The policy framework:
The Defence White Paper, Defence Reviews and DOD Strategies

Legislation is largely about control, parameters and boundaries. It is the nature of legislation to be prescriptive, inflexible – and vague. Statute law is by nature prescriptive. Its inflexibility derives from the fact that it comes into being through an Act of Parliament that requires a further legislation to amend or repeal. Writing this legislation and guiding it through the complex processes required to get it enacted is no mean feat and requires both effort and time. Legislation is often vague simply because the richness of everyday life defeats any attempt at making them any more specific. Policy is the device used to bring the ideal to the real, the mechanism that helps translate law – and ambition – into tangible programmes.

This chapter is largely about departmental policy. But the defence department does not exist in a vacuum: it is one of many overseen by Cabinet. For this reason, some consideration must be given to national policy, as articulated by the Presidency and co-ordinated interdepartmentally through Cabinet committees known as interministerial clusters. Defence is part of the following clusters:
- Government and Administration
- Justice, Crime Prevention and Security
- International Relations, Peace and Security

While the clusters do not determine policy, they do assign priorities and are meant to harmonise national policy with departmental policy. Here it is also important to recall the difference between "lead" and "follow" departments. In none of the clusters above can defence be characterised as the "lead" department. Domestically, therefore, defence will always be overshadowed by the justice, intelligence and police (safety and security) establishments, while abroad, the Presidency and Foreign Affairs should give the lead.

What is "policy"?

Houghton Mifflin Company Dictionary:
- pol·i·cy (pŏl'ĭ-sē) pronunciation n., pl. -cies.
  1. A plan or course of action, as of a government, political party, or business, intended to influence and determine decisions, actions, and other matters: American foreign policy; the company's personnel policy.
  2. a. A course of action, guiding principle, or procedure considered expedient, prudent, or advantageous: Honesty is the best policy. b. Prudence, shrewdness, or sagacity in practical matters.

Merriam Webster legal dictionary
- pol·i·cy

> An overall plan, principle, or guideline; esp One formulated outside of the judiciary (obligated to consider legislative policy on the matter in their decision).
>
> **Wikipedia**
> A policy is a plan of action for tackling political issues. It is often initiated by a political party in government, which undergoes reforms and changes by interested actors (for example, opposition parties and lobby groups). Policy designates a process. This process includes the elaboration of programs by different, usually public and private collective actors and the way the programs are then applied as concrete programs and actions. Policies in short can be understood as political and administrative mechanisms arranged around explicit goals. (Source: Müller, Pierre; Surel Yves: L'analyse des politiques publiques. Paris, 1998)

Table 3.1: Some dictionary definitions of "policy"

Of interest is that neither the US nor the South African military dictionaries contain a definition of "policy." This tempted US *blogger* "Armchair Generalist" to develop his own definition: "Defence policy is a course of action or conduct, as defined by OSD (Office of the Secretary for Defence), NSC (National Security Council), and other civilian leaders in the administration, intended to influence and determine decisions, actions, and other matters relating to the conduct of military affairs, consistent with the national security strategy. Policy can take the form of instructions, directives, and memorandums submitted through OSD to the defence agencies, Services, and combatant commands to guide them in the execution of defence efforts."[1]

Where can South Africa's defence policy be found?

Broadly, South Africa's defence policy can be found in the 1996 Constitution, the 1996 Defence White Paper and the 1998 Defence Review. It is a new policy for a new era. Gone was the previous emphasis on a strategic offensive posture, built on pre-emptive strikes, the threatened use of weapons of mass destruction and the employment of sponsored guerrilla groups to destabilise neighbours. MG Len le Roux (SAAF, Retd), in a study for the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (Sipri) writes this sea change included a redefinition of South Africa's defence posture and strategy, the roles and tasks of the SANDF, the required military capabilities, human resources policies, the management of military land and the environment, the military acquisition process, and the military legal system. "During the development of policy governing the tasks, operational concepts and required capabilities of the SANDF, a needs-driven but cost-constrained approach was used," Le Roux says. "This entailed an analysis of the present and future security environments, the identification of probable future defence contingencies and associated risks, and the evaluation of the capabilities required to confront these contingencies. This was then accurately costed and debated within the parliamentary defence committees and by civil society. After nine regional and three national consultative conferences, Parliament decided on what was considered to be an affordable core force: a balanced and sustainable nucleus maintaining capabilities and

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[1] Armchair Generalist, A Progressive View on Military Affairs, http://armchairgeneralist.typepad.com/my_weblog/2004/12/1_defense_polic.html, accessed August 5, 2005.

expertise for immediate requirements and the ability to expand if required. Parliament also accepted the risks that this entails. Defence policy is therefore based on an appreciation of the security environment and the consequent risks as well as the economic realities and priorities of South Africa. The processes used in the development of the new defence policy were open and consultative and have been internationally acclaimed for the manner in which they were conducted," Le Roux adds.

What is South Africa's defence policy?

The starting point of current defence policy is the 1996 Constitution and the 2002 Defence Act, both of which lie down important principles, including that national security, in general, must reflect the resolve of South Africans, "as individuals and as a nation, to live as equals, to live in peace and harmony, to be free from fear and want and to seek a better life." This resolve is meant to preclude participation in armed conflict, nationally or internationally, "except as provided for in terms of the Constitution or national legislation," meaning the Defence and Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Acts. The primary object of the defence force is to defend and protect the Republic, its territorial integrity and its people in accordance with the Constitution and the principles of international law regulating the use of force.

National security must further be pursued in compliance with domestic and international law. This is amplified by the requirement that the SANDF "must act, and must teach and require their members to act, in accordance with the Constitution and the law, including customary international law and international agreements binding on the Republic." Soldiers are also explicitly prohibited from obeying manifestly illegal orders or, in the performance of their functions, prejudicing a constitutionally legitimate political party interest or furthering, in a partisan manner, any party political objectives.

The Constitution also subjects national security to the authority of Parliament and the national executive. The President, as head of the national executive is Commander-in-Chief of the defence force. In this role he is authorised to appoint all senior commanders, without any reference to Parliament. To give effect to the principles of transparency and accountability, the Constitution then dictates that multi-party parliamentary committees must have oversight of all security services. It is also requires that the SANDF "must be structured and managed as a disciplined military force", under the supervision of a Cabinet minister assisted by a civilian defence secretariat. To further enhance Parliamentary oversight, the President is required to inform the lawmaker, promptly and in appropriate detail, of all deployments of the SANDF. Only the President, as head of the national executive, may authorise the employment of the defence force and then only in co-operation with the police service; in defence of the Republic; or in fulfilment of an international obligation.

These principles are largely repeated in the Defence Act, with the addition of one further, crucial, point: the SANDF must have a primarily defensive orientation and posture.

Governing principles

198. The following principles govern national security in the Republic:

   a. National security must reflect the resolve of South Africans, as individuals and as a nation, to live as equals, to live in peace and harmony, to be free from fear and want and to seek a better life.

   b. The resolve to live in peace and harmony precludes any South African citizen from participating in armed conflict, nationally or internationally, except as provided for in terms of the Constitution or national legislation.

   c. National security must be pursued in compliance with the law, including international law.

   d. National security is subject to the authority of Parliament and the national executive.

Establishment, structuring and conduct of security services

199. (1) The security services of the Republic consist of a single defence force, a single police service and any intelligence services established in terms of the Constitution.

(2) The defence force is the only lawful military force in the Republic.

(3) Other than the security services established in terms of the Constitution, armed organisations or services may be established only in terms of national legislation.

(4) The security services must be structured and regulated by national legislation.

(5) The security services must act, and must teach and require their members to act, in accordance with the Constitution and the law, including customary international law and international agreements binding on the Republic.

(6) No member of any security service may obey a manifestly illegal order.

(7) Neither the security services, nor any of their members, may, in the performance of their functions

   a. prejudice a political party interest that is legitimate in terms of the Constitution; or

   b. further, in a partisan manner, any interest of a political party.

(8) To give effect to the principles of transparency and accountability, multi-party parliamentary committees must have oversight of all security services in a manner determined by national legislation or the rules and orders of Parliament.

Defence

Defence force

200. (1) The defence force must be structured and managed as a disciplined military force.

(2) The primary object of the defence force is to defend and protect the Republic, its territorial integrity and its people in accordance with the Constitution and the principles of international law regulating the use of force.

Political responsibility

201. (1) A member of the Cabinet must be responsible for defence.

(2) Only the President, as head of the national executive, may authorise the employment of the defence force

    a.   in co-operation with the police service;

    b.   in defence of the Republic; or

    c.   in fulfilment of an international obligation.

(3) When the defence force is employed for any purpose mentioned in subsection (2), the President must inform Parliament, promptly and in appropriate detail, of

    a.   the reasons for the employment of the defence force;

    b.   any place where the force is being employed;

    c.   the number of people involved; and

    d.   the period for which the force is expected to be employed.

(4) If Parliament does not sit during the first seven days after the defence force is employed as envisaged in subsection (2), the President must provide the information required in subsection (3) to the appropriate oversight committee.

Command of defence force

202. (1) The President as head of the national executive is Commander-in- Chief of the defence force, and must appoint the Military Command of the defence force.

(2) Command of the defence force must be exercised in accordance with the directions of the Cabinet member responsible for defence, under the authority of the President.

State of national defence

203. (1) The President as head of the national executive may declare a state of national defence, and must inform Parliament promptly and in appropriate detail of

    a.   the reasons for the declaration;

    b.   any place where the defence force is being employed; and

    c.   the number of people involved.

(2) If Parliament is not sitting when a state of national defence is declared, the President must summon Parliament to an extraordinary sitting within seven days of the declaration.

(3) A declaration of a state of national defence lapses unless it is approved by Parliament within seven days of the declaration.

Defence civilian secretariat

204. A civilian secretariat for defence must be established by national legislation to function under the direction of the Cabinet member responsible for defence.

Table 3.2: Defence policy prescriptions in the 1996 Constitution

Principles
2. The Minister and any organ of state defined in section 239 of the Constitution, as well as all members of the Defence Force and any auxiliary service and employees, must, in exercising any power or performing any duty in terms of this Act, have regard to the following principles: (a) The formulation and execution of defence policy is subject to the authority of Parliament and the national executive. (b) The primary object of the Defence Force is to defend and protect the Republic, its people and its territorial integrity. (c) The Defence Force must perform its functions in accordance with the Constitution and international law regulating the use of force . (d) The Defence Force must have a primarily defensive orientation and posture . (e) No member of the Defence Force may obey a manifestly illegal order. (f) Neither the Defence Force nor its members may, in the performance of their functions, prejudice a political party interest that is legitimate in terms of the Constitution, or, in a partisan fashion, further any interest of a political party. (g) The Defence Force must respect the fundamental rights and dignity of its members and of all persons.

