

Chapter 5

Civilian oversight: The MoD and Defence Secretariat: mandate, activities and key personalities

It is well to remember that in a Parliamentary democracy, cabinet is meant to be merely an executive committee of the legislature. Ministers should therefore at all times be accountable to Parliament, which normally maintains a number of non-executive committees to supervise departmental policy and to hold the executive, both ministers and officials, accountable for spending as well as the achievement of set goals.

What is civil versus civilian oversight?

The debate regarding the difference between civil and civilian, or in clearer terms, the distinction between democratic civil control of the armed forces, in contrast to merely having a civilian in charge, is a new, yet important, one in the field of civil-military relations (CMR). For a long time it was assumed that making the military answerable to a civilian was the same as making the armed services democratically accountable. CMR is largely a post-World War Two phenomenon, yet from the start it seemed to escape them that nearly all the military leaders of that conflict were civilians. Hitler was an elected leader turned despot, as was Mussolini, as was Robert Mugabe – several times over. Stalin did not believe in elections unless he knew the outcome in advance, but he too was a civilian until 1943 when he gave himself military rank – a development Churchill copied.

In a recent paper¹ on CMR, Dr Anthony Foster, director of research at the Department of Defence Studies at King's College, London, as well as at the Joint Services Command and Staff College, argued that "questions concerning civilian control of the armed forces in the Cold War period emphasised 'civilian' rather than 'democratic' control of the military. 'Old' CMR were focussed on the threat of praetorian military intervention in domestic politics and the resultant need to enforce civilian executive control of the military. Rarely in the Cold War period was the concept of civilian control linked to notions of democratic control," he wrote. "For example membership of NATO was not conditional upon a particular form of Civil-Military Relations between 1949 and 1989. As Portugal and Turkey and Greece's membership attest, they have had experiences periods of military rule, with NATO membership unaffected. Being a member of the camp was more than a particular form of civil military relations within a state."

¹ Dr Anthony Foster, New Civil-Military Relations and its Research Agendas, Connections: The Quarterly Journal, Vol 1, No 2, April 2002, pp71-87, accessed October 11 2005, also <http://www.dcaf.ch/pfpc-ssr-wg/Meetings/forsterA%20New%20CMR%20final.pdf>, accessed September 9, 2005

South Africa has enjoyed civilian control of the military since 1994 when a Defence Secretariat with a civilian Secretary for Defence was re-established. There are some who argue that the time is now right to move to a more civil approach, giving greater oversight and powers to civil society in general and Parliament in particular.

What is the role of Parliament in defence oversight?

The 1996 Constitution gives Parliament a powerful voice in the direction of defence. In addition to its ordinary scrutiny of the defence force's finances as well as its policy and plans, it has a veto over the employment of the SANDF and declaration of a "state of national defence."

Governing principles

198. The following principles govern national security in the Republic:

- a. ...
- b. ...
- c. ...
- d. National security is subject to the authority of Parliament and the national executive.

Political responsibility

201. (1) ...

(2) ...

(3) When the defence force is employed for any purpose mentioned in subsection (2), the President must inform Parliament, promptly and in appropriate detail, of

- a. the reasons for the employment of the defence force;
- b. any place where the force is being employed;
- c. the number of people involved; and
- d. the period for which the force is expected to be employed.

(4) If Parliament does not sit during the first seven days after the defence force is employed as envisaged in subsection (2), the President must provide the information required in subsection (3) to the appropriate oversight committee.

State of national defence

203. (1) The President as head of the national executive may declare a state of national defence, and must inform Parliament promptly and in appropriate detail of

- a. the reasons for the declaration;

<p>b. any place where the defence force is being employed; and</p> <p>c. the number of people involved.</p> <p>(2) If Parliament is not sitting when a state of national defence is declared, the President must summon Parliament to an extraordinary sitting within seven days of the declaration.</p> <p>(3) A declaration of a state of national defence lapses unless it is approved by Parliament within seven days of the declaration.</p>

Table 5.1: What the 1996 Constitution says about Parliamentary oversight of defence

In theory, and by law, the executive is accountable to the legislature. There is, however, a disconnect between theory and practice, as have been discussed by numerous analysts and opposition politicians the past ten years – and as was briefly explained at the end of the previous chapter. In short, the flaw in the theory is that the members of legislature serve at the pleasure of the head of state, who is also the head of the majority party. It is not clear therefore how the committee – and Parliament as a whole, for that matter – will act (or fail to act) should it find itself at odds with the executive on a point raised by Table 5.1.

Another aspect of this problem is the extent to which the term “legislature” is appropriate to the South African Parliament. It certainly does have to enact Bills before the President can assent to them and they can come into operation as Acts of Parliament – but it seldom drafts them. (See Appendix 5A for details on the process). A Bill’s passage is also a foregone conclusion: the majority party’s more than two-control of the National Assembly, and the party leadership’s control over those members, ensure that. The visceral dislike by the majority party of the Official Opposition further weakens Parliamentary oversight. Bills are debated before being passed and portfolio committees (see below) are empowered to amend them. The concerns and amendments of the Official Opposition is, however, often ignored or dismissed, regardless of merit.

To their credit, the defence committees have nearly always acted in a collegial atmosphere and non-partisan manner. Members have also taken their role seriously and have asked tough questions, courageously made necessary amendments and, on many an occasion, referred Bills back to the DoD for redrafting. In fact, some Bills have been referred back several times before the committee would approve of them.

Which are the key committees? What are their mandate and activities?

Parliamentary oversight comes in two forms: There are portfolio committees that monitor particular departments and at least one that supervises government spending. In the case of defence, there is a Portfolio Committee on Defence (PCOD) in the National Assembly, and a statutory Joint Standing Committee on Defence. Overseeing government finances is the task of the Standing Committee on Public Accounts (SCOPA).

Most of the work of Parliament is done by committees, which is also where the public can best express their opinions directly to MPS and try to influence the outcome of Parliament's decisions.²

According to Parliament, the committees have one or more of the following functions: They -

- monitor and oversee the work of national government departments and hold them accountable,
- oversee the accounts of national government departments and state institutions,
- take care of domestic parliamentary issues,
- examine specific areas of public life or matters of public interest,
- consider bills and amend them, and may initiate bills,
- consider private members' and provincial legislative proposals and special petitions, and
- consider international treaties and agreements.

“Committees have the power to summon any person to appear before them, give evidence or produce documents, they may require any person or institution to report to them, and they may receive petitions, representations or submissions from the public. They play a crucial role in the lawmaking process,” Parliament says.

Portfolio Committees. “The National Assembly appoints from among its members a number of portfolio committees to shadow the work of the various national government departments. Each committee has between 17 and 19 full members, and a number of alternate members. Portfolio committees consider bills, deal with departmental budget votes, oversee the work of the department they are responsible for, and enquire and make recommendations about any aspect of the department, including its structure, functioning and policy. The work of committees is not restricted to government - they may investigate any matter of public interest that falls within their area of responsibility. There is a portfolio committee for each of the national ministries and their associated government departments. The National Council of Provinces (NCOP) appoints from its permanent members a number of select committees to shadow the work of the various national government departments and to deal with bills. Each committee has between 13 and 15 full members. Because the NCOP has only 54 permanent members compared to the National Assembly's 400, the select committees shadow the work of more than one national government department.

Public Accounts. The National Assembly's Standing Committee on Public Accounts (SCOPA) acts as Parliament's watchdog over the way taxpayers' money is spent by the executive. Every year the Auditor-General tables reports on the accounts and financial management of the various government departments and state institutions. Heads of these

² Fact sheet, Committees, www.parliament.gov.za, accessed September 8, 2005.

bodies are regularly called to account by this committee. The committee can recommend that the National Assembly takes corrective actions if necessary.

Joint Committees. The Joint Standing Committee on Intelligence and the Joint Standing Committee on Defence are statutory committees made up of members from both the National Assembly and the NCOP.

Who are the key personalities?

In both committees the people to watch are the chairs and the official opposition spokes types.

Portfolio Committee On Defence				
<u>Surname</u>	<u>First Names</u>	<u>Party</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Comment</u>
Tobias	Thandi Vivian	ANC	Chairwoman	
Booi	Mnyamezeli Shedrack	ANC	Member	
Burgess	Cecil Valentine	ANC	Member	
Chikunga	Lydia Sindiswe	ANC	Member	
Diale	Letsau Nelson	ANC	Member	
Dodovu	Thamsanqa Simon	ANC	Member	
Groenewald	Petrus Johannes	FF+	Member	FF+ spokesman
Koornhof	Gerhardus Willem	ANC	Member	
Makasi	Xoliswa Caroline	ANC	Member	
Mngomezulu	Garth Piet	ANC	Member	
Monareng	Oupa Ephraim	ANC	Member	
Ndlovu	Velaphi Bethuel	IFP	Member	
Ntuli	Somangamane Benjamin	ANC	Member	
Pheko	Salzwedel Ernest Motsuoko	PAC	Member	
Phungula	Johannes Phumani	ANC	Member	
Sayedali-Shah	Mohammed Rafeek	DA	Member	DA spokesman
Schmidt	Hendrik Cornelius	DA	Member	
Dlali	David Mtheteleli	ANC	Alternate	
Fihla	Nkosinathi Benson	ANC	Alternate	
Huang	Shiaan-Bin	ANC	Alternate	
Madasa	Zweletu Lukanyiso (Mighty)	ANC	Alternate	
Madikiza	George Tembela	UDM	Alternate	
Mncwango	Mangaqa Albert	IFP	Alternate	
Moatshe	Monako Stephen	ANC	Alternate	
<u>Committee staff:</u>				
Secretary	Gabriel Campher			
Private Secretary	Gadija Osman			

Table 5.2: The National Assembly's Portfolio Committee on Defence, as on October 19, 2005. Source: www.parliament.gov.za

Standing Committee on Public Accounts

<u>Surname</u>	<u>First Names</u>	<u>Party</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Comment</u>
Godi	Themba	PAC	Chairman	
Bhoola	Royith Baloo	MF	Member	
Dreyer	Anchen Margaretha	DA	Member	
Gerber	Pierre-Jeanne Alexander	ANC	Member	
Gumede	Donald Mlindwa	ANC	Member	
Koornhof	Gerhardus Willem	ANC	Member	
Mabe	Lorato Louisa	ANC	Member	
Madikiza	George Tembela	UDM	Member	
Meruti	Maseokwane Violet	ANC	Member	
Mofokeng	Tsokudu Ronald	ANC	Member	
Molefe	Christopher Thabo	ANC	Member	
Ndou	Ratshivhanda Samson	ANC	Member	
Smith	Vincent George	ANC	Member	
Tobias	Thandi Vivian	ANC	Member	
Trent	Edward William (Eddie)	DA	Member	
Woods	Gavin Gower	Nadeco	Member	
Arendse	Jonathan Doneley	ANC	Alternate	
Asiya	Spetho Enoch	ANC	Alternate	
Fubbs	Joanmariae Louise	ANC	Alternate	
Hogan	Barbara Anne	ANC	Alternate	
Vezi	Temba Ellis	IFP	Alternate	
Wang	Chris	ANC	Alternate	

Committee staff:

Secretary	Ntombi Madide
Assistant	Mfundo Vumazonke
Private Secretary	Xolelwa Mabindisa

Table 5.3: The National Assembly's Portfolio Committee on Defence, as on October 19, 2005. Source: www.parliament.gov.za

Hendrik Jacobus Bekker (Born 7 July 7, 1942 in Johannesburg) Bekker went to school in Ventersdorp and completed matric at Florida Afrikaans Medium High School. He obtained his B. Comm with majors in Economics, Business Economics, Mercantile and Company Law and Cost Accounting at Potchefstroom University. He is now a Fellow of the Chartered Institute of Business Management and a Fellow of the Chartered Institute of Secretaries. Bekker has now registered for a PhD in Corporate Governance. He completed his national service in the SADF and several "camps". He has been a Member of Parliament since 1987 and was a MPC for Transvaal from 1981. Bekker has also worked at Trust Bank, was Secretary and Treasurer of the SA Council for Professional Engineers and Administrator of the SA National Council for Child Welfare.

