Defence Intelligence

Military intelligence is often cited as a classic oxymoron. Yet the role of intelligence, all levels, cannot be underestimated or overstated.

What is intelligence?

Arguably the best lay answer to this question can be found in US Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 2, Intelligence[1]. The manual discusses the effective use of knowledge about the enemy and the environment in support of military decision making. The Marine approach sensibly acknowledges that uncertainty pervades the battlefield and that one's best intelligence efforts can only reduce, not eliminate, uncertainty.

"Accurate and timely intelligence—knowledge of the enemy and the surrounding environment—is a prerequisite for success in war. Certainly, manoeuvre warfare places a heavy emphasis on the judgment of leaders at all levels. Nonetheless, judgment, even genius, cannot substitute for good intelligence. Genius may make better sense of available information, and it may provide superior and faster use of the knowledge it gains from that information, but no commander—no matter how brilliant—can operate effectively without good intelligence[2].

"Intelligence, therefore, is at once inseparable from both command and operations. Intelligence contributes to the exercise of effective command during military operations and helps ensure the successful conduct of those operations. By identifying enemy weaknesses susceptible to attack, intelligence also serves as an important element of combat power," he manual adds.

"Understanding the relationship between intelligence and command and control is key to understanding the role of intelligence. Command and control is about making and executing decisions. The main purpose of intelligence is to support (that) process. Intelligence strives to accomplish two objectives. First, it *provides accurate, timely, and relevant knowledge about the enemy (or potential enemy) and the surrounding environment.* In other words, the primary objective of intelligence is to support decisionmaking by reducing uncertainty about the hostile situation to a reasonable level—recognizing, of course, that the fog of war renders anything close to absolute certainty impossible.

"In achieving its primary objective, intelligence performs four related tasks. First, it identifies and evaluates existing conditions and enemy capabilities. Second, based upon those existing conditions and capabilities, it estimates possible enemy courses of action, providing insight into possible future actions. Third, it aids in identifying

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[1] US Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 2, Intelligence, Headquarters United States Marine Corps, Department of the Navy, Washington, DC, June 1997.
[2] Ditto.

friendly vulnerabilities the enemy may exploit. Finally, intelligence assists in the development and evaluation of friendly courses of action based on the results of the first three tasks.

"The second intelligence objective is that it *assists in protecting friendly forces through counterintelligence*. Counterintelligence includes both active and passive measures intended to deny the enemy valuable information about the friendly situation. Counterintelligence also includes activities related to countering hostile espionage, subversion, and terrorism. Counterintelligence directly supports force protection operations by helping the commander deny intelligence to the enemy and plan appropriate security measures. The two intelligence objectives demonstrate that intelligence possesses both positive—or exploitative—and protective elements. It uncovers conditions which can be exploited and simultaneously provides warning of enemy actions. Intelligence thus provides the basis for our own actions, both offensive and defensive.

Intelligence defined

"Very simply, intelligence is knowledge—knowledge about the enemy or the surrounding environment needed to support decisionmaking. Since people understand situations best as images—mental pictures—intelligence aims to create an accurate or meaningful image of the situation confronting a commander. Good intelligence paints a picture—or more accurately, several pictures—of possible realities.

"Not all knowledge which goes into military decisionmaking qualifies as intelligence. Knowledge pertaining directly to the friendly situation or to the status of an ally does not constitute intelligence. What do we mean by knowledge? In describing intelligence as knowledge, we are distinguishing intelligence from data or information. Intelligence is developed from information, but it is important to recognize that *intelligence is not simply another term for information*. Information is unevaluated material of any kind … and represents the raw material from which intelligence is ultimately derived. Few pieces of information speak conclusively for themselves. They must be combined and compared with other pieces of information, analysed, evaluated, and, finally, given meaning. Good intelligence does not simply repeat the information which a source reveals. Rather, it develops this raw material in order to tell us what that information means and identifies the implications for decisionmaking.

"In other words, *intelligence is the analysis and synthesis of information into knowledge.* The end result is not more information, but knowledge that gives us a meaningful assessment of the situation. Since intelligence is derived from information, it shares many attributes of information. Information, and the intelligence which results from it, is perishable. Information will always be incomplete, sometimes confusing, and often contradictory. Not all information will be important or even relevant, and much of it may be inaccurate or misleading. Too much information can be as harmful as too little. With all information, we seek not a large amount, but to have the right information available when needed and in a useful form, and so it is with intelligence.