Table 3.3: Principles underlying defence policy as legislated in the Defence Act

These principles and policy prescriptions are then enlarged upon in the Defence White Paper and the Defence Review.

What is the Defence White Paper (DWP)?

A white paper is a detailed statement of government policy on a particular topic as prepared by a department, approved of by the executive and formally adopted by Parliament as a definitive statement of fact against which to measure the administration's performance of the mandate contained in the document. MG Len le Roux (SAAF, Retd) told a Sipri-sponsored conference on defence budgets in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in May 2005 that the SA Navy became the unwitting catalyst for the 1996 DWP when, in 1995, they approached the Ministry of Defence and Parliament with a request for new frigates to restore a blue ocean capability lost in the 1980s. It had long been a cherished dream of the Navy to recapitalise and then retire its flotilla of acutely uncomfortable short-range missile-armed patrol boats, called "strike craft" in the local nomenclature. But the ministry and the Parliamentary majority party, ruled there would be no equipment acquisitions before a thorough analysis of what was required – and why – had been prepared.

The document, as approved by Cabinet and adopted by Parliament, was drafted by a DoD team after unprecedented public input. The document has eight chapters:

- Chapter 1: The Challenge of Transformation
- Chapter 2: Civil-Military Relations
- Chapter 3: The Strategic Environment
- Chapter 4: Role and Functions
- Chapter 5: Human Resource Issues
- Chapter 6: Budgetary Considerations
- Chapter 7: Arms Control and the Defence Industry
- Chapter 8: Land and Environmental Issues

What is the Defence Review?

The DWP laid down policy and principles in broad brush-strokes. In order to flesh out the details, it provided for a Defence Review to "elaborate on this policy framework through comprehensive long-range planning on such matters as posture, doctrine, force design, force levels, logistic support, armaments, equipment, human resources and funding."[2] The document, as approved by Cabinet and adopted by Parliament in 1998, was drafted by a DoD team after further public input. The document has 15 chapters:
- Chapter 1: Introduction
- Chapter 2: Defence Posture and Doctrine
- Chapter 3: Self-defence and the Peace-time Force
- Chapter 4: Regional Security Co-operation
- Chapter 5: International Peace Support Operations
- Chapter 6: Cooperation with the SA Police Service
- Chapter 7: Non-military tasks
- Chapter 8: Force Design Options
- Chapter 9: Force Structure
- Chapter 10: Human Resources
- Chapter 11: The Part-Time (Reserve) Force
- Chapter 12: Land and Environment
- Chapter 13: The Acquisition Management Process
- Chapter 14: Defence Legal Environment
- Chapter 15: Conclusion
- Glossary of Military Ranks with Corresponding Civilian Appointments

What other policy papers have an influence on defence?

Defence and the DoD do not exist in a vacuum. As has already been observed, the DoD is effectively a service department that provides support to other departments in the attainment of government goals. Inside South Africa, the SANDF has been called upon to support the civil power in fighting crime and in assisting during natural and other

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[2] Defence Review, DoD, Pretoria, 1998, Chapter 1, Introduction, par 6, p1.

disasters. Abroad, it has been drafted to support the efforts of the Presidency and Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) in their ongoing efforts to bring peace to Africa's many trouble spots. As a result, thousands of soldiers, sailors and airmen have since 1999 served as United Nations and African Union peacekeepers. South Africa's policy on peacekeeping can be found in a White Paper on the subject generated by the DFA in 1998. The paper, and South Africa's foreign policy is further discussed in Chapter 15.

In the late 1990s demilitarisation pressure groups and sympathisers within the DoD were pressing for the conversion of the state and privately-owned defence industry to "peaceful production." At the same time, what remained of the once powerful industry was increasingly anxious for government direction after a period of drift and neglect. The result was the White Paper on the Defence-related Industry, published in 1999 by then-National Conventional Arms Control Committee chairman Prof Kader Asmal. The policy aspects raised therein are further discussed in Chapter 16.

Are these once-off documents, or ought they be "living", update continuously, or at least periodically?

In the United States, legislation requires the Pentagon to conduct a "Quadrennial (four-yearly) Defence Review (QDR)" in the year following a presidential election. The most recent QDR was in 2005, following the re-election of President George W Bush in 2004. The requirement was forced on the US DoD to ensure a regular rethink of the posture, doctrine, force design, force levels, logistic support, armaments, equipment, human resources and funding of the US Armed Forces for the next 20 years. The danger of "engraving in stone" policy is that it stagnates and gradually loses touch with reality as its underlying assumptions part ways with actual events. While this would suggest that "living" documents, updated continuously, are a better approach, they also have their pitfalls. In 2003, then-Standing Committee on Defence chairwoman, Thandi Modise, complained that the continuous tinkering of officials with the DWP and DR, in order to keep it current, was undermining not only certainty on policy but also democracy, as the changes were not being put before Parliament for approval.

Are any processes underway to "properly" update the DWP and DR?

Standing Committee on Defence chairwoman Thandi Modise as well as other members of her committee and the National Assembly's Portfolio Committee on Defence in 2003 and 2004 called for a review of the DWP and DR. This was initially resisted by Defence Minister Mosiuoa Lekota. However, by 2005 a review process was underway, led by Chief Director for Defence Policy Nick Sendall.

Has Parliament expressed any opinion on what ought be updated or clarified?

The Portfolio Committee on Defence has been following the process closely under its combative post-2004 chairman, former education minister Kader Asmal. Asmal, who is known to have an eye for detail, have on several occasions criticised departmental officials for vague presentations and shallow analysis. As a result, by the second half of 2005, the quality of presentations had substantially improved, allowing more information to flow into the public domain and allowing MPs greater scope in holding the department to account. Indeed, it is well to remember that Cabinet is merely an executive committee of Parliament, even under the South African system, where the balance of power is firmly tipped in favour of the executive and the president is not an MP.

At a presentation on the DWP/DR review on June 14, 2005, questions that arose after a briefing on the changed strategic environment, collective security, South Africa's approach to national security and the role, functions, objectives and missions of the SANDF, in effect the new document's first four chapters, included:
- The difference between civil and civilian control of the military,
- The relationship between poverty and conflict,
- Whether it would be in the national interest to subsidise the local defence industry, and,
- the need for more concrete evidence of the needs of the defence force and its priorities.

Are there currently any policy gaps?

Experts argue that there is a hierarchy of policy. They argue that defence policy, as articulated in DWPs and DRs are, or ought to be, derived from a supra-departmental national security policy. In the US, the QDR is always preceded by an update of their National Security Strategy. This White House document outlines US goals and objectives in the conduct of international affairs – as seen by the incumbent Administration – and identifies when and where military power might have to be exercised in the achievement of these. South Africa currently lacks a document of this sort, which presumably, would define what is meant by security, and what agencies were responsible for securing it.

Policy experts argue that government positions be reduced to paper as this increases certainty and transparency. While undeniable, it also reduces flexibility, which is why politicians and officials, the world over, often prefer "unwritten" policies or do what they can to avoid taking policy positions. In this way, the decisions they take and speeches they make can be compared with policy only in a general or vague manner.[3] South

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[3] For more on this, see *The Complete Yes, Minister,* Jonathan Lynn, Anthony Jay, BBC Books, London, c. 1985 as well as *The Complete Yes ,Prime Minister,* Jonathan Lynn, Anthony Jay, BBC Books, London, 1986, 1987, 1989. The original television episodes are available on DVD.

Africa's lack of a White Paper on Foreign Affairs can be explained by way of the same argument.

Explain the interface between policy and strategy in defence.

In the same way that national security policy ought to inform defence policy, defence policy instructs strategy. A good example of this was the policy decision, by US President Franklin D Roosevelt in the days after Pearl Harbour (December 7, 1941) to "put Germany first", meaning the United Nations (the US, Britain and their allies) would first seek to defeat Nazi Germany and only then turn to destroy Imperial Japan. It was a bold decision, considering that it had been Japan that had attacked the US, not Germany. The result was the US chiefs of staff adopting a set of strategies and making the necessary arrangements to execute the decision.

Does the concept "strategy" still carry any meaning?

This is a good question. The term "strategy" has come to be so abused in recent years as to be, from one point of view, valueless. In *The Lost Meaning of Strategy[4],* Hew Strachan writes that the word "strategy" has in recent years acquired a "universality which has robbed it of meaning, and left it only with banalities". He adds that governments have strategies to tackle the problems of education, public health and inner-city housing. "Advertising companies have strategies to sell cosmetics or clothes. Strategic studies flourish more verdantly in schools of business studies than in departments of international relations". The abuse of the term has now become so acute that the confusion caused has become apparent in the speeches of government leaders and in official policy documents. In November 2003, US President George W Bush, in an address on the Middle East at the Royal United Services Institute in London spoke of a "strategy of freedom", prompting Strachan to say: "Strategy is a military means; freedom in this context is a political or even moral condition. Strategy can be used to achieve freedom, but can freedom be strategy in itself?" A fortnight later, Britain's Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) released its first White Paper since the 1970s. According to the FCO's website, the document, which is largely concerned with terrorism and security, included "the UK's strategy for policy, public service delivery and organisational priorities." Strachan notes this implies the FCO now develops strategy to set policy, rather than policy to set strategy. "…strategic studies are not business studies, nor is strategy – despite the beliefs of George Bush and Jack Straw (the British Foreign Secretary) to the contrary – a synonym for policy."

There are many definitions of strategy, and Strachan provides some answers as to why – but they are not relevant to this discussion. The official definitions used by the US and South African militaries – and some associated terms - are reproduced here (see Tables

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[4] Hew Strachan, The Lost Meaning of Strategy, Survival, The IISS Quarterly, Volume 47 No 3 Autumn 2005.

3.4 and 3.5). Readers are also referred to Strachan for a short and enlightening discussion and Sun Tzu, Clausewitz, Jomini, Corbett, Mahan and Liddell Hart for more detailed, but not necessarily more informed views.