Themba Godi (Appointed October 2005) The Democratic Alliance opposed Godi's appointment as Scopa

chair, saying he had long been a proponent of the idea that the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania – which he represented in Parliament – should merge with the ruling ANC. The DA said it was difficult to escape the conclusion that Godi had been co-opted on to the Standing Committee - the key fiscal watchdog - because of his sympathies with the ruling party. "The nomination of Godi makes a mockery of the tradition that an opposition party MP should chair Scopa. By choosing its own candidate from the opposition benches, the ANC is able to choose an opposition MP that it knows will be compliant to its wishes. This is why the ANC chose Francois Beukman after Gavin Woods' resignation and why the ANC has chosen Godi to succeed Beukman. SCOPA is customarily chaired by an opposition party. After 1994 it was chaired by then-Democratic Party MP Ken Andrew. He was succeeded by Inkatha Freedom Party MP Gavin Woods, who was sacked, some would have it, for asking too many questions during the hearings on alleged corruption in the Strategic defence Package. He was first replaced with an ANC appointee and then Beukman. Beukman joined the ANC in September and vacated his post. Whether he is the "soft touch" the ANC wanted is in dispute. The Business Report newspaper's parliamentary correspondent, Michael Hamlyn in December 2006 remarked that he was one of Parliament's "best watchdogs," no mean compliment.³ "Since he took the seat, Scopa's reputation has rallied, and its work this year in calling accounting officers to book for their failures has been stellar. In 1987 Godi was in the news for leading the Bushbuckridge community in protests aimed at forcing government to incorporate the area into Mpumalanga from Limpopo. He had graduated from the University of the North at Turfloop in 1984 after studying teaching and became a teacher.

Somangamane Benjamin (Benji) Ntuli (Born July 28, 1962) was elected into the National Assembly in 1999. Ntuli was a co-founder of Soshanguve Youth Organisation in 1979 and graduated from the Hlangani Secondary School in Soshanguve in 1983. The following year he enrolled at the Transvaal College of Education for a Secondary Teacher's Diploma, graduating in 1986. He then briefly taught at the Memezelo Secondary School but was dismissed after three months for political activities as he in 1984 had joined the Azanian Student Organisation (later the SA National Student Congress and by then was organiser for the Western Transvaal region. Ntuli then returned to university, studying for a BA Degree at Vista University's Mamelodi Campus from mid 1987 to 1989. He, however, did not complete the degree. In the years 1991-2, Ntuli busied himself with political work, as a coordinator for the Soshanguve Residents Association, building civic and labour structures and dealing with community development issues as well as rental and services matters. In early 1993, he completed a Postgraduate Diploma in Public and Development Administration at Wits University's School for Public & Development Management. In December 1993, Ntuli left the country to receive military training in Zimbabwe. He completed a platoon commander's course (conventional warfare) at the Zimbabwe Military Academy in Harare. (Regimental number: ZA – 10356F) On his return, he was appointed national organiser of the SA Democratic Teachers Union, tasked with building union structures in the country's nine provinces. In June 1996 he joined the Khululekani Institute for Democracy as a constituency researcher. In 1997, he joined the Gauteng Department of Education as a Labour Relations Officer, serving in District N49. He held that post up to June 1999 when he was elected to the National Assembly. In 2002, he completed a Certificate in Economics and Public Finance at the University of South Africa. The next year he completed an Advanced Diploma in Economic Policy at the University of Western Cape (UWC) and in 2004 commenced studying for an Honours Degree at the UWC. In Parliament, he has served on the Portfolio Committee on Defence, Joint Standing Committee on Defence and Portfolio Committee on Education. Ntuli is married with two children.

Hendrik Cornelius Schmidt (born October 31, 1963), has been an MP since the 1999 general elections. Schmidt holds a B IURIS from Unisa, a LLB (Unisa) and a LLM (RAU) He is currently completing MPHIL in labour law at the University of Johannesburg. Schmidt completed his National Service during 1985/6 and served as an officer at 1 Parachute Battalion, rising to company second-in-command. Afterwards, he served as public prosecutor in the Johannesburg District and Regional Court to 1994 and at as Senior State Advocate at the Attorney General's office/Director of Public Prosecutions (Witwatersrand Local Division) from 1994 to 1999. During this time he was also elected a local councillor and served on

³ Michael Hamlyn, Ambitious careers tend to take off from the committee chair launch pad, Business Report, December 11, 2006, p2.

the Northern Metropolitan Local Council from 1995 to 1999. Schmidt is married with two sons. Hobbies and leisure activities include scuba diving, parachute jumping, jogging and cycling.

Table 5.4: Some pencil sketches of key personalities

What is the role of the minister and ministry of defence?

It is the task of the minister and ministry to provide political direction and supervision to his or her department. Their powers and functions are governed by the Constitution and the Public Finance Management Act. Some ministries, such as the DoD, include a deputy minister. Deputy ministers are not members of Cabinet.

Cabinet

91. (1) The Cabinet consists of the President, as head of the Cabinet, a Deputy President and Ministers.

(2) The President appoints the Deputy President and Ministers, assigns their powers and functions, and may dismiss them.

(3) The President -

- a. must select the Deputy President from among the members of the National Assembly;
- b. may select any number of Ministers from among the members of the Assembly; and
- c. may select no more than two Ministers from outside the Assembly.

(4) The President must appoint a member of the Cabinet to be the leader of government business in the National Assembly.

(5) The Deputy President must assist the President in the execution of the functions of government.

Accountability and responsibilities

92. (1) The Deputy President and Ministers are responsible for the powers and functions of the executive assigned to them by the President.

(2) Members of the Cabinet are accountable collectively and individually to Parliament for the exercise of their powers and the performance of their functions.

(3) Members of the Cabinet must -

- a. act in accordance with the Constitution; and
- b. provide Parliament with full and regular reports concerning matters under their control.

Deputy Ministers

93. The President may appoint Deputy Ministers from among the members of the National Assembly to assist the members of the Cabinet, and may dismiss them.

Table 5.1: The Constitution on cabinet ministers

Chapter 7 of the PFMA defines the responsibilities of Ministers, who are referred to as “executive authorities”.

Chapter 7

EXECUTIVE AUTHORITIES

Financial responsibilities of executive authorities

63. (1)(a) Executive authorities of departments must perform their statutory functions within the limits of the funds authorised for the relevant vote.

(b) In performing their statutory functions executive authorities must consider the monthly reports submitted to them in terms of section 39(2)(b) and 40(4)(c).

(2) The executive authority responsible for a public entity under the ownership control of the national executive must exercise that executive's ownership control powers to ensure that that public entity complies with this Act and the financial policies of that executive.

Executive directives having financial implications

64. (1) Any directive by an executive authority of a department to the accounting officer of the department having financial implications for the department must be in writing.

(2) If implementation of the directive is likely to result in unauthorised expenditure, the accounting officer will be responsible for any resulting unauthorised expenditure unless the accounting officer has informed the executive authority in writing of the likelihood of that unauthorised expenditure.

(3) Any decision of the executive authority to proceed with the implementation of the directive, and the reasons for the decision, must be in writing, and the accounting officer must promptly file a copy of this document with the National Treasury and the Auditor-General.

Tabling in legislatures

65. (1) The executive authority responsible for a department or public entity must table in the National Assembly.—

(a) the annual report and financial statements referred to in section 40(1)(d) or 55(1)(d) and the audit report on those statements, within one month after the accounting officer for the department or the accounting authority for the public entity received the audit report; and

(b) the findings of a disciplinary board, and any sanctions imposed by such a board, which heard a case of financial misconduct against an accounting officer or accounting authority in terms of section 81 or 83.

(2) If an executive authority fails to table, in accordance with subsection (1) (a), the annual report and financial statements of the department or the public entity, and the audit report on those statements, in the relevant legislature within six months after the end of the financial year to which those statements relate—

(a) the executive authority must table a written explanation in the legislature setting out the reasons why they were not tabled; and

(b) the Auditor-General may issue a special report on the delay.

Table 5.2: The PFMA responsibility of ministers.

What is the difference between the ministry and department of defence?

In the South African context a ministry is the minister's personal staff, a department his professional staff. The minister heads the ministry and a director-general (DG, a permanent secretary in British parlance) heads a department. In the case of the DoD, the DG is the Secretary for Defence. In terms of the Public Finance Management Act the secretary is also departmental accounting officer.

What is the mandate and activities of the MoD?

The end-state required from defence, in co-operation with other state departments is "effective defence for a democratic South Africa."⁴ "This outcome⁵ enhances national, regional and global security through the existence of defence capabilities that are balanced, modern, affordable and technologically advanced," the 2005/6 to 2007/8 Strategic Business Plan advises.

The Minister of Defence is responsible for the following objectives in order to ensure that the department's mission is achieved⁶:

- Defending and protecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic, as well as supporting its people, by maintaining cost-effective defence capabilities, in order to be prepared and equipped to participate in operations as ordered and funded by Government.
- Contributing to global security. This is done through the promotion of regional and continental security and Government diplomatic initiatives through regional defence co-operation and participation in peace missions.
- Ensuring good governance of the DOD through effective, efficient and economical management, administration and accounting within the regulatory framework and Government policy.
- Ensuring continuous improvement of defence capabilities by means of quality command and control, by developing the people and by improving the equipment and facilities of the DOD.
- Implementing the "One-force Concept" by adequately resourcing and utilising both the regulars and the reserves, as well as by rejuvenating and rightsizing the human resource composition of the DOD.

Who are the key personalities?

The key personalities are the Minister of Defence Mosiuoa Gerard Patrick Lekota and Deputy Minister of Defence.

⁴ DoD, Strategic Business Plan FY2005/6 to FY2007/8, DoD, Pretoria, 2005, p3; available online at www.mil.za.

⁵ Outcomes are defined by the National Treasury as "the end result that government wants to achieve and refer particularly to changes in the general state of well-being in the community."

⁶ Strategic Business Plan, p3.

Mosiuo Gerard Patrick Lekota

- Date of Birth: August 13, 1948, Senekal, Free State Province.
- Marital Status: Married, three children.

Current Position

- Minister of Defence of the Republic of South Africa since June 17, 1999.

Academic Qualifications

- Primary education at Emma Farm School.
- Secondary education at Mariazel, Matatiele (Standard 8).
- Matriculated at St Francis College, Marianhill (1969).
- Enrolled for a Social Science degree, University of the North (now Limpopo). Expelled due to Student Representative Council and South African Student's Organisation (SASO) activities (1972).

Career/Positions/Memberships/Other Activities

- Permanent Organiser for SASO (1974-1975).
- Imprisoned at Robben Island Prison for conspiring to commit acts endangering the maintenance of law and order (1974-1982).
- Elected Publicity Secretary for the United Democratic Front (1983).
- Contributed to the publication of the book titled, '30 years of the Freedom Charter' (1985).
- Detained and sentenced in the Delmas treason trial (1985).
- Released after the Appeal Court reviewed the sentence (1989).
- Convenor of the ANC in Southern Natal (1990).
- Elected to the ANC National Executive Committee and its National Working Committee.
- Served as ANC Chief of Intelligence (1991).
- Elected Secretary for ANC Election Commission (1992).
- Premier of the Free State Provincial government (1994-1996).
- Chairman of the National Council of Provinces (February 1997-June 1999).
- National Chairperson of the ANC (December 1997 to date).

Research and Publications

- Author of "Prison Letters to my Daughter".

Mosiuo Gerard Patrick Lekota is currently African National Congress chairman (since 1997) and Defence Minister. He is also a member of the ANC's national executive committee (NEC) and national working committee (NWC).

He was born at Emma in the Free State district of Senekal on August 13, 1948, the eldest of seven children in a working-class family. He did his schooling mainly in Kroonstad, but matriculated from St Francis College, Mariannhill, in KwaZulu-Natal in 1969. Black consciousness leader Steve Biko had passed through this school just a few years earlier.

Lekota entered the University of the North in 1971 to study social sciences. Here he became involved in the SA Students' Organisation (SASO), and when SASO's full-time organiser Abraham Tiro had to flee the country to go into exile in 1973, Lekota took his place. In September 1974, when SASO began to organise pro-Frelimo rallies to celebrate the independence of Mozambique, Lekota and eight other black consciousness leaders, including Saths Cooper and Strini Moodley, were charged under the Terrorism Act. Following a 17-month trial he was found guilty of conspiring to commit acts capable of endangering the maintenance of law and order and sentenced to six years on Robben Island. He was freed in 1982, and the following year became national publicity secretary for the United Democratic Front at its launch in August

1983.

He was detained shortly before the 1984 tricameral elections, and again in 1985 when he and 21 others were charged with high treason relating to civil disturbances in the then Vaal Triangle. They were alleged to have conspired with each other, the ANC and the SA Communist Party to promote unrest to overthrow the government by revolutionary means. He and four co-accused were convicted in November 1988, but the convictions and Lekota's 12-year sentence were overturned on appeal.