"Finally, we note that knowledge does not exist for its own sake, but as the basis for action. We do not develop lengthy intelligence studies just because we have the ability to do so or because a subject is of academic interest. Intelligence that is not acted upon or that does not provide the potential for future action is useless," MCDP2 adds.

"Intelligence should be thought of as not just a product—knowledge—but also the *process* which produces that knowledge. Intelligence is the process which identifies and evaluates existing conditions and capabilities, estimates possible enemy courses of action based upon these conditions and capabilities, and assists in the development and evaluation of friendly courses of action—all in support of the commander's decisionmaking. Intelligence is thus a central component of the command and control process, which can be described by a simple model known as the observation-orientation-decision-action (OODA) loop. Intelligence activities make up a significant portion of the observation-orientation phases of the OODA loop with the primary purpose of supporting the decision phase. Intelligence also supports the action phase by identifying targets for attack and by assessing results, bringing the OODA loop full circle to the next observation phase in support of a subsequent decision.

"Intelligence must not be construed as the exclusive province of intelligence specialists. Intelligence activities are driven by the need to answer questions crucial to the planning and execution of operations. Intelligence is inseparable from operations. Data collected during the course of operations is essential to the development of a timely and accurate intelligence picture. Above all, intelligence shapes (some would say drives) the decisions made during the conduct of operations," MCDP said. *Everyone involved in operations are involved in intelligence in one way or another, and everybody involved in intelligence are involved in operations.*

Why the mystery?

"In the past, there has been a perception that intelligence is a highly specialized field shrouded in secrecy and isolated from other warfighting areas. Many misconceptions concerning intelligence have arisen; some even view it as the modern equivalent of wizardry. Why has this aura of mystery developed?

"First, intelligence is usually much less concrete than knowledge of the friendly situation, which Marines are likely to know with much more certainty and detail. It is commonly understood that effective intelligence is an important factor—often *the* critical factor—in mission success or failure. Isolating or measuring the specific effects of intelligence on the mission's outcome, however, is often difficult.

"Second, intelligence employs specialized techniques to develop studies and products. Intelligence personnel receive certain specialized training—but hardly more than specialists in other fields. In the normal course of performing their mission, Marine intelligence sections request and receive support from specialized, technical, and sometimes highly compartmented national, theatre, or service-level intelligence agencies. While these activities provide access to resources necessary to develop tactical intelligence, the activities themselves may be of limited interest to combat

units. In addition, intelligence often involves highly specialized technology, especially in the collection of information.

"Finally, to protect the value of a piece of intelligence as well the sources used in developing it, many intelligence products and methods are classified. Out of the legitimate concern for security, a need to know is a basic requirement for access to intelligence products. In order to protect the sensitive nature of some intelligence activities, elements of the intelligence section may be physically separated from other staff sections, with access to these elements being controlled. Unfortunately, the rightful concern over security contributes more to the mystification of intelligence than any other single factor.

"The result is a veil of mystery that often surrounds intelligence activities. However, intelligence is not an obscure activity unrelated to other warfighting activities. In fact, intelligence is a central component of command and control, a fundamental responsibility of command, and inseparable from operations. … There is nothing mysterious about intelligence. … Good intelligence begins with commanders clearly identifying their intelligence concerns and needs. It is developed through the focused collection of information, thorough study, and, most importantly, effective analysis and synthesis. The result is an intelligence product that provides knowledge, reduces uncertainty, and supports effective decisionmaking."

What are the characteristics of good intelligence?

Quoting again from MCDP2, Intelligence, the following can be said:

"First, intelligence should be *objective—*as free as humanly possible of bias or distortion. We have already noted that a significant problem in intelligence is not the lack of information, but the difficulty in interpreting that information correctly. Intelligence can be distorted if we attempt to make it conform to preconceived notions, fail to view the situation from the enemy's perspective, or manipulate the intelligence product to support a particular decision or conclusion. For example, prior to Chinese intervention in the Korean War (1950-53), there were ample indications and warnings of imminent Chinese involvement. However, despite availability of much factual information to the contrary, strongly held preconceptions led commanders and their intelligence officers to conclude that the Chinese would not intervene. Unfortunately, data and information are almost always susceptible to more than one interpretation and can be manipulated consciously or unconsciously to support preconceived notions.