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military strategy — The art and science of employing the armed forces of a nation to secure the objectives of national policy by the application of force or the threat of force.

national military strategy — The art and science of distributing and applying military power to attain national objectives in peace and war.

national security strategy — The art and science of developing, applying, and coordinating the instruments of national power (diplomatic, economic, military, and informational) to achieve objectives that contribute to national security.

national (grand) strategy — The art and science of developing and using the diplomatic, economic, and informational powers of a nation, together with its armed forces, during peace and war to secure national objectives.

strategy — The art and science of developing and employing instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theatre, national, and/or multinational objectives.

Table 3.4: US definitions of strategy and related terms

The point is that the more strategy has come to be appropriated by politicians, diplomats, think tank pundits and business, the more demilitarised its meaning has become. This must be stopped. Strachan explains that in the absence of strategy, thinking about the operational level of war can diverge dangerously from the direction of foreign policy. "Strategy is not just a matter for historians. It concerns us all. Strategy is about war and its conduct, if we abandon it we surrender the tool that helps us understand it," Strachan argues. "In Hobbesian terms, the state's legitimacy rests in part on its ability to protect its citizens through a monopoly of violence, but the state's right to resort to war in its fulfilment of its obligations has been reduced. … The state therefore has an interest in re-appropriating the control and direction of war. That is the purpose of strategy. Strategy is designed to make war useable by the state, so that it can, if need be, use force to fulfil its political objectives. One of the reasons we are unsure what war is, is that we are unsure about what strategy is or is not. It is not policy; it is not politics; it is not diplomacy. It exists in relation to all three, but it does not replace them."

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strategic - Higher level management considerations concerned with the broad, open and more global state of affairs in the organisation and the implications thereof, usually on a long-term basis, for the effective functioning of the organisation and to attain over-all objectives.

strategic concept - Course of action accepted as the result of the estimate of the strategic situation. It is a statement of what is to be done expressed in broad terms sufficiently flexible to permit its use in framing the basic undertakings which stem from it.

strategic policy - Policy or pattern of objects according to strategic thought covering the entire scope of actual and foreseeable conflict situations, as opposed to limiting it to a particular conflict situation. Also covers the applicable logistic planning.

<table>
<tr><td>strategic study - Analysis of laws and principles which govern conflicts between nations.

strategist – 1. One who devises or shapes strategy. 2. Person specialising in strategy.

strategy – Art and science of developing and using political, economic, psychological and military forces during peace and war, to afford maximum support to policies in order to increase the probability of victory and to decrease the possibility of defeat.</td></tr>
</table>

Table 3.5: SA definitions of strategy and related terms. In light of the accompanying discussion, the concept of "strategic policy" is noteworthy. Threats are made bigger and less manageable by the use of imprecise vocabulary, Strachan says.

What is the difference between national, departmental and military strategy?

National strategy exists at supra-departmental level and aims to put into effect national policy. In theory, there can be a single, consolidated, strategy or there can be a number of national strategies, including, for example, a national security strategy, from which military strategy could be derived. Note that national security strategy is subordinate to national security policy and military strategy to defence policy. Nonetheless, military strategy will, more often than not, be an expansion of national security strategy – assuming there is one. British historian and strategist Basil H Liddell Hart, as a result defined military strategy as "the art of distributing and applying military means to fulfil the ends of policy." Departmental strategy differs from military strategy in that it is not department-specific and deals mainly with administration.

Is there a hierarchy of strategy?

Yes, according to the Strategic Business Plan[5] there is a distinct hierarchy, starting with a national security strategy. Below it, the document identifies four levels, namely: corporate strategies, resource strategies, core capability system strategies and resource system plans. Schematically, it looks like this:

<table>
<tr><td colspan="5" align="center">National Security Strategy
▼</td></tr>
<tr><td>• Corporate Strategies:</td><td colspan="2" align="center">Military Strategy</td><td colspan="2">Defence Strategy</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="5" align="center">▼</td></tr>
<tr><td>• Resources Strategies:
Strategies</td><td>HR</td><td>Finance</td><td>Materiel</td><td>Information</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="5" align="center">▼</td></tr>
<tr><td>• Core Capability System Strategies:</td><td>Provide Forces Strategy</td><td>Support Strategies</td><td colspan="2">Employ Forces Strategy</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="5" align="center">▼</td></tr>
<tr><td>• Resource System Plans:</td><td>HR System Plan</td><td>Finance System Plan</td><td>Materiel System Plan</td><td>Enterprise Information</td></tr>
</table>

[5] Strategic Business Plan FY2005/6 to FY2007/8, DoD, Pretoria, p14.

Table 3.6: Strategies and plans

What strategy documents are there?

It is impossible to tell. The military strategic level is firmly within the sphere of government where some secrecy is warranted. What follows is a discussion of what is in the public domain. Before continuing, it must be said, that as is the case with the DoD's Annual Report, there are often two versions of strategic documents – a classified version for government use and a sanitised version for public release. These are often void of detail and filled with vagueness. Intentional vagueness in such a case is often not meant to keep the public in ignorance as much as leaving strategists and their principals space to manoeuvre. It has been observed that when strategists rush to the precipice, they often do not leave themselves room to turn.

The following documents are available:
- Strategic Business Plan
- SANDF Military Strategy
- DoD Annual Report

Strategic Business Plan. The latest plan applies to the three year period starting April 1, 2005 and ending March 31, 2008. As such, the plan complies with the Treasury's three-year Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF). A new strategic plan is released every year.[6]
The plan addresses:
- Chapter 1: Strategic profile and defence objectives: Introduction, Vision, Mission, Mandate of the Department of Defence, Defence Strategic Objectives, Mission Success Factors, Defence Outcome, Minister of Defence's Objectives, Minister of Defence's Strategic Guidelines FY2005/06, Strategic Focus, Functions of the Secretary for Defence, Functions of the Chief of the SANDF, Functions of the SANDF, Defence Outputs, Defence Programmes, Departmental Values, Affordability and Sustainability, and Parys Resolutions.
- Chapter 2: Defence Strategy: Introduction, Defence Strategy, The Military Strategy, Military Strategic Objectives, Military Strategic Concepts, Military Strategic Capabilities, Missions, Employ Forces Strategy, Force Employment Strategy, Force Preparation Strategy, Support Strategies, The Support Concept, Force Renewal, Human Resources Strategy 2010, Information Strategy, Logistic Strategy, Strategic Objectives, and Strategic Capital Acquisition Master Plan (SCAMP).
- Chapter 3: Organisational management: Overview, Post Structure, Force Structure and Design, Force Structure, and Force Design and Status.

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[6] Available, online, at www.mil.za

- Chapter 4: Defence administration: Purpose, Financial Resources, Outputs, Risks and Mitigating Actions, Services to be Scaled Down, Suspended or Abolished, and Performance and Service-delivery Improvement.
- Chapter 5: Force employment (Joint Operations): Purpose, Financial Resources, Outputs, Joint Exercises, Multinational Exercises, Regional Security, Support to the People, Training Support to Foreign Forces, Risks and Mitigating Actions, Services to be Scaled Down or Suspended during FY2005/06, and Performance and Service-delivery Improvement.
- Chapter 6: Landward defence: Purpose, Financial Resources, Outputs, Risks and Mitigating Actions, Services to be Scaled Down, Suspended or Abolished, and Performance and Service-delivery Improvement.
- Chapter 7: Air defence: Purpose, Financial Resources, Outputs, Risks and Mitigating Actions, Services to be Scaled Down, Suspended or Abolished, and Performance and Service-delivery Improvement.
- Chapter 8: Maritime defence: Purpose, Financial Resources, Outputs, Risks and Mitigating Actions, Services to be Scaled Down, Suspended or Abolished, and Performance and Service-delivery Improvement.
- Chapter 9: Military Health Service: Purpose, Financial Resources, Outputs, Risks and Mitigating Actions, Services to be Scaled Down, Suspended or Abolished, and Performance and Service-delivery Improvement.
- Chapter 10: Defence intelligence: Purpose, Financial Resources, Outputs, Risks and Mitigating Actions, Services to be Scaled Down, Suspended or Abolished, and Performance and Service-delivery Improvement.
- Chapter 11: Joint Support: Purpose, Financial Resources, Outputs, Risks and Mitigating Actions, Services to be Scaled Down, Suspended or Abolished, and Performance and Service-delivery Improvement.
- Chapter 12: Special Defence Account: Purpose, Financial Resources, Outputs, Risks and Mitigating Actions, Services to be Scaled Down, Suspended or Abolished, and Performance and Service-delivery Improvement.
- Chapter 13: Conclusions

Military Strategy. The military strategy document does not waste time defining what military strategy is, or making small-talk, such as disclosing its date of compilation or suchlike. Instead, it launches straight into the topic, saying by way of introduction that the SANDF military strategy "provides an answer to the military challenges expected throughout the next decade." The more-wordy Strategic Business Plan, while still failing to define the subject, explains that military strategy was derived from the Constitution, the Defence Act, the DWP, DR and the National Security Strategy of SA, "which directs the defence strategy." The document states the "aim of the DoD defence strategy is the compilation, integration and alignment of existing strategies, plans and initiatives to ensure the effective, efficient and economic implementation and execution of the military strategy. The defence strategy operationalises the prescripts of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, the Defence Act, the White Paper on Defence and the Defence Review… The defence strategy therefore gives direction to the execution of the military strategy and its sub-strategies."

MILITARY STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES

The Military Strategic Objectives are the *ends* that are to be achieved by the South African National Defence Force. These objectives cover the full range of military and other ordered commitments.[7] The objectives are as follows:

- **Defence Against Aggression.** The provision of self-defence in accordance with international law against any external aggression which endangers the stability of South Africa.

- **Promoting Security.** The provision of external deployment or support to enhance security in support of decisions by the executive.

- **Supporting the People of South Africa.** Supporting the population of South Africa by means of operations other than war, during periods when the responsible state departments do not have the capacity to do so.

MISSION-BASED APPROACH

The mission-based approach uses wartime and peacetime missions to direct the peacetime strategy for force preparation and to guide joint and combined force preparation and force employment for conflict. As the South African National Defence Force has to operate with limited resources and the threats to be encountered in the next ten years are uncertain, it is impossible to train and plan for all possible contingencies. A list of missions, derived from the National Security Strategy and other policy documents, is subsequently used to steer the activities of the South African National Defence Force. By intelligently utilising this list, the risk of being surprised by unforeseen contingencies is greatly reduced and military excellence ensured. The Mission-Based approach looks at all the prescribed missions, whilst simultaneously maintaining conventional skills required by the SANDF. Missions are combinations of tasks that should be performed to achieve Military Strategic Objectives. The missions postulated for the next 10 years are as follows:

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[7] The Strategic Business Plan adds that "the objectives are not prioritised".

