our section leaders effective tools, and the freedom to make errors and to learn in training how to apply them effectively, we can establish and maintain that capability as a strength in our land forces. Training, trust and the reward of initiative are the keys to improvement and future success in small unit tactics. Options of organization and tactics provide our section commanders a fundamental framework on which to base sound decision-making. The words of US General H.H. Howse best describe the guiding advice we should issue whenever we conduct this level of training: "Don't do everything according to the book: look at your mission, see what you have to do it with, and then work out the most sensible (which may frequently be the most unusual and most audacious) way of doing it - and let fly. Use your brain, your imagination, your initiative¹⁸."

O'Leary suggests actual structures in peacetime means less than the freedom commanders should enjoy to reorganise their assets to match tactical requirements. TO&E are important to the extent that they determine the number of soldiers available to the commander and their armament. This applies from section up past brigade and also affects the attachment of support weapons.

Mechanisation, money and voluntary service system have all placed pressure on the military to make sections and platoons smaller – especially in the infantry who have been squeezed into vehicles with ever-fewer seats for dismounts. As it stands, even these seats are not always fully filled in battle as casualties, illness and other LoB causes decrease the number of boots on the ground. As a result, sections can become unviable after just one or two casualties. This means mission failure for the sections and platoons concerned and the diversion of other detachments from their assignments to take and hold the objective.

The debate also tends to overlook the need for redundancy in leaders. Section and platoon leaders have a notoriously short life-span in combat. Doctrinally, the platoon sergeant replaces the platoon commander and the deputy section leader the section leader. But who replaces them? The platoon sergeant is not only an alternative commander – he is primarily the platoon's “chief of logistics”, a vital function before, during and after the fight. The SA Army now has the space to take a leaf from the Reichswehr¹⁹ and build redundancy in leaders. This is more important than arguments about whether the 60mm mortar is a platoon or company weapon and where to situate the FT5.

¹⁸ General Hamilton H. Howse, *Howse on Training*, CONARC Board for Dynamic Training, Fort Benning, 1971.

¹⁹ The German military between World Wars I and II. Restricted to a strength of 100,000 by the Treaty of 1919 Versailles, a number deemed to small to defend the country's frontiers against serious attack, the Reichswehr heavily invested in leadership training, training all leaders to levels of competency two levels up. This training was abused by Nazi dictator Adolf Hitler to rapidly expand the military for aggressive reasons. But it did allow German sergeants to command companies and lieutenants battalions when war – and casualties – came.