"Second, intelligence should be *thorough*, meaning that it satisfies the intelligence requirements of the commander. Thoroughness does not imply completeness and certainty to the last detail, but rather sufficient depth to assist the commander in reaching sound decisions and developing effective plans. Intelligence personnel should not only identify for the commander what is known but also what is not known. The commander may then assess the risks and decide what actions are worth these risks.

"Third, intelligence should be *accurate*, meaning that it should be factually correct. Sound estimates of the enemy's capabilities and intentions must agree with the facts at hand. Since intelligence cannot be precise to the last detail, commanders must have an appreciation of the reliability of a particular intelligence assessment or product.

"Fourth, intelligence must be *timely*, meaning that it must arrive in the hands of appropriate decisionmakers in time to affect tactical decisions. Intelligence does not exist for its own sake, but as the basis for taking effective action. The most accurate and valuable piece of intelligence is of no use if it arrives too late to be acted upon. Some kinds of intelligence are more time-sensitive, or perishable, than others—a warning report, for example, is a type of intelligence product that tends to be highly perishable. It is important to keep this time sensitivity in mind when dealing with any intelligence product.

"Fifth, intelligence should be *usable*, appearing in a form meaningful to and easily assimilated by decisionmakers. Good intelligence should be concise and clear. It must create coherent images—meaningful mental pictures that are immediately and easily understood—rather than present the commander with a mass of unfocused data.

"Sixth, intelligence should be *relevant* in that it supports the commander's planning and decisionmaking requirements. Relevance means that intelligence is pertinent to the level of command for which it is intended. Relevance means also that commanders are provided information and intelligence bearing significantly on the situation at hand and that they are not burdened with information and intelligence of minimal or no importance. Intelligence that is tailored appropriately for one commander may be too generic or too detailed for commanders above and below that particular level. However, it may be extremely difficult to know in advance what is relevant and what is not. This leads again to the necessity for commanders to focus the intelligence effort. The value of providing relevant intelligence is illustrated by the following example. Following the bombing of the Marine Corps compound in Beirut in 1983, Department of Defense investigators faulted commanders and intelligence for inundating on-scene commanders with information and failing to provide them with timely intelligence tailored to their specific operational needs. While information overload was certainly not the only cause of the Beirut tragedy, more focused intelligence might have helped commanders prevent its occurrence or at least take greater security precautions.

"Finally, intelligence must be *available*—which means that it is readily accessible to appropriate commanders. Availability is a function of both timeliness and usability, but it is also a function of an effective information management system that allows commanders at various levels to readily access the intelligence they need. Availability also means that relevant basic intelligence has been developed in advance and that intelligence assets are maintained in readiness to develop other intelligence products as needed. Finally, availability is a function of effective use of security classifications that protect sources of information while at the same time ensuring that commanders have reasonable access to intelligence.

"This discussion is not meant to specify a checklist for what does or does not constitute good intelligence, but to describe the general characteristics which effective

intelligence tends to exhibit to one degree or another. Few intelligence products will exhibit all the above characteristics. Some of the characteristics such as timeliness, usability, and availability are mutually supportable. Others such as timeliness and thoroughness can be in conflict. The extent to which actual intelligence demonstrates each of these characteristics depends on the particular situation.

Explain the "levels of intelligence"

MCDP2, Intelligence, divides intelligence into levels which correspond to the levels of war. "*Tactical intelligence* concerns itself primarily with the location, capabilities, and possible intentions of enemy units on the battlefield and with the tactical aspects of terrain and weather. *Operational intelligence* pertains more broadly to the location, capabilities, and possible intentions of enemy forces within the theater and with the operational aspects of geography. Finally, *strategic intelligence* is broadest of all in scope and addresses the factors needed to formulate policy and military plans at the national and international levels.

What is an "intelligence requirement"?