DEFENCE AGAINST AGGRESSION

The provision of self-defence in accordance with International Law against any external aggression which endangers the stability of South Africa.

- **Show-of-force.** A demonstration of the readiness of the force to engage in one or more missions. This could, for instance, be done by means of a training exercise.

- **Pre-emptive Operations.** This is an attack initiated on the basis of a belief that an enemy attack is imminent or under way. (Within the limits of International Law regulating the use of force.)

- **Repelling of a Conventional Onslaught.** Military operations launched in order to protect and defend South Africa, its citizens and national interests against aggression committed by forces of another state or group of states, excluding the use of nuclear weapons.

- **Repelling of an Unconventional Onslaught.** Operations conducted against guerrilla or para-military groupings conducting operations that are in conflict with the Constitutional order of South Africa.

- **Repelling of a Non-conventional Onslaught.** Operations to curb attacks by a-national (not belonging to a specific nation), sub-national (groupings within a country) or meta-national (groupings that span more than one nation, for example multi-national companies or cartels) forces. Examples are religious fundamentalists, warlords or groups trafficking in illicit drugs, piracy, weapons or undocumented migrants. These can be groupings from within or outside South Africa.

- **Defence Against an Information Onslaught.** Defensive measures against an onslaught on South Africa's military information, information-based processes and information systems.

- **Defence Against a Biological and/or Chemical Onslaught.** Defensive measures against the employment of biological agents or chemical products by an adversary to produce casualties in man or animal and damage to plants or matériel, to obtain military advantage.

- **Special Operations.** Special operations are operations of a specialised nature that are conducted by specially trained and equipped military forces. Special Operations will normally be conducted jointly with different Services, while the authority for these deployments will mainly be granted at the highest or even political level.

- **Protection of Foreign Assets.** Examples of foreign assets that need protection include embassies, high commissions, consulates and related facilities.

PROMOTING SECURITY

Promoting Security means the provision of external deployment or support to enhance security in support of decisions by the executive.

- **Supporting Military Foreign Relations.** Military foreign relations could include attachés, own personnel attending courses, foreign students attending own courses or any other activity that will enhance the peace and security-building measures between countries.

- **Defence Against an Information Onslaught.** Defensive measures against an onslaught on alliance's military information, information-based processes and information systems in which South Africa participates.

- **Sub-regional, Regional or International Peace Support Operations**

    - **Observers.** A military observer is a person mandated by an international organisation to observe a treaty, military cease-fire, an international organisation or the execution of a United

Nations Security Council resolution.

- **Peace-keeping.** Peace-keeping operations describe the activities of the United Nations in the field. Modern peace-keeping operations normally involve both military and civilian personnel who are tasked with monitoring and assisting with the implementation of agreements reached between belligerent parties. Such activities are also mandated under Chapter VI of the UN Charter. They take place with the consent of the conflicting parties and do not involve the use of force (other than in self-defence) by the peace-keepers.

- **Peace-making.** Peace-making is primarily a diplomatic process/activity, which is conducted with the aim of bringing hostile parties to a negotiated agreement through peaceful means.

- **Peace-enforcement.** Peace-enforcement describes activities where, in terms of Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Security Council deems it necessary to use armed force to maintain or restore international peace and security in situations where the peace is threatened, where a breach of the peace occurs, or where there is an act of aggression.

- **Peace-building.** Peace-building may occur at any stage in the conflict cycle, but it is critical in the aftermath of a conflict. In essence, peace-building is mainly a diplomatic/developmental process.

- **Humanitarian Intervention.** The provision of safe areas or corridors to ensure the safety of populations caught up in areas of conflict.

- **Search-and-rescue.** The use of aircraft, vessels, specialised rescue teams and equipment to search for and rescue personnel in distress on land or at sea.

- **Disaster Relief and Humanitarian Assistance Disaster Relief.** The provision of support for the preservation of life, health and property in emergency situations which exceed the capacity of the civilian authorities.

- **Humanitarian Assistance.** The provision of support to alleviate human suffering.

SUPPORTING THE PEOPLE OF SOUTH AFRICA

The population of South Africa is supported by means of operations and activities other than war during periods when the responsible government departments do not have the capacity to do so.

- **Maritime Support.** Support to other state departments which do not have the capacity to execute their maritime responsibilities. It currently consists of the following:
  - The provision of surveillance and enforcement support to the relevant authorities for the protection of marine resources.
  - The provision of assistance in the protection of the marine environment against pollution.
  - The provision of transport assistance to the Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism to the Prince Edward Island group, Gough Island and the Antarctic.
  - The provision of hydrographic services for the purposes of the Navy, South Africa's mariners and to other mariners in terms of regional and inter-national obligations.
  - The promulgation of radio navigation warnings, notices to mariners, and tidal and related meteorological data to mariners in terms of international obligations.

- **Border-line Control.** Border-line control is the application of border control between identified ports of entry, such as a border control post. Border-line control includes control between designated ports of entry, as well as airspace and maritime control. Border-line control is a South African Police Service

function in which the South African National Defence Force currently assists.

- **Co-operation with the South African Police Service.** The South African National Defence Force may in certain circumstance assist the South African Police Service. This assistance excludes police functions such as criminal investigation, arresting suspects, preparing dockets and involvement in the criminal justice system.

- **Search-and-rescue.** The use of aircraft, vessels, specialised rescue teams and equipment to search for and rescue personnel in distress on land or at sea.

- **Disaster-relief and Humanitarian Assistance**
  o **Disaster Relief.** The provision of support for the preservation of life, health and property in emergency situations which exceed the capacity of the civilian authorities.
  o **Humanitarian Assistance.** The provision of support to alleviate human suffering.

- **Support to Other Government Departments.** Providing assistance when other government departments do not have the capacity or during emergencies.

- **Presidential Tasks.** These are tasks that are performed by the Department of Defence for national interest or at the request of the President. The tasks include support provided on an *ad hoc* basis when emergencies occur. Examples are: when soldiers are used to curb the spread of foot-and-mouth disease or cholera, the provision of the National Ceremonial Guard, as well as protection and health care of very important persons.

- **Air Transport for Diplomatic Commitments.** The provision of air transport for the President, the Deputy President, the Minister and Deputy Minister of Defence and, where capacity allows, other cabinet ministers and provincial premiers.

- **Presidential Health Support.** A comprehensive military health support to the President, Deputy President and other personnel as directed by the President on a 24-hour basis, both internally and externally to South Africa.

- **Maintenance of Health Status of Members of the South African National Defence Force.** Maintaining the health status of individuals and groups at an acceptable level for the South African National Defence Force to fulfil its obligations.

MILITARY STRATEGIC CONCEPTS

The Military Strategic Concepts are the *ways* in which the Military Strategic Objectives of the South African National Defence Force are to be achieved. At the strategic level, Military Strategic Concepts are intangible, but become more substantial as lower levels of objectives/tasks are derived. The South African National Defence Force will use the mission-based approach. This approach uses wartime and peacetime missions to direct the peacetime strategy for force preparation and to guide joint and multi-national force preparation, and force employment for incidences of conflict. The mission-based approach consists of the following strategic concepts:

Mission-essential Training. The training of personnel in the essential knowledge and skills required to execute tasks necessary to accomplish missions.

Mission-trained Force. A force prepared and supported to execute identified missions (within the parameters of the selective engagement concept).

Selective Engagement. The concept of selective engagement indicates that the South African National Defence Force will execute all the prescribed missions, but will be selective in terms of the extent to which operations and tasks emanating from these missions will be executed. This concept implies that calculated

risks will have to be taken. The Chief of the South African National Defence Force will advise the National Executive (the President and Cabinet), who ultimately decides on the extent of the operations.

Strategic Positioning. This concept indicates that the South African National Defence Force is willing to proactively establish a sound security environment, supported by influencing political and military foreign-relations actions, and the pre-placement of appropriate military capabilities.

The Critical Success Factors underlying the Military Strategic Concepts, namely doctrine, leadership, the soldier, education, training and development, focused effort, technology and sustainability, are to be developed into goals and objectives. They are to be measurable and aimed at the practical implementation of the Mission-based Approach.

MILITARY STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES

The missions which will enable the South African National Defence Force to achieve the Military Strategic Objectives (ends) are prioritised and divided into three capability groupings. The first of these groupings clearly fall into the 'Support the People' category, the second in the 'Promoting Security' category, and the third in the 'Defence Against Aggression' category.

As these missions are considered to be capability drivers, each capability's contribution to the successful execution of each mission was considered, taking the priority of each mission into account. This constitutes the *means* of the Military Strategy. As missions can change at short notice, it was not considered prudent to prioritise the capabilities based on the current prioritised missions. However, it was clear that there are three broad categories of joint strategic capabilities within a single force, which are described as follows:

- **C4I3RS.** C4I3RS capability is a collective description consisting of the elements of command and control, communications, computers, information, intelligence, infrastructure, reconnaissance and surveillance. It is the essential military sensory capability and command and control support for the whole range of military missions.

- **Light Mobile Capability.** Personnel and matériel prepared and sustained to participate in operations where agility, flexibility and limited fire power are required.

- **Conventional Warfare Capability.** Personnel, matériel and doctrine prepared and sustained to repel a conventional onslaught.

- **Support Capability.** The ability to support and sustain systems commensurate with the force and executing the mission according to the Military Strategic Objectives.

These categories of strategic capabilities are used to guide the composition of the Mission-trained Force and the Mission-essential Training concepts. C4I3RS is essential for the whole range of missions.

Maintaining the correct balance in the provision of the required organisational structure with its military equipment and fighting vehicles, aircraft and vessels will allow for the growth potential within capabilities. In order to develop and maintain the strategic capabilities, the following concepts apply:
- **Skills-based Capabilities.** The training of operators to enhance knowledge and skills, for instance through simulation-based training, cross-training or training in foreign countries. The hardware component of the capability could be preserved, leased or even acquired on a lay-by contract.

- **Multi-role Preparation.** All elements are structured, equipped and prepared according to the mission-essential tasks in one of the strategic capabilities. However, the same elements should also be trained and prepared for mission-essential tasks in the other strategic capabilities, e.g. the trooper in the Armour Corps is trained not only as a tank gunner, but also as a rifleman capable of fulfilling certain light infantry missions. Multi-role preparation implies that total numbers can be reduced.

- **Reserves.** The Reserves should be fully utilised to ensure economy of effort and cost effectiveness.