After the ANC was unbanned in February 1990, Lekota spent time as chairman of the Southern Natal region, then chairman of the Northern Free State region. He was elected on to the NEC in 1991. From 1994 until 1996 Lekota was the first Premier of the Free State province. He was chosen to be the first Chairman of the new National Council of Provinces when it convened in February 1997. After the second democratic elections, June 1999, he was appointed Minister of Defence, and re-appointed to that position after the 2004 elections. Lekota has played a significant role on behalf of the South African government in peace-making and peace-keeping processes on the African continent, including Burundi, Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Ivory Coast. He is married and had three children.

Sapa

Table 5.3: Defence Minister Lekota's biography

Mluleki Editor George

- Date of Birth: February 2, 1948
- Marital Status: Married

Current Positions

- Deputy Minister of Defence of the Republic of South Africa since April 29, 2004.

Academic Qualifications

- Matriculated at Nathaniel Nyaluza High School, Grahamstown.
- Passed 9 Bachelor of Arts courses at University of South Africa (UNISA).
- Passed 7 Bachelor of Commerce courses at Rhodes University.

Career/Positions/Memberships/Other Activities

- Member of Parliament in the National Assembly (1994-).
- Chairman of Portfolio Committee and African National Congress study group on Safety and Security.
- Alternate member of Portfolio Committees on Minerals and Energy, Correctional Services and Intelligence.
- Appointed as board member of South African Rugby Union (2003).
- Chairman of ANC East London/KWT Region (1996-1999).
- Member of the International Rugby Board (1994-1997).
- Vice President of South African Rugby Football Union (SARFU) (1993-1998).
- President of National Sports Council and United Border Rugby Union (1991-2001).
- Director Human Resources Department, Kei Brick (1990-1994).
- Executive member of SACP Border Region (1990).
- Executive member of National Olympic Committee of South Africa (NOCSA) (1989).

- Founder member of National Sports Council (1988).
- President of Rugby Union with Border South African Rugby Board (1986-1991).
- President of UDF Border Region (1986).
- President of King Central and Districts (1984-1986).
- Manager at Kei Brick (1983-1990).
- Worked for the SA Communist Party (1984).
- Involved in the formation of United Democratic Front (UDF) (1983).
- Arrested and sentenced to five years in Robben Island (1978).
- President of Border Rugby Union until arrested (1976).
- Secretary of KADRU (1973).
- Employed by Ciskei Government as procurement officer (1972-1978).
- Joined the ANC (1972).

Table 5.4: Deputy Defence Minister George’s biography

Why is there a Defence Secretariat?

The Defence Secretariat was re-established in 1994 to ensure the subordination of the SANDF to democratic civil authority. A previous Defence Secretariat was abolished in 1966 when the Chief of the SANDF (then Commandant General of the SADF) also became department head and accounting officer. The militarisation of the DoD was accentuated in the aftermath of a 1977 White Paper that led to the “securicratisation” of the then-government as “Total Strategy” was devised to defeat “Total Onslaught”. PW Botha, then defence minister, and his advisors, believed South Africa was under attack from all sides by the Soviet Union through its proxies, including the African National Congress and the country’s black neighbours, then called the Frontline States. Botha’s answer, which took the military into all aspects of South African life, brought South Africa to the brink of disaster and military dictatorship – an experience most South Africans are keen to prevent the repetition of.

What is the role and function of the Defence Secretary?

In terms of section of 8 of the Defence Act, the Secretary for Defence is

- Head of Department as contemplated in the Public Service Act and the Accounting Officer for the Department as contemplated in section 36 of the Public Finance Management Act, 1999;
- the principal departmental adviser to the Minister of Defence on defence policy matters;
- the one to advise the Minister on any matter referred to the Secretary for Defence by the Minister;
- the one to perform any function entrusted by the Minister to the Secretary for Defence, in particular those necessary or expedient to enhance civil control by
 - Parliament over the DOD;
 - Parliamentary committees having oversight over the DOD; and
 - the Minister over the DOD;

- the one to provide the SANDF with comprehensive instructions regarding the exercising of any power delegated or the performance of any duty assigned to members by the Secretary for Defence as Head of Department and Accounting Officer of the DOD;
- the one to monitor compliance with policies and directions issued by the Minister of Defence to the SANDF and reports thereon to the Minister; and
- the one to ensure discipline of, administrative control over and management of employees, including their effective utilisation and training.
- The one to ensure, in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution, the Public Finance Management Act (PFMA) and Treasury Regulations, that
 - the system of financial management and internal control established for the DOD is carried out within the SANDF;
 - the resources of the SANDF are used efficiently, effectively, economically and transparently;
 - the management and safeguarding of assets within the SANDF are regulated; and
 - over- and underspending and unauthorised, irregular, fruitless and wasteful expenditure do not occur.

During the apartheid era the Department of Defence was militarised, with most of its functions being performed by the Defence Headquarters. In the interests of entrenching democratic civil-military relations, the Defence Act provides for a Department of Defence which comprises the SANDF and a civilian Defence Secretariat.

The Minister of Defence is responsible for the defence function of government and is accountable to the President, the Cabinet and Parliament for the management and execution of this function. The Minister constitutes the civilian authority on military matters on behalf of Cabinet.

The minister Directs and controls performance of the defence function through, inter alia, the statutory Council on Defence. The Chief of the SANDF and the Secretary for Defence serve on this body. They have equal status under the Minister, and serve as co-chairpersons of the Defence Staff Council which tenders advice to the Minister.

The respective statutory powers and functions of the Chief of the SANDF and the Secretary for Defence are governed by the Defence Act of 2002.

The Secretary for Defence manages the Secretariat and will be the accounting officer of the DOD. He/She is the principal advisor to the Minister regarding defence policy and matters which may be investigated by the Joint Standing Committee on Defence. The Secretary will perform such duties and functions as may be necessary for democratic and civilian management of the defence function and to enhance parliamentary and Ministerial control over the SANDF. The Secretary will monitor compliance with directions issued to the Chief of the SANDF by the President or the Minister.

The Chief of the SANDF executes defence policy, directs the work of Defence Headquarters and manages the overall functioning and operations of the Defence Force. He/She is the principal adviser to the Minister on military, operational and administrative matters within his/her competence.

In determining the respective functions of the Secretariat and Defence Headquarters, there are two basic guidelines. Firstly civilians formulate defence policy and the military executes this policy. Secondly, civilians are responsible for the political dimensions of defence. This breakdown does not prevent military

officers from contributing to policy formulation on the basis of their functional expertise.

It is intended that a large number of posts, of which the greater number will be the Financial Section, will be transferred from defence Headquarters to the Secretariat.

The minister aims to staff these posts predominantly with civilians. The composition of the Secretariat will be broadly representative of the racial and gender composition of South African society. This will be achieved through selective recruitment, accelerated training, civilianisation of present incumbents and lateral entry. Senior military officers are not precluded from being seconded to work in the secretariat on the basis of their functional expertise.

Table 5.5: The Defence Secretariat explaining itself. Source: www.defsec.mil.za, accessed September 14, 2005.

What are the Defence Secretariat's current strategic guidelines?

The Strategic Business Plan decrees that the DoD has to align itself with tasks related to promoting collective security in the region and on the continent, namely:

- To prioritise all the existing Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) and to develop and effect a Foreign Military Co-operation Plan in line with Government (Department of Foreign Affairs) priorities.
- To ensure that current peace mission tasks/responsibilities are sustained until further notice. This includes conflict resolution activities in Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).
- To assist/participate in post-conflict reconstruction activities in Angola, Burundi and the DRC.
- In the process of strengthening the multilateral organisations, such as the United Nations (UN) and especially the African Union (AU) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) safety and security structures, the Department should ensure that it is represented in such a manner that strategic positioning is achieved.
- To become actively involved in the creation of an early warning system that will assist Government initiatives to prevent and reduce potential conflicts.
- To continue our participation in the development of the African Standby Force, including the identification and preparation of force structure elements (light mobile elements) for contribution to the Southern African Standby Force.
- To develop common doctrine and enhance interoperability with our African, especially Southern African, allies. This emphasises the need for multinational training exercises, the exchange of military intelligence, sharing of experiences concerning civil-military relations and Education, Training and Development (ETD) opportunities.
- To integrate all New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) projects in which the DOD is involved with those of the SADC region.
- To create a nodal point within the Department through which the activities for the region can be effectively and efficiently co-ordinated.

The Strategic Plan next argues that military capabilities required for promoting security in the region must be planned over the short to medium term (including financial support). “The specific challenge is to meet the demands and risks of peace-support operations, but not if it entails the loss of capability. The SANDF must complete its phased withdrawal from internal involvement/operations in support of the South African Police Service (SAPS) by April 2009. As internal involvement decreases the focus on promoting collective security (multinational) must increase.”

The document attaches priority to the completion of an extensive logistical audit of all Commando (territorial reserve) units, with specific focus on the accounting of firearms, armament, and radios, “as it poses serious implications for security and promotes fraudulent activities”. The DoD is further instructed to continue to support government in “strengthening of the international framework on specific global security issues such as terrorism.” As such, DoD planning must work within a broad security context, which includes the security of ports, installations at sea (such as oil and gas platforms) and protection of assets in the country’s offshore Exclusive Economic Zone. “Cognisance must be taken of the extended continental shelf zone. The DoD must prioritise and co-ordinate its international bilateral/multilateral obligations and align existing policy and structures to meet the NEPAD challenges and goals. An effective, efficient and credible resources management system must be institutionalised at all levels,” the Strategic Plan admonishes. The management of DoD resources, it says, requires that the following be achieved:

- To fully implement Human Resources Strategy 2010.
- The DoD Human Resources Development Plan has to be developed and be in line with the requirements of the Human Resources Development Committee of government, which will be monitoring it annually.
- Succession planning to ensure representativity and the maintenance of skills are a key area and a top priority that must be incorporated into all plans.
- To ensure that military equipment is sustained and that redundant equipment, ammunition and spares are disposed of.
- To maintain a dedicated programme that will bring the equipment of the DoD to an acceptable combat-ready level for deployment, especially for external deployment⁷.
- To ensure that the DoD's information infrastructure provides appropriate command and management information and is fully integrated and aligned with the Cabinet's "Executive Information Management System".
- To migrate the Service Corps to become a national asset outside the DOD.
- The disposal plant for ammunition should aim to be operational by FY2005/06. Planning is to be based primarily on obtaining donor funds.
- To ensure compliance with national legislation, especially with regard to facilities in terms of occupational health, safety and disability. However, certain exemptions may have to be sought under the Occupational Health and Safety Act.

⁷ Does this imply this was not the case at the time of writing?

The Strategic Business Plan then advises that the DOD needs to look at nation-building projects (such as participation in sports) that it can launch as part of the SANDF's ordered commitments to assist in transforming society. "The transformation of military legal structures must continue. The transformation imperatives of "Representativity and Equal Opportunity" are confirmed as valid. Implementation is to be afforded a high priority throughout the DoD and must be included for the Strategic Defence Packages." The following must be achieved with regard to the Strategic Defence Packages:

- Ensure that the new equipment is fully integrated and functional according to SANDF doctrine over time.
- Ensure that the new equipment is employed expediently and in such a manner that safety and security are enhanced in the region.
- Ensure that representativity is achieved in the training for the new equipment.

Turning to resources allocation, the Strategic business Plan determines that defence capabilities "with a high readiness state, capable of all commitments, must be provided. These capabilities include the total of four to six light infantry battalions that are required. This is essential to guarantee our participation in peace missions and our responsibilities in terms of the African Standby Force. To achieve this the department's planning should be based on the following in terms of resources allocation: A final establishment of 70,000 DOD personnel by 2005/06 excluding the Military Skills Development (MSD) members of which the size will be determined by the additional funds provided by government."

Looking further ahead, the Strategic Business Plan advises that over the next decade the DoD will focus on acquiring the optimal level of competency, technology and organisational structure allowed for by the MTEF allocation. Over the medium term, the strategic focus of the DoD will be

- to create an affordable and sustainable force design and structure;
- to introduce the new weapon systems into operation, bearing in mind the challenges posed by its cost and complexity;
- to meet the DoD's approved and funded obligations;
- to provide support for government's diplomatic initiatives in Africa;
- to promote regional security in the form of peace missions, including post-conflict reconstruction; and
- to reduce systematically the SANDF's internal deployments, which are to be completed by April 1, 2009 (in other words, disband the commandos and their support structure).

The short-term focus of the DOD will be on

- preparing defence capabilities;
- employing defence capabilities to meet operations and commitments ordered by government; and
- the restructuring of the DOD.

How is the Defence Secretariat organised?

Answering to the Secretary for Defence is a number of divisions and directorates (See




Table 5.6).