MCDP2, Intelligence, answers thus: "A unit's intelligence effort begins with receipt of the mission and the commander's guidance. On-hand intelligence is rarely sufficient to support comprehensive planning and decisionmaking needs—gaps will remain. Such intelligence gaps are known as *intelligence requirements*.

"Intelligence requirements are questions about the enemy and the environment, the answers to which a commander requires to make sound decisions. The breadth of potential intelligence gaps, however, will generally far exceed organic intelligence capabilities. Thus, it is important to focus intelligence operations on those intelligence requirements crucial to mission success. We call these requirements *priority intelligence requirements*. Priority intelligence requirements are intelligence requirements associated with a decision that will critically affect the overall success of the command's mission. Priority intelligence requirements constitute the commander's guidance for the intelligence collection, production, and dissemination efforts. The nature and scope of intelligence requirements will vary with the level of command and its mission. Further, the type of operation and at what particular phase of planning or execution the commander states a requirement will be major influences on its breadth and complexity. However, it is the commander who designates the priority intelligence requirements and therefore provides direction to the intelligence effort. The importance of clear and focused intelligence requirements was demonstrated during the recovery of Air Force pilot Capt Scott O'Grady from Bosnia in June 1995. After Capt O'Grady was shot down, the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) afloat in the Adriatic was placed on alert to conduct a tactical recovery of aircraft and personnel (TRAP) mission. Upon notification that a signal had been received from Capt O'Grady's recovery beacon, the MEU commander designated three priority intelligence requirements: determine Capt O'Grady's exact location, update and reassess air defence threats to the TRAP force, and identify and describe flight hazards to the TRAP force. The clear identification

of the critical intelligence needed to execute the mission enabled the MEU intelligence section to concentrate its effort on satisfying those requirements in the few hours it had available."

What are the sources of intelligence?

MCDP2, Intelligence, notes that intelligence information comes from a wide variety of information sources, ranging from a soldier with a pair of binoculars to a sophisticated electronic sensor. Intelligence information may be derived from any human source, imagery, radar, signals, other emissions or signatures, and media references. "Effective intelligence operations employ all information sources, whether organic or external. The value of a source is not necessarily related to the sophistication or cost of that source. Sources of information must be appropriate to the nature of the particular intelligence requirement; that is, the collection method or capability used must be appropriate to the aspect of the enemy or the environment about which information is needed. For example, electronic intelligence will likely be of little use against a technologically unsophisticated enemy; human intelligence sources (observers, spies, etc.) will generally be more valuable. We must tailor the sources to the requirement, ensuring that we exploit both the observations of units in direct contact with the enemy and our more sophisticated sensors."

What are the "functions of intelligence"?

MCDP2, Intelligence, explained that intelligence performs six specific functions in order to provide knowledge of the threat and the surrounding environment as well as to deny that same knowledge to the enemy.

"The first function of intelligence is to *support the formulation of the commander's estimate of the situation* by providing as accurate an image of the hostile situation as possible. Through this function, intelligence helps the commander gain an initial appreciation for the terrain, weather, and other aspects of the operational environment. Intelligence personnel use techniques to estimate enemy capabilities, intentions, vulnerabilities, and possible courses of action. In this manner, intelligence supports initial decisionmaking and planning.

"The second function of intelligence is to *aid in situation development*—to provide continuing knowledge of unfolding events to help update the commander's image of the hostile situation. While the commander's initial estimate of the situation takes place before execution and provides the basis for the plan, situation development occurs during execution and provides the basis for adjusting plans to adapt to new circumstances or to exploit opportunities as they arise.

"The third function of intelligence is to *provide indications and warnings*. Indications and warnings serve a protective purpose, namely to provide early warning of potential hostile action and thereby lessen the chance of being surprised. Properly used, indications and warnings act as alarms. They alert us to developments that run counter

to the commander's planning assumptions and understanding of the situation in time to take necessary actions or precautions.

A fourth function of intelligence is to *provide support to force protection*. Force protection includes defensive operations, security measures, and collection activities undertaken by a commander to guard the force against the effects of enemy action. Intelligence supports the commander's force protection needs by estimating an enemy's intelligence, terrorism, espionage, sabotage, and subversion capabilities as well as recommending countermeasures against those capabilities. Support to force protection requires detailed assessments of both the capabilities and intentions of the enemy. A successful program of force protection lessens the enemy's ability to take offensive action against us.