MILITARY STRATEGY IN CONTEXT

The Military Strategic Objectives, the Military Strategic Concepts and the Military Strategic Capabilities are not to be seen as separate parts of the Military Strategy, but as an integrated whole. The integration takes place through the implementation of the Military Strategy by means of the multi-role approach. Each of the entities should not be viewed as being the basis of separate force structures, but should be seen in an integrated fashion.

The contextual environment is characterised by uncertainties and unpredictability. A flexible approach to defence planning necessitates a Military Strategy that takes account of strategic surprises. This Military Strategy enables the Department of Defence to comply with the demands of the uncertain environment. Flexibility is achieved through the utilization of multi-role preparation, skills-based capability and the Reserves.

Table 3.7: Extract from the Military Strategy, undated.

FORCE EMPLOYMENT STRATEGY

Introduction. In contrast with its previous isolation, the SANDF now forms part of a larger defence community with new challenges and opportunities, which necessitate a new approach to regional defence. NEPAD will challenge the SANDF to contribute to the success of these initiatives. The Force Employment Strategy aims to guide the SANDF in conducting operations in this new environment.

Regional Priorities. The region is the focus of the SANDF, with specific countries identified as key partners in enhancing peace and prosperity in the region. The SANDF must contribute to the successful execution of NEPAD as its first priority and be guided by the approved objectives and priorities of the International Relations, Peace and Security (IRPS) Cluster, in respect of other priorities. This, however, does not preclude the SANDF becoming involved in countries outside the region.

Approach to Force Employment. The SANDF Force Employment Strategy, which will be executed in three stages, is based on the following:

☐ A multinational approach aimed at the establishment, structuring, staffing, equipping, operating, exercising, sustaining and empowering of subregional structures to foster security.
☐ An interdepartmental approach with the focus on improving co-operation.
☐ A phased approach that endeavours to change the focus over time from 'Supporting the People' to 'Promoting Peace, Security and Stability in the Region and the Continent'. The aim is to foster an environment of stability and security in the region to reduce the possibility of having Enhancing and Maintaining Comprehensive Defence Capabilities'.

All the above-mentioned approaches will be executed with a joint and/or multinational mission-trained task force comprising the capabilities of all the Services and Divisions, either supported by or in support of other role players.

It is therefore imperative that a focused effort should be maintained to co-ordinate all projects relating to the approved missions, to provide cost-effective solutions. Furthermore, it is crucial that capability development should enhance interoperability between the SANDF and other forces in the region to ensure effective multinational operations. Interoperability should therefore be addressed a a priority.

FORCE PREPARATION STRATEGY

The defence capabilities of the SANDF will only be fully used in the event of a general war, which threatens the nation's sovereignty. There is thus no need to keep the entire force at a high level of readiness as the costs incurred cannot be fully justified and would potentially be a fruitless expenditure. This principle has been recognised in both the Defence Review and the Military Strategy.

Currently, before committing forces for a general war, it is assumed that there will be a period of preparation. Large, fully trained, equipped and manned ready standing forces are deemed unnecessary. Armed forces are therefore split into three categories:
 Immediate forces for unexpected or sudden crises requiring a quick response.
 Follow-up forces where a crisis is either foreseen (and there is sufficient warning time to mobilise Reserves) or where a crisis has escalated.
 Heightened force requirements that would only be fully mobilised in the event of a war of national survival.

It will be noticed that the bulk of the forces are Reserve Forces and that only a portion of the Regular Force is within the Immediate Forces category. Forces that are currently deployed or are preparing to deploy on a mission or are resting after a mission, are drawn from the Immediate Forces pool. The approach above informs the Force Preparation Strategy which aims to prepare the force required to execute the Military Strategy in an efficient and effective manner. Chief of Joint Operations specifies, on behalf of the Chief of the SANDF, the readiness states and force levels of the immediate forces.

SUPPORT STRATEGIES

THE SUPPORT CONCEPT

The concept of support provides for all modes of operation in multiple combinations and is to be implemented on the premise that force preparation is founded on bases, while mobile support capabilities are to be created to support operations in the strategic domain.

The support of the DOD is optimised at Departmental level by integrating the common and unique support efforts across functional capability centres based on centres of excellence and the utilisation of national level agencies such as the Commission for Administration Training Centres, SITA, and the SABS in conjunction with tertiary institutions and ARMSCOR.

The concept of support is integrated with the concept of operations and bound together by a single Departmental plan that implements the Departmental strategy. The uniqueness is characterised in terms of the unique operational environments and dictates that specialised support concepts are to be developed which entails that the "front" of the support system supports uniqueness, while the "rear" utilises a common technology base.

In and outsourcing activities that constitute the DOD core capabilities will not be outsourced. Outsourcing, therefore, will be driven by the existence of a competitive market for the activity, to ensure that competition drives the improvement of quality, reduction of costs, and achieves a better supplier focus on DOD requirements, resulting in best value for money for the taxpayer. Many activities can, therefore, either best be performed by the DOD or by outside parties, based on expertise or technological edge, or aspects such as economy of scale and systems integrity, and to ensure that the DOD does not encroach on the domain of the private sector or duplicate national infrastructure.

In-sourcing of support to or from other departments or parastatals will be utilised where so dictated by factors such as economy of scale, expertise and technological capability.

The determining of strategic reserves should be seen as a multi-departmental interactive process rather than a mono-driven process by the DOD based on the premise that strategic reserves could also be determined by other departments, e.g. Minerals and Energy Affairs for oil reserves.

Although contingencies are utilised at strategic level to define force requirements, provision has to be made at operational level to prepare for aspects such as disaster relief in the region. Reserves per mission should therefore be planned by mission commanders within the boundaries of present conventional doctrine based on a three and five-day paradigm.

FORCE RENEWAL
The renewal of the SANDF resources, both matériel and human, is detailed in the following plans:
 Human Resources Strategy 2010.
 Information Strategy.
 Logistic Strategy.
 Strategic Capital Acquisition Master Plan.

Financial and other constraints necessitate extending force renewal over a relatively long period. The long-term sustainability of the SANDF will be maintained by restructuring the Force in order to ensure that scarce resources are not inappropriately utilised, whilst retaining the capability to expand in times of need and thus meet current and foreseen future commitments.

Human Resources Strategy 2010

The aim of the DOD HR Strategy 2010 is to ensure the availability of the right quantity and quality of human resources in the right places at the right times, who are effectively, efficiently and economically managed and administered. The strategic goals of the HR Strategy 2010 are as follows:
 To rejuvenate the SANDF's (HR) composition with young, fit and healthy members who meet the requirements for operational utilisation.
 To achieve an affordable HR composition.
 To adequately resource and utilise the Regular Force and the Reserve Force.
 To replace the current SANDF service system with a new service system that will reduce personnel expenditure and optimise force level flexibility.
 To attain a broad level of representativity at all levels and in all occupational classes.
 To improve HR service delivery.
 To obtain equity in the management and administration of uniformed and civilian personnel.
 To retain the required operational and functional expertise.
It is imperative that specific projects or interventions support existing policy and institutional frameworks in order to improve service delivery and efficiency.

Information Strategy

The Information Strategy presents the ways, means and ends to transform the information resources to be effective and efficient in their role of attaining the DOD corporate objectives. Within the context of the National Security Strategy, the Information Strategy forms a key element of the DOD strategic framework ... and comprises the following:
 DOD Defence Strategy that forms the capstone of all the strategies and plans, and articulates the corporate strategic objectives (ends), a mission-based approach to strategic military concepts as the ways by which to achieve these objectives and the capabilities as the means to achieve the strategic objectives.
 Resource strategies that prescribe the evolution of key resources, i.e. human re-sources, materiel resources, financial resources and the information resources, as fundamental means to enable the DOD Defence Strategy.
 Core capability system strategies that prescribes the evolution of resource configurations and methods in support of the DOD Defence Strategy and resource strategies.
 Resource system plans that unpack the strategies into realistic and executable plans.

Logistic Strategy

The DOD Logistic Agency is to provide an integrated, joint logistics support system to the DOD and

customers as determined by the Secretary for Defence and the Chief of the SANDF. The following will provide for this:

☐ The DOD Logistic Division will supply strategic logistic direction and guidance by means of logistic strategy, policy, doctrine, strategic resources allocation and output objectives.

☐ The DOD Logistic Support Formation and force structure elements will execute the strategy by complying with the policies, doctrine, resources allocation and output objectives.

The policies and plans as promulgated by the DOD Log Division include the guidance of unique logistics as conducted by the Services and Divisions. Joint Logistics will be conducted as follows:

☐ Deeper level logistic capabilities by means of depots and other force structure elements under command (4th Line) (deeper/depot level).

☐ Joint second line (2nd) (intermediate level) logistic support in-sourced from the Services and/or Divisions to support operations as required by CJ Ops.

☐ Third line (3rd) (deployable D - Level) logistic support by means of reserve forces and in doing this enhancing the 'One-Force' concept.

☐ Logistic support (Internal) through the deployment of Joint Support bases.

During peacetime and in war situations the logistical depots are employed to ensure the capability and capacity to support the STFEP.

Strategic Objectives

Over the next decade the Logistic Agency will focus on acquiring the optimal level of competency, technology, and organisational structure as allowed for by the Medium-term Expenditure Framework (MTEF).

Over the medium term, the strategic focus of the DOD Logistic Agency will be to create an affordable single logistic structure within the DOD based on the transformational principles and design (provide logistics process). It will also strive to enforce the transformation imperatives of ensuring that all logistic functions from the 2nd line (intermediate) to the 4th line (deeper/depot level) form part of the strategy of the Agency so as to ensure a single point of entry, accountability and responsibility for Logistics in the DOD, thereby ensuring effective, efficient, economical and transparent resources management in the DOD.

The short-term focus of the DOD Logistic Agency will be to support defence capabilities to meet operational and other commitments ordered by Government and continue with the restructuring of the DOD Logistic Agency based on the transformational design and principles to meet these challenges.

Strategic Capital Acquisition Master Plan (Scamp)

The Force Structure Plan of the DOD contains the essential defence capabilities, each of which inherently represents a certain priority in terms of the total defence capability. The contribution of each capability is assessed in order to determine the life cycle budget allocation for such a capability.

Existing capabilities are always in various states of obsolescence from a technological or physical perspective, which in turn determines the urgency of upgrading or replacing them.