Table 5.6: Organogram: Defence Secretariat. Source: www.defsec.mil.za, accessed September 14, 2005.

What is the mandate and activities of the Defence Secretariat?

The mandate of the Defence Secretariat as an entity is to provide departmental direction to the DoD “that ensures the effective, efficient and proper conduct of defence activities in accordance with legislation and policy”⁸.

Vision: Excellence in governance to ensure efficient and effective defence delivery.

Mission: The Secretary for Defence directs specified managerial, administrative and advisory services to achieve the ends of the Defence Strategy and to enhance and effect the MOD’s capacity for civil control.

Mandates:

Finance Division: To provide a cost effective public finance service to the DoD in accordance with the Public Finance Management Act, Treasury Regulations and circulars.

Policy & Planning Division: To advise on national security policy matters and co-ordinate the strategic direction process for the DoD by developing, formulating, monitoring and adapting defence policy, strategy and plans in accordance with national policy to enable the effective, efficient and proper conduct of defence activities.

Acquisition & Procurement Division: To manage the DoD acquisition process and formulate acquisition policy.

⁸ DoD, Promotion of Access to Information Act Manual for the DoD, DoD, Pretoria, 2005.

Defence Inspectorate: To ensure the validity and veracity of the management of the DoD.

Equal Opportunities & Affirmative Action Chief Directorate: To provide equal opportunities and affirmative action advice to the DoD.

Who are its key personalities?

The key personalities within the Defence Secretariat are the Defence Secretary, the chiefs of Finance, Policy & Planning and Acquisition & Procurement, the Inspector General and the Chief Director of Equal Opportunities & Affirmative Action.

- Defence Secretary: DG January B Masilela
- Chief Finance Officer: DDG Jack L Grundling
- Chief of Policy & Planning: DDG TE Motumi
- Chief of Acquisition & Procurement: DDG BE Ramfolo

January Boy Masilela

Mr Masilela was born in Mpumalanga, South Africa where he grew up and did his secondary school education until he left the country for exile. While in exile he trained in Lybia, Soviet Union, Germany Democratic Republic and Cuba. He was a Commissar (Deputy Commander) in the Umkhonto WeSizwe Head Quarters in Angola and Chairman of Regional Political Military Council in Botswana. On returning from exile he held the following senior positions: 1994-1997, Member of the Executive Council (MEC) Local Government; 1997-1999, Member of the Executive Council (MEC) Department of Agriculture and 1999 Member of the Executive Council (MEC) Department of Agriculture, Conservation & Environment until he was appointed as the Secretary for Defence/Director-General.

His term was extended for a further two years by Cabinet decision on October 24, 2007.

He received his Diploma in Social Sciences from Moscow Institute of Social Sciences and did the Senior Management Programme at the University of Pretoria. He has successfully done a number of military school courses among them Basic Infantry Course, Senior Instructor's course, Commanders Course and Military and Combat work.

In 1981 he was part of the African National Congress Military Mission to German Democratic Republic. He accompanied the late O.R. Tambo to Algeria in 1985 as the Chief Military Advisor. In 1986 he was a member of the Military Advisory Team of the Military Delegation that was led by J. Slovo to USSR.

In 1995 and 1996 he was a member of the government delegation that visited Taiwan and Canada on a Trade and Investment Mission respectively. He was the leader of the delegation that visited Bulgaria and Portugal on a Trade and Investment Mission in 1997. In 1998 he visited the People's Republic of China

on Trade and Investment Mission.

As the Head of Department for Defence he has played an instrumental role in the signing of International Agreements in and outside the borders of the Republic of South Africa.

Mr Masilela is married and he has six children.

Table 5.7: Secretary for Defence Masilela's biography

Major General Mattheüs Johannes Du Toit, MMM

Major General Matie du Toit was born in Cape Town in July 1956 and matriculated from the Outeniqua High School in George in 1973. He has studied at the University of South Africa and received his Masters degree in Information Technology from the University of Pretoria in September 2001. He is currently reading for a PhD in Strategic Information Management, focusing on Strategic ICT Planning in Diversified Organisations. He has also completed functional training courses in the SANDF as well as staff training with the completion of the Air Force Senior Command and Staff Course in 1989 and the Joint Staff Course in 1995.

Major General Du Toit has received various medals for good service, the highest of which is the Military Merit Medal, as well as campaign medals. These were obtained for service in the SA Air Force, the Ciskei Defence Force, to which he was seconded for a period of three years, and the SANDF.

Major General du Toit started his career as a logistician in the SA Air Force and gained experience in areas including procurement, general logistics and general staff functions. In addition to this he also served as the Chief of Staff Logistics for the Ciskei Defence Force during his secondment (1990–1993). Since 1993 he has been involved in the IT environment on a full time basis and has gained experience in the planning and acquisition of IT systems for the SA Air Force. Major General Du Toit was directly involved in the establishment of the CMIS Division as part of the initial transformation initiative of the DOD. In 1999 he was appointed as the Director Enterprise Information Systems Architecture (D EISA) within the CMIS Division and was responsible for the information system architecture, which enables the DOD to manage its information system requirement in accordance with the approved business definition. In December 2002 he was appointed as the Second-in-Command of the CMIS Division in the post of Director Divisional Staff (D DS). On 1 January 2005 he was appointed as the Government Information Technology Officer (GITO) for the DOD. He is currently responsible for Strategic Information Systems Management for the Department of Defence at corporate level.

Major General Du Toit is a member of the Defence Staff Council and Defence Secretary Board. He is the Chairperson of the CMIS Staff Council as well as the DOD/SITA Board. He also represents the DOD on the interdepartmental GITO Council. In addition to this he serves as a full member of the Defence Programme and Budget Evaluation Committee.

Major General du Toit enjoys fly-fishing, golf and Formula 1 motor racing and is not married.

Table 5.8: GITO MG Du Toit's biography

Jack L Gründling was born on October 12, 1946. He graduated from High School in Pietermaritzburg in 1963 and then joined the SA Air Force. In 1967 he obtained a B Mil degree in aeronautics and geography from the University of Stellenbosch. His air force career began in earnest in 1968. Until his demilitarisation

in 1995, he served as a flying instructor, combat instructor, fighter pilot, military aide de camp to the state president, commanded a fighter squadron and then an air base and was promoted a strategic planner.

In 1991 Gründling obtained a Master of Business Leadership from the University of SA. This came in handy in 1995 when he joined the newly re-established Defence Secretariat as Acting Chief Director, Defence Policy. In November, that year, he was appointed Chief Director Programming and Budgeting. This post subsequently became that of CFO and Gründling was promoted DDG.

Table 5.9: CFO Jack Gründling's biography

Chief of Policy & Planning/Deputy Director-General Mr Tsepe E. Motumi

Tsepe Motumi was born in Soweto (WHEN?) and matriculated at Lobone High School. He furthered his education and attained the Bachelor of Arts Degree in Social Science at the University of Witwatersrand, the Bachelor of Arts (Honours) Degree in Strategic Studies at University of South Africa and the Masters of Management Degree at the University of Witwatersrand. He has also written and published three chapters to different books as well as authored several articles in journal publications.

Over period of 1985-1990, Motumi served as a fulltime functionary of the ANC and uMkhonto we Sizwe in various capacities, including Underground Section of the Internal Political Committee (IPC) of the Politico-Military Council (PMC). He underwent military training in Angola in 1985 and 1986 and in the former Soviet Union in 1988 and 1989. Whilst studying as a full time student at the University of Witwatersrand over the period 1991-1993, he was also employed on a part-time basis by Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA), the Congress of South Africa Trade Unions (COSATU) and Department of Education and Training (DET). He graduated with a BA degree in politics, sociology and anthropology. A period of research on behalf of Transnet, the state transport utility, followed. In 1993 he was part of a project researching the social integration of returning exiles.

During the period 1993-19965, he was employed as a researcher in military sociology at the Institute for Defence (now known as Institute for Security Studies). During 1994 he was an exchange Senior Research Fellow in War Studies at King's College, London. In early 1996 he accepted an appointment in the Department of Defence as a Director Human Resources Policy. From May 1995 he was promoted to the position of Chief Director Defence Policy and during February 2000, over and above his responsibilities coupled to the latter post, he was appointed the as the Acting Chief of Policy and Planning of the Department. He was appointed as the Chief of Policy and Planning and promoted to the Deputy Director General with effect from 1 November 2001.

Motumi is married with two children and keeps himself physically and mentally fit by jogging/gym.

Table 5.10: Chief of Policy & Planning Motumi's biography

Table 5.11: Chief of Acquisition & Procurement:

Table 5.12: Defence Inspector General:

Table 5.13: Chief Directorate Equal Opportunities & Affirmative Action

Elaborate on the activities of the Finance Management Division




Table 5.14: Organogram: Finance Division. Source: www.mil.za, accessed, April 5, 2005.

The Financial Management Division (FMD) has as its divisional core objective the provision of a cost-effective public finance management service to the Minister of Defence, Secretary for Defence and the Chief of the South African National Defence Force (C SANDF) in accordance with the Public Finance Management Act (PFMA), Treasury Regulations, practice notes and circulars. In short, FMD wishes to see the defence function performed economically, efficiently, effectively and ethically through the pursuit of financial management excellence.

In the period immediately after the PFMA was enacted in 1999, the main focus of the division was to refine departmental processes and systems related to resource management with a view to aligning them with the new regulatory framework. From 2001 the emphasis moved to resource management aspects other than the management information systems. From FY2003/4 the focus moved to the implementation of Generally Recognised Accounting Practices (GRAP).

Vision: The FMD is the source of financial management excellence in the DOD⁹.

Mission. To provide a cost-effective financial management service to the Minister of Defence, Secretary for Defence and the Chief of the SA National Defence Force within the evolving regulatory framework by means of a professional representative civilian financial management corps and an appropriate financial management system.

Elaborate on the activities of the Policy and Planning Division

⁹ Many thanks to the Chief Directorate Corporate Communications. Wording provided on September 21, 2005.




Table 5.15: Organogram: Policy and Planning Division. Source: www.ppdiv.defsec.mil.za, accessed September 14, 2005.

“Policy and Planning Division strives to achieve the highest standards of professionalism by adhering to scientific principles in formulating policy and policy advice. This is based on the premise that the division’s capacity is at its maximal point. To this end its approach is rooted in dynamic and consultative decision-making processes,” the division says of its strategy on its website¹⁰.

Vision: Excellence in Defence policy and planning¹¹.

Mission, Core Objectives & Aim: To provide defence policy, strategy, plans, instructions and structure management for the DoD that are fully aligned with government policy and defence needs of South Africa. This is achieved by means of a fully representative team of appropriately skilled people and technology.

The main objectives of the Policy & Planning Division are as follows¹²:

- Divisional Direction. To provide strategic direction to the Policy and Planning Division.
- Strategic Management. To provide strategic management services to the Head of Department (HoD) through professional staff work in order to enhance the effectiveness, efficiency, economy and image of the DoD.

¹⁰ www.ppdiv.defsec.mil.za, accessed September 14, 2005.

¹¹ ditto

¹² ditto

- Defence Policy. To formulate and manage defence policy in alignment with government policy.
- HR Policy and Plan. To provide an accountable, effective, efficient and economical DoD Human Resource Policy and Planning service to meet organisational and individual needs.
- Conventional Arms Control. To administer the regulation and control over the manufacture and transfer of conventional armaments in accordance with the provisions of the Conventional Arms Control Act as determined by the National Conventional Arms Control Committee.
- Legal Advice and Support. To provide efficient, professional legal advice and support to the Ministry and DoD.
- Support Section. To provide administrative, personnel management and logistical support to Policy and Planning Division.

As a sub-programme of Defence Administration Programme, Policy and Planning Division strives to achieve the highest standards of professionalism by adhering to scientific principles in formulating policy and policy advice. This is based on the premise that the Division's capacity is at its maximal point. To this end its approach is rooted in dynamic and consultative decision-making processes.

The Division's strategy is rooted in the following key tenets¹³:

- Client Focus. "As a 'service' division, it is crucial that Policy and Planning Division has to expand and cement its close relations with clients with a view to ensuring continued quality service. In this respect it will consult during all policy formulation and strategic planning processes in order to ensure the requirements of client Divisions and Services are incorporated."
- Service Orientation. "The division acts as a conduit between the government, the executive authority (minister), accounting officer (Secretary for Defence), the Services and other divisions. This requires that all members act professionally and are responsive to the needs of higher authority, whilst at all times ensuring that staff work is done meticulously and timelessly."
- Skills Development. "The division subscribes to the imperatives of human resource development as required by national legislation and departmental policy. There is a constant need for the divisional staff to acquire formal and informal training, and to be given as much exposure as possible to other divisions and to best practice in other defence establishments and other structures performing similar duties. Short and focused competency-enhancement courses presented by academic and statutory institutions will be optimally utilised."
- Capacity Improvement. "There is a serious gap between the approved structure and the minimum acceptable number of posts filled. Since this gap impacts negatively on the quality of service provided by the division, a concerted effort will be made to prioritise posts. The lack of funds for the Policy and Planning Division's unfilled

¹³ ditto

critical posts hampers the efforts of capacity improvement. However, the DPBEC process will also be used to provide guidelines on this matter.”