"The fifth intelligence function is to *support targeting*, a function that intelligence shares with operations. Targeting is the process of acquiring information about targets and choosing the best method for attacking those targets. Intelligence supports this process by locating and portraying targets for attack and by estimating the vulnerability and relative importance of those targets. Targets may be physical targets such as a bridge or enemy position, or they may be functional targets such as the enemy's command and control system.

"The final role of intelligence is to *support combat assessment*. Combat assessment is the process used to determine the effects of friendly actions on the enemy. It includes battle damage assessment which refers specifically to the effects of friendly fires on enemy targets. It also applies more broadly the overall effects of friendly actions on enemy capabilities and intentions. Combat assessment provides the basis for future friendly actions as well as a dynamic link back to the first step of the intelligence cycle."

Where does security fit in?

MCDP2, Intelligence, remarks that safeguarding intelligence is an essential consideration. "Intelligence is normally less valuable if the enemy is aware of what we know. If the enemy concludes that we are in possession of a key piece of intelligence, he will likely change his plans and thus invalidate the intelligence. Security is important not only because it protects a specific piece of intelligence but also because it protects the sources upon which the intelligence is based. Thus, in the interests of security, the dissemination of and access to intelligence is often restricted.

"A tension exists between the legitimate need for security and the essential need for dissemination. On the one hand, we must protect not only the value of individual pieces of intelligence but also the sources which we depend upon to provide additional valuable intelligence in the future. On the other hand, intelligence is useless unless it can be acted upon; to be of value, intelligence must be in the hands of the decisionmakers who plan and execute military operations. Finding the proper balance between greater security and wider dissemination is a matter of reasoned judgment based upon the situation, the nature of the intelligence, and the sources involved."

What is the "intelligence cycle"?

MCDP2, Intelligence, explains that the intelligence cycle describes the general sequence of activities involved in developing intelligence. "The cycle is not meant to prescribe a procedure to be followed, but simply to describe a process which generally occurs. The intelligence cycle has six phases through which information is planned, obtained, assembled, converted into intelligence, provided to decisionmakers, and, ultimately, used in making decisions.

"The first phase in the intelligence cycle is *planning and direction*. This phase consists of the identification of intelligence requirements and the planning of intelligence operations and activities to satisfy those requirements. The commander directs the intelligence effort; the intelligence officer manages this effort for the commander. In so doing, the intelligence officer is guided by the commander's intent, the established priority intelligence requirements, and specific guidance provided by the commander for the conduct of the intelligence effort. Planning and direction encompasses the supervision of collection, processing, production, and dissemination operations as well as developing the intelligence structure necessary to support planned or ongoing operations.

"*Collection* is the second phase of the intelligence cycle. During collection, organic, attached, and supporting intelligence sources collect and deliver information to the appropriate processing or production unit—or, in some instances, directly to the appropriate commander for immediate action. Effective collection depends upon the use of a variety of mutually reinforcing sources. Necessary, planned redundancy and overlap of sources increase the reliability of information and can reduce the effectiveness of enemy deception or denial efforts.

"*Processing and exploitation* is the third phase of the intelligence cycle, the conversion of raw data into a form suitable for the production of intelligence. Largely a technical function, processing and exploitation convert the data into an understandable form and enhance its presentation. Examples of processing and exploitation include developing and interpreting a piece of film, translating a foreign-language text, or decoding an encrypted radio report. Not all information requires processing; some is collected in a form already suitable for production. Sometimes processing and exploitation occurs automatically during collection.

"The fourth phase of the intelligence cycle is *production*, the activities by which processed data is converted into intelligence. Production involves evaluating the pertinence, reliability, and accuracy of information. It involves analysing information to isolate significant elements. It includes integrating all relevant information to combine and compare those elements of information with other known information. Finally, production involves interpreting the information to form logical conclusions that bear on the situation and that support the commander's plan to engage the enemy. *Production is a process of synthesis—the most important action in developing usable*

intelligence for the commander. Production arranges the intelligence pieces to form coherent images. It is this step which adds meaning to these pieces, creating *knowledge*. Synthesis does not generally create a complete image—totally filling in the gaps and eliminating uncertainty—but it should provide an image from which the commander can reach an acceptable level of understanding. In the end, synthesis answers the all-important question: *"What effect does all of this have on our ability to accomplish the mission?"*