With due consideration of this urgency, a set of development plans for this force design and the rest of the infrastructure has been compiled. From the development plans, requirement specification baselines for a combat grouping and/or a user-system are established for each of the Required Operational Capability (ROC). ROCs are to satisfy requirements for new operational capabilities or for the expansion of existing operational capabilities, and to satisfy a need for improvement of the existing operational capabilities through upgrading, modification or replacement. This is done through the prioritisation of requirements derived from the operational gap analysis, based on obsolescence and other considerations, subsequently expressed as ROCs.

The DOD strategic direction process directs armaments acquisition. The annual financial allocation and scheduling of armaments acquisition is contained in the (Strategic) Capital Acquisition Master Plan

(SCAMP), from which annual business plans are derived and budgetary actions are taken. Updates to the SCAMP will be directed by the strategic direction process, annual budget cycle and inyear revisions.

Table 3.8: The SANDF's force employment, force preparation and support strategies, as explained in the Strategic Business Plan, FY2005/6 to FY2007/8

Are there currently any strategic gaps?

Again, it is difficult to say. Since some of the documents concerned are classified in whole or in part, it is not easy to gain an informed opinion. Even in the case of public documents, such an opinion is problematic because they lack the detail of the classified versions.

What is the link between strategy and doctrine?

Strategy flows from policy. Doctrine flows from strategy, but is also influenced by posture, itself derived from policy. Section 2(d) of the Defence Act (See Table 3.3) stipulates that the "Defence Force must have a primarily defensive orientation and posture," a prescription first raised in the 1996 Defence White Paper.

Posture n.

1. a. A position of the body or of body parts: a sitting posture.
   b. An attitude; a pose: assumed a posture of angry defiance.
2. A characteristic way of bearing one's body; carriage: stood with good posture.
3. Relative placement or arrangement: the posture of the buildings on the land.
4. A stance or disposition with regard to something: "Those bases are essential to our *military posture* in the Middle East."
5. A frame of mind affecting one's thoughts or behavior; an overall attitude.

Table 3.9: Posture, as defined by the Houghton Mifflin Company Dictionary. Author's *italics*.

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military posture

capability in terms of personnel and materiel that affect the capacity to fight a war; "we faced an army of great strength"; "politicians have neglected our military posture" Synonyms: military capability, military strength, strength, posture

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Table 3.10: Military posture as defined by Princeton University's online WordNet dictionary (**http://wordnet.princeton.edu/perl/webwn?s=military%20posture)**, accessed October 6, 2005. This definition, found on several other US dictionary websites, seems less appropriate than that found in Table 3.9 (points 1b and 4).

> **orientation**
>
> - the act of orienting
> - an integrated set of attitudes and beliefs
> - position or alignment relative to points of the compass or other specific directions
> - predilection, preference, orientation (a predisposition in favor of something) "a predilection for expensive cars"; "his sexual preferences"; "showed a Marxist orientation"
> - a person's awareness of self with regard to position and time and place and personal relationships

Table 3.11: Orientation, as defined by Princeton University's online WordNet dictionary (**http://wordnet.princeton.edu/perl/webwn?s=orientation**), accessed October 6, 2005.

What is the South African military's posture? A "Defence Update 2005"[8] briefing to the National Assembly's Portfolio Committee on Defence on August 17, 2005, told MPs the "SANDF has a defensive non-threatening posture that best accommodates the international and domestic legal imperatives guiding defence. This posture allows for the involvement of the SANDF in collective security structures, bilateral and multi-lateral mechanisms and the promotion of regional and continental security through participation in peace missions. However, this does not abrogate capabilities that can provide the ability to operate in a tactically offensive manner."

This is, in effect, a synopsis of the 1996 White Paper that provided the following additional directives:
- National security was to be sought primarily through efforts to meet the political, economic, social and cultural rights and needs of South Africa's people, and through efforts to promote and maintain regional security.
- South Africa would pursue peaceful relations with other states. It would seek a high level of political, economic and military co-operation with Southern African states in particular.
- South Africa committed itself to the goals of arms control and disarmament at national, regional and international levels.
- South Africa would not then, or in the future, ever again have aggressive intentions towards any state.

That sorted, what then is doctrine? The US military defines doctrine as "fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application."[9]

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[8] Available from the Parliamentary Monitoring Group, www.pmg.org.za
[99] US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint Publication 1-02, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf, accessed, June 5, 2005.

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doctrine

1. A principle or body of principles presented for acceptance or belief, as by a religious, political, scientific, or philosophic group; dogma.
2. A rule or principle of law, especially when established by precedent.
3. A statement of official government policy, especially in foreign affairs and military strategy.
4. Archaic. Something taught; a teaching.

[Middle English, from Old French, from Latin *doctrina*, from doctor, teacher. See doctor.]

Table 3.12: Doctrine, as defined by the Houghton Mifflin Company Dictionary.

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doctrine

Doctrine, from Latin doctrina, means "a body of teachings" or "instructions", taught principles or positions, as the body of teachings in a branch of knowledge or belief system. The Greek analogy is the etymology of catechism.

Often doctrine specifically connotes a corpus of religious dogma as it is promulgated by a church, but not necessarily: doctrine is also used to refer to a principle of law, in the common law traditions, established through a history of past decisions, such as the doctrine of self-defence, or the principle of fair use, or the more narrowly applicable first-sale doctrine.

In matters of foreign policy, a doctrine is a body of axioms fundamental to the exercise of a nation's foreign policy. Hence, "doctrine,' in this sense, has come to suggest a broad consistency that holds true across a spectrum of acts and actions. Doctrines of this sort are almost always presented as the personal creations of one particular political leader, whom they are named after. Examples include the Monroe Doctrine, the Stimson Doctrine, the Truman Doctrine, the Eisenhower Doctrine, the Brezhnev Doctrine, and the less catchy Bush administration doctrine of military pre-emption, and the Kirkpatrick doctrine.

In the US it has become something of a tradition for each President to have his own doctrine.

Sometimes 'doctrine' is an ambitious word for a mere slogan: the slogan 'Peace through strength' is termed a 'doctrine' at Wikipedia.

The term also applies to the concept of an established procedure to a complex operation in warfare. The typical example is tactical doctrine in which a standard set of manoeuvres, kinds of troops and weapons are employed as a default approach to a kind of attack.

SYNONYMS: dogma, tenet. These nouns denote a principle taught, advanced, or accepted, as by a group of philosophers: the legal doctrine of due process; church dogma; experimentation, one of the tenets of the physical sciences.

Table 3.13: Doctrine, as defined by the wikipedia, **www.wikipedia.com**, accessed, October 6, 2005.

What is the SANDF's doctrine?

The answer can be found, no doubt, in part, in Chapter 2 of the 1998 Defence Review. To recap: The Constitution provides that the primary object of the SANDF is to defend and protect the Republic, its territorial integrity and its people, in accordance with prescripts

found elsewhere in that document and the principles of international law regulating the use of force. Posture was set at defensive and South Africa committed itself to pursue peaceful relations with other states. This included a commitment not to have aggressive intentions towards any other state.

The 1996 White Paper further asserted that the government has an inherent right and responsibility to ensure the protection of the state and its people against external military threats. The 1998 Defence Review added South Africa would employ the following principal strategies to this end:
- Political, economic and military co-operation with other states. In this context, a common security regime, regional defence co-operation and confidence- and security-building measures in Southern Africa are particularly important.
- The prevention, management and resolution of conflict through non-violent means. Conflict resolution, in the form of diplomacy, mediation or arbitration, may take place on a bilateral basis or under the auspices of an international or regional body.
- The deployment of the Defence Force. The use or threat of force against external military aggression is a legitimate measure of last resort when political solutions have been exhausted.

"It is thus clear that the government s preferred and primary course of action is to prevent conflict and war. South Africa will only turn to military means when non-violent strategies and deterrence have failed. Deterrence requires the existence of a credible defence capability to inhibit potential aggressors. Although South Africa is not confronted by any foreseeable external military threat, this capability cannot be turned on and off like a tap. It is therefore essential to maintain a core defence capability with the potential for expansion should this ever be necessary." The Defence Review then explained that deterrence plays a crucial role in preventing armed conflict. The concept implies that a potential aggressor must believe that South Africa has the capacity to apply sufficient force to thwart an act of aggression – and the political will to apply it if compelled to do so.

"In summary, South Africa has turned away from an isolationist and offensive posture to one of common security in Southern Africa; defence co-operation with other states; respect for international peace and security; and adherence to international law," the Defence Review adds.

The Constitutional imperative that the security services adhere to international law on armed conflict (Articles 198(c), 199(5) and 200(2)) also affects doctrine. The Geneva and Hague conventions and protocols provide, *inter alia*, that armed forces may only attack military targets and must refrain from attacking civilians and civilian property. "These rules necessarily circumscribe deterrence doctrine."

The 1998 Defence Review describes South Africa s approach to deterrence as encompassing the following:

- South Africa will pursue military co-operation with other states in such a way that potential aggressors run the risk of encountering collective military capabilities in response. Collective capabilities would also deter threats to the region as a whole.
- Capabilities to neutralize possible threats should be at a level of readiness commensurate with the lead time for such threats to develop. This should be clearly visible. Care must be taken not to open strategic gaps in the capability of the SANDF when reducing force levels.
- Deterrence will not only be pursued against potential short-term aggression through immediate force readiness. Potential aggression in the longer term will also be deterred by maintaining the capability for expansion.
- Even if South Africa is not strong enough to ensure dominance in defensive actions, the risk to any potential aggressor should be unacceptably high.
- Deterrence should not be counter-productive in that it triggers an arms race. This has implications for doctrine, force design and force levels.

The 1998 Defence Review describes operational doctrine as consisting of the main principles and concepts by which armed forces guide their actions in military operations in support of national objectives. "Doctrine derives from, and must be consistent with, defence policy and posture," it adds. SANDF doctrine should therefore reflect the international prohibition on acts of aggression; the exercise of the right of self-defence in a manner which is consistent with international law; a defensive posture at strategic level; and the employment of the SANDF as a measure of last resort, its writers argued.

Doctrine statement: "The policy of non-aggression and the constitutional commitment to international law, which outlaws the initiation of armed hostilities by states, constitute the basis of SANDF doctrine. International law does not preclude the exercise of the right of self-defence against external aggression. In the light of the above, the doctrine of the SANDF will be based on a strategic defensive posture with sufficient capabilities to protect military and economic assets against offensive actions by an aggressor. Further, capabilities to reverse the effects of offensive actions are required. The SANDF must be able halt, contain and roll back such actions. Accordingly, appropriate offensive capabilities will be required at operational level. This approach will be complemented in times of conflict by government spelling out clearly the threshold for offensive action by the SANDF. In practice this may take the form of a declaration of appropriate exclusion zones or similar mechanisms. Finally, it is important to note that the defensive orientation of the SANDF is reinforced by Executive and Parliamentary control over its employment," the Defence Review says.