- Expansion of the ‘Knowledge’ Base. “The knowledge required for developing, managing, monitoring and assessing policies and strategies in order to direct the activities of the DoD, and to provide meaningful advice to government, is derived from a variety of sources. It is therefore essential that members of the division continuously strive to develop and broaden their knowledge base through, inter alia, networking in the fields in which they are required to develop policies for the DoD. Continuous liaison with and exposure to the foreign defence establishments and defence-related NGOs is therefore crucial.”
- Optimal Use of Technology. “Information technology will be used as an enabler to manage the development, configuration and distribution of DoD policies. In order to ensure that DoD policies have the intended impact, policies must be user-friendly, current and accessible to the lowest levels. This implies a major short-term investment in people, technology and its licenses so as to ensure that substantial medium- and long-term savings can be achieved in accordance with the principles formulated during the transformation process.”
- Promotion of and Linkage with the Military Strategic Objectives. “In its interaction with internal and particularly external clients, the division shall strive to ensure that it contributes directly towards the achievement of the military strategic objectives as captured in the Military Strategy. Thus, in respect of military strategic objectives, the following will be done:
 - To enhance and maintain comprehensive defence capabilities. Policies and policy advice related to ensuring that the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of the country are not violated, will be refined to ensure that the Military Strategy is successfully implemented.
 - To promote peace, security and stability in the region and the continent. Processes for ensuring speedy and sustainable deployment of the SANDF in peace missions shall be expedited. All MoUs shall demonstrate direct benefit for the SANDF and the DoD at large. Strategic participation in regional organisations such as the African Union (AU) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) structures including the Inter-State Defence and Security Council shall be ensured. Promotion and continued participation in programmes related to the New Partnership for Africa’s Development Programme (NEPAD) shall be enhanced.
 - Supporting the people of South Africa. Despite the fact that the SANDF will be withdrawing gradually from routine support of the South African Police Service (SAPS) by March 2009, the division will continue to interact with related external clients, especially the parliamentary committees on defence, in order to ensure that this does not result in policy and security vacuum and loss of strategic support from the populace. In future (effective April 2009), SANDF support to the SAPS will be intelligence-driven. Similarly, processes for ensuring speedy and sustainable deployment of the SANDF in support of SAPS, when required, will also be refined.

Elaborate on the activities of the Departmental Acquisition and Procurement Division

The principal task of the Departmental Acquisition and Procurement Division (DAPD) is to acquire material and services for the DOD through its acquisition agency, the Armaments Corporation of South Africa (ARMSCOR) as prescribed in the DOD policies and the Defence Review, 1998.¹⁴

Reporting directly to and being accountable to the Secretary for Defence, DAPD strives to support the vision, mission and corporate values of the DOD as well as its broad strategies, programmes and objectives for good governance. In order for the Secretary for Defence to fulfil the task of Accounting Officer of the DOD, DAPD was assigned as the nodal point for all interactions between DOD and ARMSCOR, including bilateral ties with foreign countries. In support of the above-mentioned functions, the SANDF must ensure its future in armament support capability through meaningful technology development. The ability to do local design development must be maintained to ensure that DAPD and ARMSCOR remain knowledgeable buyers in weapon system fields. A minimum capacity to do systems integration should also be maintained in local industry. The Division is furthermore ultimately responsible to all clients for the functionality of systems that are delivered via the acquisition process.

Vision: The DAPD satisfies the DoD's materiel requirements every time on time and in good time.

Mission: To acquire the end user's specified materiel in an innovative and cost effective way, within the freedom provided by the prescribed policy process.

Goal: To provide the DoD with the materiel capabilities necessary for the SANDF to defend and protect the RSA and its people.

National and Departmental Policy: Acquisition and procurement in the DoD are regulated by the Defence Review, 1998, Chapter 13, as well as the Policy on the Acquisition of Armaments.

¹⁴ DoD, Annual Report, FY2003/4, available online at www.dod.mil.za




Table 5.16: Organogram: DAPD

Armament Acquisition: “Within the framework of defence management, the acquisition function satisfies the need to provide armaments to the SANDF. Defence management seeks the optimum combinations of personnel and equipment which will provide the maximum defence capability for available funds. A structured decision-making and authorisation process for the acquisition of armaments by means of baseline management and consequent phased contracting is followed, resulting in transparency and accountability. The armament acquisition process is fundamentally a system engineering process, requiring good project management. Technology development and industrial development are closely related to armament acquisition and are therefore part of the overall acquisition process. The model used for structuring the armament acquisition management process allows for sequential and parallel phases separated by formalised baselines. Underlying the above phased approach is the systems engineering process. This process systematically translates functional needs stated by the operational user into technical design and manufacturing parameters. It also ensures that, parallel to the functional process, all other stakeholders and interest groups are kept involved. This process is managed by appointed project teams, representing all members of the DoD and Armscor. A project team is responsible for the execution of a project and for the

submission of project milestone documents, as prescribed, to the approval committees and boards for acquisition programmes.

Research and Development: The DAPD also oversees the DoD's research and development (R&D) function. The "DoD annually invests approximately R230 million in the development and retention of key capabilities in the South African industry to support the long term requirements of the SANDF for technologically advanced equipment."¹⁵ The level and nature of the development effort are determined by whether or not the capabilities are deemed strategically essential - capabilities that provide a distinct combat advantage; or satisfy unique environment-induced requirements (which cannot readily be satisfied through the procurement of standard equipment); or which will ensure self-sufficiency in areas for which high priority operational needs exist. In other areas the capability to provide lifecycle logistical support to the SANDF and the need to be a knowledgeable purchaser and a knowledgeable user of equipment are also key factors shaping research and technology development effort. The DoD's research and technology budget is managed by the Defence Research and Development Board (DRDB) which is chaired by the Chief of Acquisition of the DoD. All the services of the SANDF as well as Armscor (the acquisition and procurement agency of the DoD) are represented in the DRDB. The six main areas of the program are:

- Landward Operations
- Maritime Operations
- Air Operations
- Support Operations
- Electronic Technologies
- Test and Evaluation Facilities

Research and technology development projects are contracted to various institutions outside the DoD, including some privately owned and some state-owned industries, as well as universities.

Elaborate on the activities of the Defence Inspectorate

The Defence Inspectorate's strategic objectives derive from legislation, including the Public Finance Management Act (PFMA) and is to provide a system of internal audit to the Department of Defence (DoD). The Defence Inspectorate Organisation subscribes to the Departmental Codes of Conduct, including the related Institute of Internal Auditor's Code of Ethics pertaining to internal audit, as well as of the Institute of Internal Auditor Standards. In complying with this instruction, the Defence Inspectorate Organisation strives for objectivity and independence as prescribed by the aforesaid standards. The effective functioning of a properly constituted Audit Committee overseeing the internal audit activities of the Defence Inspectorate, an effective Inspector General Staff Council and the Accountability Management Committee have greatly contributed to a maximised Departmental internal audit function.¹⁶

¹⁵ www.mil.za, accessed April 5, 2005.

¹⁶ DoD, Annual Report FY2003/4, available online at www.dod.mil.za

Inspectors General: Origins

The modern Inspector General was introduced by the Royal French Army. Louis XIV, the Sun King, created an inspector general of infantry and an inspector general of cavalry with the principal duties of reviewing the troops and reporting to the king. Louis later expanded the system to include geographical inspectors. "They examined everything within their sphere of influence. Soon, military inspection became an essential aspect of all modern armies," the US Army's Inspector General's website explains.

Table 5.xx: The origins of the Inspector General explained. Source: US Army Inspector General's Office, www.public.ignet.army.mil/History_of_the_IG.htm, accessed, October 20, 2005.

Elaborate on the activities of the Chief Directorate Equal Opportunities & Affirmative Action

"The Equal Opportunities Chief Directorate (EOCD) encompasses the diversity, strength, and knowledge that lie in its most valuable resource - the people. Complete utilisation of this resource, regardless of race, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, national origin, religion, age, or level of ability is essential to successful mission accomplishment."¹⁷ The aim of the EOCD is to develop and monitor policy with regard to affirmative action, gender equity, disability equity and development opportunities. It also researches and evaluates the policies and statistics.

Among its activities highlighted in the 2003/4 Annual Report were efforts to boost shared values and ethics in the DoD. "A shared values system in any organisation is crucial as it forms part of that organisation's culture. The ... lesson plans on the shared values in the DoD were compiled and handed over to the Chief of Joint Training for implementation in the development and functional courses. The said values and ethics promote mission readiness and esprit de corps. Therefore, EOCD managed to secure a permanent slot at the DoD Mobilisation Centre where Shared Values and Ethics are presented to members who are to be deployed..."

Another policy under development is one on military fraternisation. "Research is being undertaken on the framework of this prospective policy. Defence advisors and military attachés, through Defence Foreign Relations, have been requested to assist in this matter. Mozambique, the United States and Argentina have responded so far and the matter will be pursued with their respective defence advisors. Information will be processed for developing the policy..."¹⁸ In many militaries fraternisation in the form of close friendships, relationships and marriages between officers and non-commissioned officers are a taboo as it is considered prejudicial to good order and discipline.

What is known about the previous Defence Secretariat?

¹⁷ ditto

¹⁸ DoD, Annual Report FY2003/4, available online at www.dod.mil.za

The Commandant General of the SA Defence Force, General RC Hiemstra, SSA, SM, brother of the late appellate judge¹⁹, assumed the post of Secretary for Defence with effect from October, 17, 1966 in terms of Government Notice 1749 dated November 4, 1966²⁰.

Stratford also gave a good account of the origin of the office: "In the early military system in the Cape Colony the commission issued to a governor styled him as "Governor and Commander-in-Chief", and all military as well as civil officers were commanded to render obedience to him. In addition to the governor there was a post of Commander of the Forces, with the rank of Lieutenant-General. The Lt-General was in fact the actual commander while the governor, who incidentally also held the appointment of Vice-Admiral, was the titular commander.

"In his capacity as Commander-in-Chief the Governor was assisted by a secretary designated the 'Military Secretary'. As the Governor did not take a very active part in military matters at all times, and was in reality only the titular commander, the functions of the Military Secretary were more of an administrative nature. Pensions, the issuing of passes to discharged soldiers, ordnance and financial matters connected with the army, and similar concerns, formed the subject matter of his office.

"The office of Military Secretary was created in 1806. Originally he seems to have been fairly detached from the Governor; his office was at Military Headquarters in the Castle, and instructions were conveyed to him from the Governor by the Secretary to the Government. Correspondence was initiated by him to the Governor and to other officials.

"At that time Colonel Napier held the dual appointment of Commandant of Cape Town as well as Military Secretary.

"In later years we have the position where there was a Military Secretary at the Castle as well as at Government House, and even after the designation of the office had been changed to Secretary for Defence, the Governor retained such an officer, who was known as the Colonial Secretary.

"The office of "Commandant General of all the Colonial Forces" was created by Act No. 5 of 1878. During times that this office was vacant, the duties and powers devolved on an officer 'who shall for the time being be, or be by the Governor appointed to act as, Senior Officer of the Colonial Forces.'

¹⁹ He died in May 2006.

²⁰ Commandant (Lt Col) DO Stratford, The Office Of Secretary For Defence, Military History Journal - Vol 1 No 3, The South African Military History Society, December 1968. Available online at www.rapidhttp.com/milhist/journal.html, accessed February 20, 2006.

“By Act No. 18 of 1885 the Military Secretary of the Defence Department was entitled at all times to sit on boards appointed for the trial of offences committed by members of either the Cape Mounted Riflemen or the Cape Infantry. He could also act in the absence of any field officer-commanding of either of the forces on such boards, in respect of offences committed by members of such forces.

“On 30 August, 1896, the title of the Military Secretary was changed to that of Secretary for Defence.

“Up to August, 1896, the Colonial Secretary was charged with the administration of colonial defence matters, but on that date his functions were assigned to the Prime Minister.