The implications of this doctrine on the SANDF's force design were explained as follows:
- The size and capabilities of the SANDF, in the context of government's defence policy, should not be seen as threatening by other states in Southern Africa. The emphasis will be on confidence-building defence in the regional context.
- Force levels will be limited to what is needed to maintain essential capabilities and expertise. These will serve as a basis for expansion if required.

- The potential for expansion should be consistent with a realistic appreciation of warning times for the development of military threats. Participation in regional early warning structures will reinforce such appreciation.
- SANDF doctrine requires an emphasis on defensive rather than offensive force elements. Manifestly offensive armaments and weapon systems have therefore been excluded from the force design. Other potentially offensive weapon systems which give undue strategic reach have been limited in number.
- The design of the SANDF should allow for dispersion of own forces. This leads to a reduction in target concentration and therefore less vulnerability in the event of an attack. It also contributes to regional confidence-building since mobilisation can easily be observed.
- Great reliance will be placed on the Reserves. This ensures that mobilisation will be more visible and thus less threatening than a large standing force.
- Where practically possible and financially viable, mobile and offensive forces will be drawn away from border areas to deeper internal bases.
- Training and force preparation should be consistent with defence policy, posture and doctrine.

What flows from doctrine?

Subordinate to doctrine is the tactics, techniques and procedures soldiers, airmen, sailors and their commanders employ in any given situation to deliver to the policy makers and strategists their required end state.

Principles of War?

For many the idea of Principles of War sounds as odd as "military efficiency" and "army intelligence." Yet, the idea is not as strange as it sounds. Just as centuries of business practice have allowed business school gurus to discern certain guidelines for commercial activities, some students of warfare have discerned what they call principles of war from millennia of warfighting. Among the first to do so was French general, writer and Clausewitz contemporary Baron Antoine-Henri Jomini (1779-1869). The principles of war are regarded as fundamental truths that have stood the test of time and are seen as a good starting point for evaluating strategy, tactics and operational planning. US manuals discussing the issue include:
- JP1, Joint Warfare of the US Armed Forces, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington DC, November 14, 2000.
- FM1, The Army, Department of the Army, Washington DC, June 2005.
- NDP1, Naval Warfare, Department of the Navy, Washington DC, March 28, 1994.
- AFM1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the US Air Force, Department of the Air Force, Washington DC, March 1992.
- MCWP3-11.1a Marine Rifle Company/Platoon, Department of the Navy, Washington DC, February 1978.

South Africa	US	Britain & Australia	Russia	France	China
Selection and maintenance of aim	Objective	Selection and maintenance of aim			Selection and maintenance of aim
Maintenance of morale		Maintenance of morale			Morale
Offensive action	Offensive action				Offensive action
Surprise	Surprise	Surprise	Surprise	Surprise	Surprise
Concentration of effort	Mass	Concentration of force	Massing & correlation of force	Concentration of effort	Concentration of force
Security	Security	Security			Security
Economy of force	Economy of force	Economy of force	Economy, sufficiency of force		
Unity of command	Unity of command		Interworking & coordination		Coordination
Flexibility		Flexibility	Initiative		Initiative & flexibility
Manoeuvre	Manoeuvre				
Cooperation		Cooperation			
Logistic support					
Maintenance of reserves					
Intelligence					
	Simplicity				
			Mobility & Tempo		Mobility
			Simultaneous attack t all levels		
			Preservation of combat effectiveness		
				Liberty of action	Freedom of action
					Political mobilisation

Table 3.14: Principles of war compared by country. The principles are listed in no particular order. All must be considered and none should be neglected.

What are "military operations other that war"?

Military operations other than war (MOOTW) are aimed at deterring war, resolving conflict by means other than violence, promoting peace – where it exists, and supporting the civil authorities in response to domestic crises or natural disasters. MOOTW may involve combat. In most instances, however, it is strictly non-combat. Because of its wide scope, MOOTW can happen in peacetime, in conflict area, or a war zones. MOOTW involving combat, such as peace enforcement, may have many of the same characteristics as war itself, including the use of most combat means. Even so, political considerations mean MOOTW operations are usually carried out under more restrictive rules of engagement (ROE) than would apply in wartime. The outcomes sought through the use of MOOTW are diverse, but may include deterring potential aggressors, protecting national interests, supporting the United Nations (UN), or provide humanitarian assistance.

The US Joint Chiefs of Staff recognises the following kinds (this is not a closed list):
- Arms Control

- Combating Terrorism: This includes anti-terrorism and counter-terrorism. Anti-terrorism programs are defensive measures taken to reduce vulnerability to terrorist acts and form the foundation for effectively combating terrorism. Counter-terrorism is offensive measures taken to prevent, deter and respond to terrorism, which provides response measures that include pre-emptive, retaliatory, and rescue operations.
- DOD Support to Counter-drug Operations.
- Enforcement of Sanctions and/or Maritime Intercept Operations.
- Enforcing Exclusion Zones.
- Ensuring Freedom of Navigation and over-flight rights.
- Humanitarian Assistance operations relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation in countries or regions outside the United States.
- Military Support to Civil Authorities (MCSA): Such operations can, for example, consist of temporary augmentation of air traffic controllers and postal workers during strikes, restoration of law and order after a riot, protection of life and property, or providing relief in the aftermath of natural disaster.
- Nation Assistance and/or Support to Counterinsurgency: Security assistance refers to a group of programs by which the United States, for example, provides defence articles, military training, and other defence-related services to foreign nations by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales.
- Non-combatant Evacuation Operations
- Peace Operations (PO): Military POs are categorized as peacekeeping operations (PKO) and PEO. PKO are military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement. PEO are the application of military force, or threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order.
- Protection of Shipping: Protection of shipping includes coastal sea control, harbour defence, port security, countermine operations, and environmental defence.
- Recovery Operations: Recovery operations are conducted to search for, locate, identify, rescue, and return personnel or human remains, sensitive equipment, or items critical to national security.
- Show of Force Operations: These operations involve increased visibility of deployed forces in an attempt to defuse a specific situation.
- Strikes and Raids: Strikes are offensive operations conducted to inflict damage on, seize, or destroy an objective for political purposes. Strikes may be used for punishing offending nations or groups, upholding international law, or preventing those nations or groups from launching their own offensive actions. A raid is usually a small-scale operation involving swift penetration of hostile territory to secure information, confuse the enemy, or destroy installations. It ends with a planned withdrawal upon completion of the assigned mission.
- Support to Insurgency: Forces may provide logistic and training support to an insurgency, but normally do not themselves conduct combat operations.

Principles of MOOTW

Applied to MOOTW, US sources argue the principles of war can be reduced to six: objective, unity of effort, security, restraint, perseverance, and legitimacy. The first three are derived from the existing principles of war, and the remaining three are MOOTW-specific:

- Objective: In MOOTW, every military operation must focus on a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective. Inherent in this is the need to understand what constitutes mission success and what might terminate operations before success is achieved.
- Unity of Effort: MOOTW requires that the entire orchestra play off the same sheet. All government departments, agencies, allies and other involved parties must know and understand the objective and their role therein.
- Security: Prudent measures must be taken to prevent hostile factions a military, political, or informational advantage.
- Restraint: The use of force must be judicious. There must be a careful balance between the need for security, the conduct of operations, and the political objective. Commanders at all levels must be sure their personnel know and understand the ROE and are quickly informed of changes, or face the risk of fratricide, mission failure and/or national embarrassment. ROE in MOOTW are generally more restrictive, detailed, and sensitive to political concerns than those applicable in general war.
- Perseverance: Sometimes it takes years to achieve the desired results.
- Legitimacy: Conditions must be created and maintained that support the perception of specific audiences that the conduct of the host government and/or MOOTW forces are legality, morality, or otherwise, right.

Fads, fashions and revolutions: How susceptible are the doctrine writers?

Doctrine writers, not unlike any other humans, are indeed susceptible to fad and fashion, with the air force being particularly prone to the malady. For many centuries the military was near impervious to innovation – change was worse than bad and had to be actively resisted. As a result, new tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) as well as technical innovations were usually the preserve of the underdog or adopted, belatedly, after a defeat. Since World War Two, the military industrial complex, led by technophiles and the like, has been keen to avoid the well-known criticism that militaries always prepare to fight the last war. As a consequence, and often for spurious reasons, militaries have adopted a range of TTPs and technical innovations, many of which have not worked as advertised. Warfare is a social activity and its study part science, part art. Little can be pinned down with any exactitude and most questions have multiple, correct, answers. Common sense is also less common than the term implies and is often not to hand when fanciful theory needs realistic testing.

"Realistic testing" is often actual combat with a real enemy. The cost of faulty logic or inappropriate equipment is paid in lives. Hundreds of Royal Air Force (RAF) pilots died in the period 1939-1942 while Bomber Command sought to prove their pet pre-war theory: that "the bomber would always get through". Entire raids were shot down because the RAF had believed its own propaganda and no one had disabused them of their beliefs. "The RAF's misfortune was that it had believed its own publicity. For twenty years it luxuriated in the conviction 'We are, *ergo* we are capable of a strategic bombing offensive," Max Hastings[10] wrote in Bomber Command. As a result, Bomber Command was the second-most deadly posting during that conflict, coming in only behind the German U-boat service. The tragedy was that for all that expenditure in life, equipment and wealth, the strategic bombing campaign achieved disproportionately little (see "effect based operations" below). By the same token, Britain, during the course of that war, was until the advent of the Comet in the last months of the war, unable to build its armoured crews a tank worthy of their heroic sacrifice[11].

Not all fads or fashions have their origin within the Services or the fertile minds of the technocrats. Some are imposed from civil society via the political machinery. The ancient belief that war is an heroic contest between two sides, preferably fairly matched, and with the better man winning, was not only dearly held by many soldiers for many centuries, as Smithers observes, but have also infiltrated the civilian mindset. For soldiers it was a matter of chivalry, for civilians it is a matter of "proportionality" and applying the policing rule of "minimum force". Both doctrines have an important role in the criminal justice system. Neither should be allowed to influence military doctrine, other than that of operations other than war, unless a nation desires more of their sons and daughters in neat, regimental, cemeteries. War is not a game and combat should never be a "fair" fight. A nation that wants to do right by its servicemen and women – and incidentally by its enemies – will ensure that they use tactics, techniques and procedures as well as technology sufficiently disproportionate – and with such violence - to render resistance futile and surrender the only viable choice. This was substantially achieved by Anglo-US troops in the 2003 invasion of Iraq, where the mismatch was such to induce "shock and awe" in the Iraqi conventional forces, leading to their speedy surrender and the rapid occupation of the country – at little cost in human life to either side. Alas, this approach works best during regular, conventional – meaning military-on-military – warfare. Its antidote, in part, lies, as we have seen in Iraq and Palestine, in irregular, unconventional civilian resistance. Ideally, every man, every woman and nearly every child should either actively fight the invader or, at least, passively support those who do. There is a catch – such "total resistance" not only comes at a great cost to the life, limb and property of civilians, but can also destroy the very fabric of civil society. Algeria, for example, fought a brutal war of liberation against the French in the 1950s, just to descend into an equally murderous civil conflict afterwards. It is still recovering from regaining its freedom.

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[10] Max Hastings, Bomber Command, Michael Joseph, London, 1987.
[11] AJ Smithers, Rude Mechanicals, An Account of Tank Maturity During the Second World War, Grafton Books, London, 1987.

Expand on some of the current theories

During the 1990s there was much talk of a "Revolution in Military Affairs" (RMA) that has given rise to "information warfare" and "effects-based operations" (EBO).

<u>RMA</u>

"The basic idea behind the RMA is that at certain times in history, some innovative combination of technology, new organizations, and new concepts led to rapid and dramatic increases in the combat effectiveness of military forces that mastered them, thus giving them at least a temporary advantage over their opponents," US National War College lecturer Dr Steven Metz told an University of Pretoria audience in August 2004. Expanding on the subject, he said those who mastered military revolutions were in some cases able to translate them into long term or even permanent strategic advantages. "In the West, the driving force of RMA thinking was a small organization in the US Department of Defence known as the Office of Net Assessment (ONA). This group believed that the modern battlefield was becoming so deadly that only accelerating the combination of dispersion, speed, seamless cooperation between land and air forces, battlefield awareness, precision, and standoff fires would allow success," Metz argued. "In addition the advocates of RMA recognized that only a military able to limit its own casualties by situational awareness, operational and tactical speed, and strategic speed (leading to short conflicts); and to minimize non-combatant casualties through precision fires could retain public support. And the American RMA pioneers recognized that the United States had assumed global security responsibilities at the same time that the public expected a post-Cold War diminution in the size of the armed forces."

The concepts and theory of the RMA quickly gained wide acceptance within the US military and developed into what can be called the "Joint Vision" model which held that the key to success in an increasingly lethal battlespace would be "dominant battlespace awareness" growing from the system of systems. "This would allow the post-modern US military to survive on a battlefield replete with weapons of mass destruction and precision guided munitions. Other Western militaries, even if they could not emulate American defence spending, largely accepted this model of the RMA. In both Operation Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan) and Iraqi Freedom, the US military, which had undergone several years of transformation along the trajectory defined by the Joint Vision concept, attained rapid battlefield dominance over its opponents but this did not lead to quick strategic success." This, Metz said, has led to a re-examination of the Joint Vision model of the RMA and a diminution in the belief that it provides a comprehensive solution to security challenges. "Specifically, two types of new threats are emerging or have emerged that challenge the Joint Vision force: states with some advanced technology that can serve in an anti-access role such as weapons of mass destruction or other advanced weaponry like cruise missiles; and non-state organizations using dispersion, intermingling, ambiguity, protraction, and terrorism. The Joint Vision force has difficulty against these, particularly the latter. In the United States, there is renewed interested in what were seen as 'old fashioned' types of military operations like counterinsurgency and stability operations. These are manpower-intensive rather than

technology intensive. They open a new range of problems, including sustaining a troops rotation base with a volunteer force, developing adequate human intelligence, developing new legal regimes, defining the role of private individuals and firms, and firms, and augmenting homeland security. All of these are topics which were not dimensions of the first generation of the RMA, but are now becoming so. The ultimate lesson, though, is that military revolutions are not about advanced technology, but about mental agility. He who innovates best and quickest wins. That will be as true of this new one as of all those in the past."

EBO

EBO has been described as "a set of processes, supported by tools and accomplished by people in organizational settings, that focuses on planning, executing, and assessing military activities for the effects produced rather than merely attacking targets or simply dealing with objectives.[12] EBO, wrote Daniel Fayette in an US Air Force Research Laboratory publication, "complements, rather than replaces, target-based or objectives-based approaches (such as strategy-to-tasks) and is very amenable to mission-type orders and strategy options that do not emphasize attrition-based approaches." He added that EBO applied across the entire range of military missions from humanitarian relief operations, peacekeeping operations, enforcement operations, or conventional war. "It applies with or without the use of lethal or non-lethal, kinetic or potential force. Since EBO is not platform specific, it is a critical capability for information operations such as defensive or offensive counterinformation warfare. An EBO approach starts from a high-level systems perspective and explicitly seeks to understand, trace, and anticipate direct and indirect effects of a specific action as the effects course through the enemy's political, military, and economic infrastructure. It applies to understanding oneself, an adversary, or any other context where elements interrelate, interconnect, or otherwise are interdependent."

By making the scope and scale of the enemy state explicit, Fayette argues planners and targeteers see the interactions between the various elements in the modeled state. "In visualizing those interactions, simulation tools predict the indirect effects as they ripple throughout the modelled state based upon direct actions and the direct effects they cause." He cites the Allied bomber campaign's "war on rails" over Germany as an example of EBO: "During the allied planning for the invasion of Europe in 1944, Supreme Allied Commander United States Army General Dwight David Eisenhower became greatly concerned that reinforcement from Germany, or the Eastern Front, would counterattack his forces before they could establish a foothold in Northwest France. Airmen proposed a plan attacking the railroad target system along many points, with particular attention to the marshalling yard target set. The allied plan was highly successful. Many years later, researchers discovered that attacks against the railroad target system indirectly led to the collapse of the German war economy by late 1944. Speculation exists that if the allies continued their efforts against the German Reichsbahn (railways), the war economy might have collapsed even earlier and saved countless lives.

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[12] Daniel F Fayette, Effect-Based Operations, AFRL Horizons, Air Force Research Laboratory, Rome, New York, June 2001, accessed at www.afrlhorizons.com/Briefs/June01/IF00015.html, May 22, 2003.

At the strategic level, attacks that directly led to the isolation of the Normandy beachhead indirectly led to the effect of reduced war-waging supplies." Fayette argued that every major conflict since then "more or less" repeated that pattern.

Information warfare

Author James F Dunnigan notes that information warfare is one of those "new flavours" that is difficult to describe accurately because it means different things to different people.[13] "To military communications people, it means keeping the many military networks (both intranet and wireless) safe from enemy interference. At the same time, the military hackers strive to figure out ways to crash or listen to enemy networks. To the psychological-warfare crew, it means getting a favourable spin on information about an ongoing war. Information war means all of these things, as well as the traditional art of deception." These, include, on the "real" battlefield, camouflage, concealment, ruses, displays, demonstrations and feints. In the media sphere they include false and planted information, lies and insight.

"Saddam Hussein used the media as a major military weapon during the 1991 Gulf War. Knowing how quickly the American public would see video of any battlefield action, he tried to arrange for enough American casualties so that a public uproar in the United States would cause an American withdrawal," Dunnigan adds. "Saddam got plenty of media play before the American attack began in January 1991. But he was outsmarted, and the attack on the Iraqis resulted in minimal American casualties: fewer that 300 deaths, unprecedented for an operation involving half a million troops. This had an unexpected side effect: the American public promptly decided this was a new development in warfare and that all future American military operations should have equally low casualties. This posed a problem. The Iraq operation had taken place under unique conditions that, in the past, had also resulted in low casualties. Ever since World War II, if you fought in the desert and had control of the air, you were likely to win with very few casualties. The British won a similar victory against the Italians under similar conditions in 1941[14]. But 24-hour television networks did not cover those battles. In 1941, the generals explained how they won and why, and the newspapers reported that. In 1991, there were hundreds of experts (some real, some just glib). Since "all the news all the time" television demanded dramatic statements, the concept that bloodless warfare was at hand was jumped on big time. No amount of sober statements from military experts could contradict this meaningless bit of analysis."

Dunnigan noted that the Somalis, Serbs, North Koreans, and many others have adopted information war tactics. "They work," he laconically added. A battle between US Rangers and Somali militiamen in 1993 resulted in 100 American casualties and more than 1,500 Somali losses. "The Rangers wanted to go back in and follow up their victory.

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[13] JF Dunnigan, How to make war, , 4th Edition, William Morrow, New York, 2003.
[14] The battle of Beda Fomm. Major General Richard O'Connor's Western Desert Force destroyed a much larger Italian force at a bottleneck in the desert, south of Benghazi in Libya over two days in February 1941. "Never has so much been surrendered by so many, to so few."

But by the next day they, and the Somalis, saw that the American news media had declared it an American defeat because there were more than a few US casualties."

Information warfare is not necessarily the preserve of the military. NGOs have used its methods too, infamously to secure a treaty in 1997 to ban antipersonnel mines (APM). "What was unique about the campaign to ban land mines was the skilful use of misinformation, lies, and rewriting of history to get the treaty signed." He points out that the basic premise used by campaigners was that APM have no military usefulness and are used primarily against innocent civilians. "Mines were used in volume during World War Two not because generals were sadists but because they saved lives," Dunnigan argued.. After that conflict, however, mines often became a political weapon. Most mines used against civilians are intended to terrorise them into supporting the guerrillas or not supporting the government. "This was not brought out during the anti-mine crusade because it did not fit the mind-set of the crusaders, who sought to pin the blame on the nations providing most of the mines," he writes. Most of the countries that afterwards signed were nations that either had no mines or were not keen to use what they had. "But on the negative side, the nations that did sign the treaty will, when they send their soldiers into some future war, lose more of those troops for the want of mines." He predicts mines will be back, perhaps under another name, very quickly when reports citing their need come from the front. "But many of their citizens in uniform will die needlessly in the meantime." A final point made by Dunnigan is that the anti-mine enthusiasts made up many of the statistics they quoted, such as that more than 100-million mines were in use and that 25,000 people were being injured each year. The figures were invented because most of those making and laying the mines were – and remain – disinclined to release accurate figures. Campaigners claimed there were up to 35 million mines in Afghanistan alone. Deminers on the spot now estimate the number at 600,000.