“By a Government Notice dated 4 March, 1904, the functions were again reversed. The notice reads: "His Excellency the Governor, with the advice of the Executive Council, has been pleased to assign to the Colonial Secretary the duties connected with the Departments for which funds are provided on the Estimates of Expenditure under the following votes, viz:

Vote 12 : Cape Colonial Forces.

Vote 13 : Cape Mounted Riflemen.

Vote 14 : Cape Medical Corps.

Vote 15 : Ordnance Department.

Vote 16 : Volunteers Department."

“In those days the term ‘Cape Colonial Forces’ was normally used to indicate all the military forces of the Colony. Here, however, a special meaning seems to have been attached to it, the following sub-divisions being given in the estimates:

(a) Colonial Military Secretary's Department.

Colonial Military Secretary.

Staff Officer.

Staff Officer of Volunteers.

Clerks

(b) Commandant General's Department.

Commandant General.

Senior Staff Officer.

Staff Officer.

(c) Pay Department.

Principal Paymaster.

Paymaster.

Assistant Paymaster.

Chief examiner.

Examiners and Clerks.

“Between 1914 and 1966, the date on which the Commandant-General was appointed Secretary for Defence over and above his appointment as head of the SA Defence Force, the following have held the post:

- Sir Henry RM Bourne: 1 April, 1914 to 30 September, 1922.
- Lt Gen Andries JE Brink, CBE, DTD, DSO: 1 October, 1922 to 31 August, 1937.
- Mr AH Broeksma, BA, LLB, KC: 1 September, 1937 to 13 September, 1939.
- Brig Charles H. Blaine, CBE, ED: 14 September, 1939 to 31 December, 1945.
- Mr Herbert C Cuff: 1946 to 1955. (Previously from 1942 until his appointment as Secretary for Defence, Cuff had been with the Department of Defence).
- Mr JP de Villiers: 1955 until his death on 25 September, 1965.
- Mr VP Steyn: 26 September, 1965 to 16 October, 1966.

“During May 1967, the dual title of Commandant General and Secretary for Defence was dispensed with by the elimination of the title "Secretary for Defence". The Commandant General, as permanent head of the Department of Defence as well as of the South African Defence Force fills the post of Commandant General, SADF, which post embraces the functions signified by the former dual title. At the same time the rank of Commandant General, instituted in September, 1956, was changed to that of ‘General’. Thus the post as well as the designation ‘Secretary for Defence’ no longer exists.”

Are the DoD’s command lines clear or is there “rule by committee”?

The DoD seems to employ a dual system. Its organograms are clear yet there seems to be a taste to “rule by committee. It appears that every luminary in the DoD is chairman of some committee and that decisions are seldom made outside the committee room. Some of these committees have been institutionalised by the 2002 Defence Act. There is also a tendency to refer and defer decisions up the chain of committees (command?). As a result of the culture of “collective responsibility” fewer individuals are accepting the accountability that goes with their positions.

Committees and meetings have their place – and may have been necessary in the early years of democracy to ensure that those from disparate forces, such as the SADF and MK, sang of the same proverbial sheet and pulled in the same direction. However, it is disturbing to note in the FY2003/4 Annual Report that the “Council of Defence”, chaired by the minister is the “highest decision-making body.” In terms of the PFMA, the minister, not some committee, is the department’s executive authority. And where does the President as statutory Commander-in-Chief fit in?

No.	Committee	Apparent Function	Chaired by	Members
1	Council on Defence (COD) (Statutory, ss43, 44 of the Defence Act)	Highest decision-making body	Minister of Defence	Deputy Minister of Defence, Secretary for Defence, CSANDF, ministerial advisors.
2	Defence Staff Council	?	Secretary for	Chiefs of Services and

	(DSC) (Statutory, ss45, 46 of the Defence Act)		Defence/CSANDF	Divisions “and some strategic elements of the department.”
3	Military Council (MC)	Deals with “high-level military operational issues”.	CSANDF	“Top management of the SANDF”.
4	Defence Secretariat Board (DSB)	Deals with “high-level defence policy issues”.	Secretary for Defence	“Top management of the Defence Secretariat”
5	Defence Planning Forum (DPF)	A departmental advisory body to the PDSC. “The DPF ensures proper cross-impact analysis of all proposals and advice that go to the PDSC.”	?	?
6	Departmental Programme and Budget Evaluation Committee (DPBEC)	A departmental advisory body to the PDSC. “The DPBEC evaluates all programme and sub-programme plans and budgets to ensure efficiency, effectiveness, economy and transparency.	?	“All senior planners and budget managers from Services and Divisions.”
7	Accountability Management Committee (AMC)	A departmental advisory body to the PDSC. “The AMC is the mechanism through which the Secretary for Defence secures accountability by functionaries of the DoD for (proper) financial management in accordance with the PFMA...”	?	Chiefs of Services and Divisions
8	Human Resources Staff Council	A specialised functional body that develops policy positions and plans for discussion at the DPF, DPBEC and/or PDSC.	?	?
9	Operations Staff Council	A specialised functional body that develops policy positions and plans for discussion at the DPF, DPBEC and/or PDSC.	?	?
10	Logistic Staff Council	A specialised functional body that develops policy positions and plans for discussion at the DPF, DPBEC and/or	?	?

		PDSC.		
11	Reserve Force Council (Statutory, s48 of the Defence Act)	Consultative and advisory body representing the Reserve Force in order to promote and maintain that force as an integral part of the Defence Force and must be consulted on any legislation, policy or administrative measures affecting the Reserve Force. The council does not have any powers of command.	Chief Defence Reserves	?
12	Defence Reserve Board (meets monthly).	To manage the development of Reserve Force policy and strategy and to monitor and report on the implementation thereof.	Chief Defence Reserves	Representatives from the Services, Joint Operations, Joint Support, DoD Logistic Formation, Command Management Information Service, Chief Finance Office, Chaplain General, Corporate Communications, Strategic Planning, Human Resources Policy & Planning, Joint Training, Defence Intelligence, Military Policing Agency and Military Legal Services.
13	Army Council	?	C Army	?
14	Air Force Board	?	CAF	?
15	Navy Board (meets monthly).	The primary function of the board is to establish strategy, long term objectives, policy, plans, the budget of the Navy and control the execution thereof. Secondary functions are to give feedback from higher command levels, to discuss and decide on general matters concerning the public image of the Service and take decisions regarding any other aspect of business that has major financial,	C Navy	The board comprises all naval chief directors (rear admirals) and those directors (rear admirals – junior grade) serving in the Navy Office. <i>Ex officio</i> members include the Navy Chaplain, C Navy's flag captain, the Senior Staff Officer (SSO) Navy Public Relations, the SSO Navy Staff Duties, the Master-at-Arms of the Navy and the Navy Budget Manager.

		personal and organisational implications.		
16	Naval Staff Council (meets weekly on Wednesdays).	The NSC has as its purpose controlling the output of the Navy staff process.	C Navy	As for the Navy Board, but includes the SSO Intelligence/Counterintelligence and the SSO Military Legal Services. Generally excluded, however, are the Flag Officer Fleet (based at Simon's Town) and the Director Naval Acquisition (attached to the Defence Secretariat).
17	SAMHS Management Board	Functions as a senior body to execute the management of SAMHS business in a consultative manner.	Surgeon General	The chief directors of military health force support and preparation, all directors, all general officers commanding, all commanders and all warrant officers. ²¹
18	Defence R&D Board	Manages the DoD R&D budget.	CDAPD	All Services and Armscor are represented.
19	IG Audit Committee	?	Inspector General ?	?
20	IG Staff Council	?	Inspector General ?	?
21	Civic Education Evaluation & Advisory Board (CEEAB)	?	?	?
22	Departmental Affirmative Action & Equal Opportunity Board	?	?	?
23	DoD Fast Tracking Assessment Board	?	?	?

Table 5.17: More committees than Parliament? Cynics would say Parliament is a talk shop anyway and there is no harm in MPs whiling away their time in committee rooms. Whether this is appropriate for a state department is a question that does not require a meeting to answer. Committees 1 to 11 are “responsible” for “strategic direction” within the DoD. More committees exist at lower levels... Minutes are kept and hours are wasted, talk is cheap and inaction dear.

Is the DoD a “lead” or “follow” department?

As resistance to apartheid spread from the middle 1970s, the military gradually infiltrated every level and department of government. By the mid 1980s the process was complete and South Africa was effectively run by the National Management System that answered to the State Security Council – effectively a parallel state administration answering to a

²¹ CDCC answer to a media enquiry received on November 24, 2005.

parallel Cabinet. “Total Strategy”, as derived from the military’s interpretation of French strategist Andre Beaufre’s writings, also extended its tentacles into most aspects of ordinary life.

The creators of the modern South Africa were determined not to repeat the experience and, instead, have one government for one country. As a result, the Constitution, the Defence Act and various DoD policy documents make it clear the SANDF can only ordinarily deploy within South Africa as a junior partner to the SA Police Service. The Constitution says the President may employ the SANDF “in cooperation with the police service”.²² The Defence Act contains similar provisions.²³ Deploying the SANDF abroad is a Presidential prerogative.²⁴ The White Paper on South African Participation in International Peace Missions explains how this is to be done and makes it clear that the Department of Foreign Affairs is the facilitator of the process. The task of the DoD is to provide the forces.²⁵ That the DoD realises it is not a “lead” but a “follow” department can be seen from its FY2002/3 to 2004/5 Strategic Plan. This described the SANDF as a “contingency-based organisation,” that did not render a direct service to the public in the tangible way that departments dealing with housing, health and water did. Elsewhere, the document pointed out that as “a result of the nature of defence the outcome of defence and the outputs of defence are not highly visible during times of peace and are taken for granted. This has led to spending on defence being questioned, as the utility of the defence expenditure is not always obvious in peace time.”

How “senior” is the department and “heavyweight” minister?

There is a perception that the Department of Defence is a senior billet and based on this, that the incumbent minister is a heavyweight. The immediately preceding paragraph should have dispelled the first notion.

The second can be rebutted in recounting a tale of a media conference early in 2005 where the minister bravely promised to convince the education and labour ministries to make more funds available for him to take in another batch of the recruits in July. He was speaking to journalists in Pretoria on January 18, 2005²⁶, a week after 4200 new recruits (out of 75,000 applicants) had joined the SANDF, its largest ever volunteer intake. Lekota said he wanted more applicants and more money in his budget to accommodate at least another 2000 recruits that year. Asked at Waterkloof Air Force Base why he wanted more applicants, Lekota answered that greater numbers would help sensitise the Cabinet, which he thought was not doing enough to help either unemployed youths or young people who could not afford to study. Lekota was brave; as there was no sign at the time he would succeed in anything other than antagonising his Cabinet colleagues. Whether he

²² Constitution, 1996, s201(2)(a).

²³ Defence Act, Act 42/2002, ss18, 19 & 20.

²⁴ Constitution, 1996, s201(2)(c)

²⁵ Department Foreign Affairs, The White Paper on South African Participation in International Peace Missions, Pretoria, 1999.

²⁶ Sapa, Lekota urges matriculants to join military, iol, www.iol.co.za, accessed October 15, 2005.

did, one will never know, but it is known there were no second intake and no borrowing of money for that purpose. The position of the chairman of the ANC and Lekota's standing in relation to Mbeki is also exaggerated. Lekota is not part of the close-knit group Mbeki went into exile with – and, frankly, the position of party chairman carries less weight than the term might imply. The British Labour and Conservative parties have chairmen too, but has anyone ever heard of them? And at home, who is chairman of the Democratic Alliance or Freedom Front Plus?

What is the role of Cabinet and cabinet “clusters” in defence?

“The strategic planning process of defence is of necessity based on a long-term view of possible contingencies, capability requirements and the expectations of government. While the first two aspects are generally covered through the comprehensive strategic environmental analysis process, the latter one tends to be driven by the short to medium-term imperatives and goals as determined by the incumbent government. However, notwithstanding the above, it is critically important that the DoD's planning process should be flexible enough to accommodate the Government's immediate operational needs. For this purpose, the DoD belongs to three Government clusters, namely the Justice, Crime Prevention and Security cluster, the International Relations, Peace and Security cluster and the Governance and Administration cluster. Its participation in these clusters and the Cabinet Makgotla²⁷ enables the DoD to incorporate relevant decisions into its planning processes for implementation. This interaction is reflected in the (government's) Ten-Year Review report which states that the equipment that has been purchased for the SANDF is expected to ‘enable it to effectively patrol South Africa's Exclusive Economic Zone and thereby protect international maritime traffic, combat transnational maritime organised crime, including sea piracy and the illegal exploitation of South Africa's maritime resources.’”²⁸

What is the rank, racial and gender breakdown of the MoD?

Awaited

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Table 5.18: The rank, racial and gender breakdown of the MoD

²⁷ A biannual Cabinet retreat.

²⁸ DoD, Annual Report FY2003/4, Pretoria, 2004, p3.

What is the rank, racial and gender breakdown of the Defence Secretariat?

Awaited

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Table 5.19: The rank, racial and gender breakdown of the Defence Secretariat

Is confidentiality concerns regarding national security and defence always justified or is it an attempt at playing “Yes, Minister.”?

“Yes, Minister” was a popular British political satire in the 1980s. For a variety of reasons it has remained remarkably current and should be watched by anyone interested in governance. Better yet, the scripts were reworked into book form and published by the BBC²⁹ and amount to an indispensable guide to understanding political process. A version also made it onto the Internet³⁰, where the author encountered it in 2003. The basic plot saw the minister, a former journalist and a bit of a duffer, pitted against his wily Permanent Secretary (locally, a director general). The minister’s ever-less naïve private secretary plays the foil. But one digresses...

Cabinet Secretary Sir Arnold Robinson, a font of much bureaucratic knowledge, at one point opines that “if people don’t know what you are doing, they won’t know what you are doing wrong.” Therefore official secrets acts exist to protect officials – not secrets. That the episodes are both realistic and applicable to South Africa can be testified to by at least one provincial premier who exclaimed, on reading the book that it was a carbon copy of events at her office and the late Dr Ian Phillips, Transport Minister Jeff Radebe’s special advisor until his death in March 2007, who said it well reflected the situation between ministers and their departments, even where both minister and officials were ANC members.

If officials are past masters at keeping the public in the dark, are they any more likely to keep their ministers informed? Robinson believes open government is a contradiction in terms. “You can be open – or you can have government.” Receiving the reply that the citizens of a democracy had a right to know, Arnold countered that they had a right to be ignorant. “Knowledge only means complicity and guilt. Ignorance has a certain dignity.”

²⁹ Jonathan Lynn & Anthony Jay, *The Complete Yes, Minister*, BBC Books, London, Omnibus edition 1989, various other editions and reprints; *The Complete Yes, Prime Minister*, BBC Books, London, 1989. Also available in various editions and prints, globally and in South Africa.

³⁰ <http://p199.ezboard.com/Yes-Minister/fthevirtualcommunityfrm16.showMessage?topicID=37.topic>, accessed between 2005 and 2007. See also *Yes, Prime Minister* at <http://p199.ezboard.com/Yes-Prime-Minister/fthevirtualcommunityfrm16.showMessage?topicID=25.topic>.

So does “discreet silence”, the device used when bureaucrats do not want to tell their political supervisors the facts. The wily permanent secretary at one point explains that as a matter of principle, ministers should never know more than they need to know. They should also not talk to departmental underlings – or they could learn things the department heads did not know themselves.

At this point it is important to distinguish between necessary confidentiality and the contrary variety. It reminds of the joke about Stalin: Why did the dictator not write his memoirs? Answer: He was afraid someone might read them... A good departure point is that all confidentiality is unnecessary; any attempt at secrecy is an effort by officials to protect themselves. Democratic civil control over the armed forces therefore requires officials – and ministers – to prove the need for confidentiality. Presently, the reverse is the case. It quickly becomes a slippery slope. Jonathan Lynn & Anthony Jay in *Yes, Minister*, observed that it is customary in Britain for ministers to conceal information from Parliamentary committees. “Such lies would be regarded in government circles as white lies. These are a number of issues about which a minister automatically tells lies, and he would be regarded as foolish or incompetent if he told the truth. For instance, he would always deny an impending devaluation, or a run on the pound. And he would always give the impression that the UK had adequate and credible defences.”³¹ In 1916 the French Prime Minister Aristide Briand went further and cost France 100,000 lives when he fabricated a battle to explain the fall of Fort Donoumont during the opening days of the Battle of Verdun. “... it is clear that once such an enriched version of events had been put about, and from such a high authority, there could be no going back,” said author Malcolm Brown of “this farrago of invention and exaggeration” in his book, *Verdun 1916*³².

Ball & Le Roux put it this way: “It is clear that some degree of confidentiality is necessary in the area of national security. However, this should not be used to justify a lower level of oversight or a lack of adherence to internationally recognized standards... Different forms of oversight may be necessary for some areas relating to national security. It is also important to be clear about the distinction between confidentiality and the lack of public scrutiny. It is possible to retain a high degree of confidentiality in highly sensitive areas without compromising the principle of democratic accountability. A subject may be sensitive—off-budget activities, for example—but it should not be kept secret. War plans, on the other hand, should be confidential. Even so, holding war plans in confidence does not mean an absence of democratic accountability. It simply requires appropriate systems of clearance and procedures for consulting the legislature and other oversight bodies.”³³

What is the role of the media in defence oversight?

31 Jonathan Lynn & Anthony Jay, *The Complete Yes, Minister*, BBC Books, London, Omnibus edition 1989, p326.

32 Malcolm Brown, *Verdun 1916*, Tempus Publishing, Port Stroud, Gloucestershire, 2000, pp54-5.

33 Nicole Ball and Len le Roux, *A model for good practice in budgeting for the military sector*, SIPRI, Stockholm, 2005.

This question was the subject of a conference in February 2003 in Budapest, Hungary. Hosted by The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) and the Office for Strategic and Defence Studies of the Hungarian Ministry of Defence, the conference aimed to analyse the role of the media, particularly in societies in transition to democracy, as a mechanism in the democratic oversight. “Of all the sectors of public policy, the security sector has historically proven one of the most resistant to public input and oversight,” the DCAF observed in a document posted on its website³⁴ to publicise the event. “However, it is increasingly apparent that the media and civil society play vital, albeit usually informal, roles in the processes of oversight, accountability and control of security structures in democratic states.” Interestingly, the DCAF observes that “scrutiny by civil society actors and the media may sometimes be even more effective at holding government to account than formal oversight structures and mechanisms.” The DCAF calls effective oversight the product of expertise and capacity in civil society to independently evaluate, challenge, or endorse governmental assumptions, analyses and decisions concerning defence and public security affairs and requirements on which policy is based. “Media form a fundamental inter-connective tissue between civil society and government, communicating information, intentions, concerns, priorities and reactions to policies. More than just observing and reporting facts; journalists have the opportunity to contribute to developing critical debate and dialogue in their societies and shaping public and political agendas,” the DCAF observes.

That, at least, is the theory...

What is the current state of play?

It is conventional wisdom to propagate the need for closer links between the military and the media. One often hears how government and the media should all cooperate for the greater good, how they are one in a common struggle and how important openness and transparency is to good governance and democracy. Alas, that is the triumph of hope over experience. Seldom in the conduct of human affairs have two groups been more predisposed to misunderstand each other than the military and journalists. The media is predisposed to “publish and be damned” whereas officials damn everything published.

US Civil War General William Tecumseh Sherman thought of journalists as worse than spies and on one occasion gave journalists in his camp a 30 minute head-start, threatening to have any found within his camp afterwards shot. New York Tribune war correspondent Henry Villard later wrote: “General Sherman looked upon journalists as a nuisance and a danger at headquarters and in the field and acted toward them accordingly... I did not, of course, agree with him at that time as to my own calling, but candour constrains me to say that I had to admit in the end that he was entirely right. If I were a commanding general I would not tolerate any of the tribe within my army lines.” In early 2004 CNN chief news executive Eason Jordan had to resign for suggesting at the World Economic Forum at Davos that the US military was doing the same in Iraq and had deliberately

³⁴ www.dcaf.ch

“taken out” a number of journalists. A free media is naturally suspicious, competitive and cynical. As a result, few but the hopelessly optimistic regard the media as a friend.

What do the media know about the military?

First, a few general clichés about the media: If a specialist is someone who learns more and more about less and less, then a generalist knows a little about a great deal. A little knowledge is dangerous. Many reporters and even many assignment or news editors today know very little about the military milieu and often will not be able to tell a general from a grenade. They also cannot tell whether an operation is going well – or not. It is axiomatic if a writer does not understand the story he cannot tell it to his readers. Very few reporters – white or black – today have any experience of military service.

Likewise, the majority of the public-at-large (including the military and politicians) are ignorant about the actors they encounter in the media world and have little real idea of how the average newsroom functions. This can be very dangerous for all concerned. There is a romantic perception that journalists are free to choose the stories they do. That is the exception rather than the rule.

How do the media operate?

Newsrooms, like armies, are never identical. Each has its own idiosyncrasies, culture and organisation. Newspaper, radio, television and wire service newsrooms are about as different as the Army, Air Force and Navy. However, the following does broadly apply. The majority of journalists are given story ideas to develop by a news or assignments editor. It is this individual, not the reporter, who decides whether there is a story to develop or not. What one has to remember is this: While some reporters may be better disposed to the military than others, and while some are certainly more knowledgeable, reporters ultimately have little say in what is covered. How much of a story gets published, the headline and the layout is again the decision of others. Generally layout- and page editors decide the layout, prominence, and perhaps, even the headline. They usually do not consult the reporter. Sub-editors also alter copy: rewriting here, slashing paragraphs there. The end product can be very different from what the reporter sent into the system...

Outsiders also discount the almost Regimental pride journalists have for the publications they work for. Sure, like soldiers everywhere, reporters also grouse and complain, but like soldiers they seldom complain out of the Regiment. Journalists, regardless of persuasion, will generally stand up in defence of their craft when it is attacked by outsiders. This sometimes gives rise to the notion that “the media” is like a Greek phalanx – homogenous and acting with a common purpose. But no-one familiar with the military would ascribe to the Army, Air Force or Navy a common purpose in all things. Inter-service rivalry and diverging interests, generally, would soon put paid to that. Why would the media be different? The same applies to reporters – even at the same

publication: competition, personal belief and the influence of their constituencies see to that. Therefore labour reporters are often pro-trade union, education reporters are beholden to the teaching establishment, business reporters favour corporations, economic reporters dislike political writers for their pat solutions to seemingly complex problems and the latter are themselves divided in loyalty between the governing party and the Parliamentary opposition. So let's have no more dark talk about the media or reporters being in cahoots or being part of some dark conspiracy to bring the military – or anyone else – into disrepute.

An aside on wire services: If newspapers are news at the retail level, then wire services, such as Reuters, The Associated Press, AFP and Sapa where print, radio, television and even many businesses (as well as the National Intelligence Agency) source their news is wholesale. Wire services generally do not sell “direct to the public”. In the author's opinion, wire services have in my view, the following functions:

- Acting as a tip-off service to the newspapers, radio, TV and other wire services,
- Providing filler material for newspapers,
- Setting the national agenda by maintaining a national news diary,
- Covering routine events newspapers cannot cover and acting as the inland office of coastal newspapers and the coastal office of inland papers, and
- Providing newspapers alternative reports to that submitted by their own reporters and in that way providing a “reality check” to news editors.

How do the media view itself?

During 2004, for many a year of reflection after 10 years of non-racial democracy, South African journalists shared in the mood and pontificated on their craft. Writing in the Sunday Times³⁵, Anton Harber, now Caxton Professor of Journalism at Wits and previously editor of the Mail & Guardian, said: “The picture that is emerging of South African media 10 years into freedom is one of vibrancy, diversity and flux, with a cacophony of new voices fighting for attention from audience and advertisers alike - and many of them having moved from the social and economic fringes to the spotlight at the centre... But more noise and clutter does not necessarily mean more quality. The fact is that all these new outlets are competing for an advertising pie that has shrunk or barely grown, particularly in the last year or two. This is a global phenomenon, and the consequence has been the steady shrinking of newsrooms and journalism resources, the trivialisation of news and the triumph of entertainment and advertising over journalism,” he continued. “It is felt no less in this country, particularly since Gauteng has an oversupply of newspapers. Business Day has 32 fewer journalists than it had two years ago. Independent Newspapers is doing more and more group sharing of editorial resources, which has the effect of homogenising their papers across the country,” Harber said.

³⁵ Sunday Times, Johannesburg, February 22, 2004.

He continued: “Specialist reporters are fewer, and that means that quality, in-depth, analytic writing is becoming less authoritative,” he added. Newsrooms are run by younger, less-experienced journalists who are expected to churn out a lot more material than their forbearers were a decade ago. This, he said, accounted for much of the trouble journalists found themselves in during that period: Noted columnist Darrel Bristow-Bovey, accused of plagiarism, “turned out to be not so much a columnist as a highly paid copy typist”; sacked Sunday Times reporter Ranjeni Munusamy “was meant to work her sources and instead appears to have worked for them” when she concocted stories based on fabrication; and City Press editor Vusi Mona, who ran a PR agency on the side, “was spending his time looking after everyone’s public relations except his own.”

Controlling the media...

Staying with scandal, it seems that every time there is some ethical or similar scandal in journalism, siren voices start calling for the registration or licensing of reporters. Implicit in this is the idea that bad journalists, like crooked attorneys, can have their licenses revoked. Business Day³⁶ summed up the registration debate quite nicely: “The debate about registration makes a mistake each time it starts and that is to assume a journalist can be registered in the same way that a doctor or lawyer might be, so that some self-regulating but state recognised body is able to stop one practicing one’s craft. But that is the problem. Journalism isn’t a profession. It is a trade, a craft, like plumbing or carpentry. It is largely unregulated because there is nothing to regulate. Journalists do not have clients or patients and hold no one’s money or health in trust. The one thing that humans value that journalists can damage is reputation, and there the laws of libel (defamation in South Africa), and even criminal libel (*crimen iniuria*), apply as perfectly adequate means of control. The relatively recent arrival of the academic qualification of journalism should not detract from the essence of the craft. The journalism degree, nowhere, can reasonably be said to confer the status of journalist upon the holder.”

Independent Group Editor Peter Sullivan believes journalists and their newspapers owe no one a duty to report in the public interest – or anything else³⁷. That is so. Instead journalists make their “best stab at the truth in the time available.” But more often this is with ever less resources. Instead, many newspapers have become little more than advertising delivery vehicles. Once upon a time newspapers may have primarily delivered information to their readers, but today they increasingly profit only their owners. Onetime Vrye Weekblad editor Max du Preez told the Cape Town Press Club³⁸ editors were no longer editors – instead they were part of management. “They get rewarded for making money. That division between state and church, between editor and management, has disappeared. Editors have become capitalists, and as my bank manager

³⁶ Editorial, Business Day, February 25, 2004.

³⁷ In a paper presented to various Executive National Security Programmes at the SA National Defence College, Thaba Tshwane, during 2003, 2004 and 2005.

³⁸ Sapa, Du Preez: editors must rethink role, Daily Dispatch, East London, February 21, 2004.

will tell you, those two don't mix.... Now we have making money as the first concern, not journalism," he added.

Do military attempts to “use” the media to convey its message undermine the role of the media as a watchdog in a democracy?

This is not a question that arose in Hitler’s Third Reich or in the Soviet Union. Yet, the military, like the government, has the same right as any other constituency to convey its message through the media to the public. There is also nothing wrong with wanting favourable publicity. The DoD’s Strategic Plan for Financial Years 2002/3 to 2004/5 made the point that the DoD, as a "contingency-based organisation," does not render a direct service to the public in the tangible way that departments dealing with housing, health and water do. Elsewhere, the document pointed out that as “a result of the nature of defence the outcome of defence and the outputs of defence are not highly visible during times of peace and are taken for granted. This has led to spending on defence being questioned, as the utility of the defence expenditure is not always obvious in peace time.” It continues: "Defence leaders have to be sensitive to popular sentiment and ensure that the contribution of defence towards the general well-being is well publicised and that every Rand is spent wisely to ensure that the citizens of South Africa continue to support the Defence Force."

This is not just a South African phenomenon. Writing mostly with the US military in mind, author James F Dunnigan notes³⁹: “Most nations’ military planning rests on their own appraisals of their own military ability. This appraisal reaches a low point just before arms budgets are voted on and rises swiftly during international crises and re-election campaigns. When actual warfare approaches, the military hopefully becomes more realistic.” He adds: “Armed forces exist primarily, or at least initially, for self-defence. Some nations go overboard, and some feel the best way to defend against a real or imagined attack is to attack it. Armed forces also serve as one more bargaining chip in a state’s international diplomacy, always an activity akin to poker. If war comes, the armed forces have failed in their primary purpose: to appear too strong to be successfully attacked. Therefore armed forces pay a lot of attention to appearing strong. If substance is sacrificed to enhance apparent strength, why not? An apparently stronger armed force is more valuable than a less capable appearing one.”

Two US officers some years ago called the media the single most important channel between the military and the public – and by extension the national legislature: the US Congress there, the South African Parliament here. Writing in *Armor*⁴⁰, Captain Jeffrey Nors said a strong military is a pillar of democracy, as is the media. "The media inform the very people who pay our salaries, own our equipment and help form the opinions of the parents whose sons and daughters they entrust to us. For a significant portion of this

³⁹ James F Dunnigan, *How to make war*, 4th Edition, Quill, New York, 2003.

⁴⁰ Capt. Jeffrey Nors, *Encountering Media on the Battlefield*, *Armor*, Fort Knox, Kentucky, USA, January-February 2002.

nation, the media is their only link to the military. The American people are our higher headquarters, and the media is our radio." In his article in the Marine Corps Gazette, Lt Col Stephen G Brozak, USMCR, called the media a conduit to the people - "the device by which we explain who we are and what we do."⁴¹ That General Godfrey Ngwenya share these sentiments became clear in 2005 when they were separately articulated by at least two of his senior subordinates. Speaking at Bloemfontein after Exercise Young Eagle's media day, Chief of the SA Army, LTG Solly Shoke told journalists: "You are an important stakeholder of the SA Army and it is therefore important for us to have you see for yourselves the working of the Army in order to provide the general public with balanced and objective viewpoints."⁴² The next week, Chief of the SA Navy, VADM Refiloe Johannes Mudimu spoke at Naval Station Durban and said: "We pride ourselves as the people's Navy, a Navy that is legitimate and credible and of which our people are proud. You as the media have a vital role to play in assisting us to make the public aware of the role and activities undertaken by our Navy - We owe this exposure to the public as our primary role are the protection of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the people of South Africa."⁴³

Very flattering, and true – from a certain point of view. But should the media be this? And how does it affect its much-valued independence?

Addressed at length in US Army Field Manual FM 100-6, Information Operations, in their simplest form can be described as “the activities that gain information and knowledge and improve friendly execution of operations while denying an adversary similar capabilities by whatever possible means. Effects of information operations produce significant military advantage for forces conducting such operations.” Synchronised information operations are conducted with an aim of achieving information dominance, described as “the degree of information superiority that allows the possessor to use information systems and capabilities to achieve an operational advantage in a conflict, or to control the situation in operations short of war, while denying those capabilities to the adversary.” Military public affairs efforts as well as what the US call “civil affairs”, for part of information operations along with that old technique, electronic warfare. This linkage may put irresistible pressure on the military authorities to see the media as a useful “weapon system” to use in their warfighting effort. And the post-2001 War on Terrorism has blurred the distinction between war and peace – at least for the Americans. Dunnigan observes that war “isn’t what it used to be before radio and television.” The flip-side of the information operations coin is that because of instant media, public opinion guides military decisions far more than in the past.

Some thoughts on defence versus war reporting

⁴¹ Lt. Col. Stephen G. Brozak USMCR, The Marine Corps, the media and the 21st Century, Marine Corps Gazette, Quantico, Virginia, USA, January 2002.

⁴² November 15, 2005.

⁴³ November 21, 2005.

Military Reporters/Correspondents

Military correspondents are specialists: authorities not only on policy matters but also on military strategy, tactics, techniques and procedures. They are often activists as well and can be partisans in the struggles that precede policy and doctrine formulation. British historian and journalist Captain Sir Basil Liddell Hart (1895-1970) is still alternatively revered and loathed for the part he played (or didn't) in the development of mechanised warfare during the 1920s and 1930s. At the time he was the military correspondent of a number of London daily newspapers. Reporters, by contrast, stress the facts and leave judgement to the reader and opinion to the editorial writers. Military reporters are far more common: non-specialist writers, often times disinterested, and penning articles of interest to the general public. Their work is generally of the "he said, she said" variety and is often more social or political in content than military.

War Correspondents/Reporters

War correspondents and reporters accompany military forces during wars and campaigns and file eyewitness accounts of what they have seen, heard, and in some instances, done. Winston Churchill (1874-1965) was an outstanding example of a war correspondent. A British Army lieutenant in 1895, he joined Spanish forces fighting guerrillas in Cuba as a military observer and correspondent. Three years later he turned his experiences during the Malakand into the subject of his first book. Later that year he sought service in General Kitchener's campaign for the reconquest of the Sudan, fulfilling the dual role of active officer and war correspondent. On the outbreak of the South African War in 1899, he went out as war correspondent for the London Morning Post. Within a month of his arrival, he was captured along with an armoured train when acting more as a soldier than as a journalist..." War correspondents, then, are participants in the events they write about. War reporters are not.

Depending on the circumstance war correspondents and reporters are entitled to protection upon capture under the Geneva Conventions as a lawful combatant. During World War Two, for example, South African journalists accompanying Commonwealth forces wore uniform and were entitled to use weapons for self defence. Carel Birkby, who covered the Somali and other campaigns for the SA Press Association, wrote in the October 1980 edition of *Armed Forces*⁴⁴ that South African correspondents were at first commissioned officers. "Paid by my civilian employers, I was to operate under the protective rank of captain under an arrangement dreamt up in Pretoria... Nevertheless the system (could) not work because war correspondents cannot be trammelled by rank of any kind. A mere captain cannot very well write dispatches calling a general a bloody fool." Birkby later persuaded the authorities to "de-pip" them and adopt the Anglo-US system under which correspondents wore uniform when in operational areas (for their own protection under the Geneva Convention) but were distinguished only by cap badges bearing the letter C in gold on a green background and shoulder flashes reading 'War Correspondent' in the same colour scheme. They took their rank from whomever they dealt with. So no private need to salute them, and they were not required to salute even a general – although often it was not only polite but politic to do so..."

⁴⁴ Carel Birkby, What is a military correspondent?, *Armed Forces*, Johannesburg, October 1980, p21.

What is the role of think-tanks and experts in defence oversight?

James F Dunnigan, author of *How To Make War*, and a former artilleryman, cuts to the quick on many issues, including this one. Here's an example: "The mass media helps create and perpetuate many myths. Often the appointed experts are equally ill informed... Real warfare is ugly, destructive and remembered fondly only by those who survived it without getting too close." To which one may add Desiderius Erasmus' (1469-1536) dictum – *Dulce Bellum Inexpertis* – War is delightful (only) to the inexperienced.

Perhaps the only thing more dangerous than an ill-informed, inexperienced journalist is the self-appointed "expert" who advises him. How often have you seen warmed-over news reports from the last few days pass as "analysis" by some policy wonk followed by a weather forecast conclusion so full of hedged bets and qualifications as to be useless to you? How seriously should one take the expertise of an academic who has not spent a single day in uniform, let alone in combat?

How good is democratic civilian oversight in South Africa?

It is currently closed season for open government in the DoD as a result of a number of public relations disasters in 1999-2000. The wider cost of these tragedies, a series of shootings at military bases where troops went "postal"⁴⁵ and shot their officers, was the reverse of a period of remarkable openness under late former defence minister Joe Modise. This was truly a period in which the approach to civil society was one of partnership and the watchword was "why keep this confidential?" As a result, any number of "secrets" kept confidential by apartheid apparatchiks were declassified and made available to legitimate enquirers, such as the media and nongovernmental organisations. It was during this time that figures, such as the number of main battle tanks in the SA Army's arsenal were released. Since then, the same officials who released the data have come to decline doing so – despite the figure, in that instance not changing, for "national security" reasons.

The reason for the DoD falling into Sir Arnold's mindset is as sad as it is unnecessary. During the incidents described, a slick PR operation was releasing information to the media faster than the creaking staff system, steeped in a "knowledge is only power if you hoard it" mentality could take the same to the minister. As a result, he was "embarrassed" on several occasions by reading in the media what his officials had declined to tell him. Alas, the solution was not to fix the system, rather it was to dismantle the PR system, or in official-speak, to improve it.

Is the media any better? Contrary to their printed and broadcast assertions, the Army neither owns nor operates any helicopters and the SA Navy's Meko A200 Valour-class

⁴⁵ A US expression resulting from disgruntled post office workers shooting their colleagues.

corvettes are not in the same league as the US Navy's Aegis class cruisers.⁴⁶ There is a clear lack of institutional knowledge about the military in the media. It is by no means certain this book will address that issue: that would require someone to buy, read and then absorb the knowledge of this work. One can take the horse to water, but who will make it drink?

And what about defence-sector NGOs and think-tanks? If it is true that for every PhD is an equal and opposite PhD, what does it say about their research and published papers, some of it funded by the DoD? Equally so, can anyone, who needs to butter up the department in order to earn his bread, or earn the possibility of doing so, be as objective and detached as may be required?

⁴⁶ The authors of these assertions will go nameless in order to protect the guilty.