The fifth phase of the intelligence cycle is *dissemination*, the timely conveyance of intelligence in an appropriate form and by a suitable means to those who need it. Depending on its importance and time-sensitivity, intelligence may be disseminated— *"pushed"*—directly to users, or it can be sent to an accessible data base from which commanders can *"pull"* that intelligence which they need (see figure 3). Intelligence flows by any number of channels or methods. The form intelligence takes can influence dissemination. Some intelligence can be transmitted almost instantaneously to multiple users via a digital communications link, while other intelligence must be physically delivered by courier. The channel or means of dissemination is less important than the arrival of the intelligence at the proper destination on time and in a form readily usable to the commander. Depending on the urgency and time-sensitivity of the intelligence, it may follow established communications channels, or it may be broadcast to the entire force simultaneously as an alert or alarm. The final phase in the intelligence cycle is *utilization*. The commander may provide direction, information may be collected and converted into intelligence, and the intelligence may be disseminated, but unless that intelligence is exploited through decision and action, it has served no purpose. Utilization is not a function of intelligence per se, but rather of command and control—making the decision and then carrying it out. This reinforces two important points made earlier: first, intelligence has no value for its own sake but assumes value only when acted upon; and secondly, intelligence is inextricably linked to command and control.

"*No one phase of the intelligence cycle is more important than the others—they are interdependent.* Without proper direction, the other phases will be uncoordinated and ineffective. Without effective collection, there may be too much or too little information, and the information obtained may prove irrelevant. Without processing and production, the resulting mass of information may appear meaningless. Lengthening production time will delay dissemination. The first four phases of the intelligence cycle offer marginal value unless the intelligence arrives to the right person in time and in a useful form to support decisionmaking. Finally, intelligence operations are wasted if commanders fail to understand and act upon the knowledge intelligence offers. "For simplicity, the intelligence cycle is described as a sequential method; however, in practice, it is a dynamic process responsive to changes in the situation and the commander's evolving intelligence needs.

What is the purpose of Defence Intelligence?

To provide the Chief of the SANDF a defence intelligence and counter-intelligence capability by establishing, training and maintaining a prepared military intelligence service, auxiliary service and facilities.

Defence Intelligence gathers intelligence and conducts counter-intelligence operations on the strategic level. It is also the SANDF's nexus with the wider intelligence community by way of the National Intelligence Coordinating Committee (Nicoc) within the Ministry and Department of Intelligence.

How does Defence Intelligence relate to the intelligence organisations of the various Services?

Each of the Services has an intelligence organisation. However, these concentrate on the tactical level of war. Indeed, the SA Army's organisation is called the Tactical Intelligence Corps. The Joint Operations Division has the use of two Special Forces Regiments and concentrates on gathering operational intelligence – although the SF also have the capacity to gather operational and strategic intelligence – normally on behalf of Defence Intelligence.

Is there any specific legislation binding Defence Intelligence?

The Defence Act contains a chapter governing Defence Intelligence. In addition, several laws of general application govern the intelligence community.

CHAPTER 6
DEFENCE INTELLIGENCE

Definitions

32. In this Chapter, unless the context indicates otherwise
(a) **"defence intelligence"** includes -
      (i) "counterintelligence" ;
      (ii) "departmental intelligence";
      (iii) "domestic military intelligence" ;
      (iv) "foreign military intelligence"; and
      (v) "national security intelligence", as defined in the National Strategic Intelligence Act, 1994
      (Act No. 39 of 1994);
(b) **"Intelligence Division"** means the Intelligence Division of the Defence Force contemplated in section 33;
(c) **"Review Board"** means the Personnel Security Review Board established in terms of section 40(1).

Intelligence Division of Defence Force

33. The Intelligence Division in existence immediately before the commencement of this Act continues as the Intelligence Division of the Defence Force in the way in which it was organised.

Application of strategic and operational intelligence

34. The Intelligence Division must, subject to the National Strategic Intelligence Act , 1994 (Act No. 39 of 1994), gather, correlate, evaluate and use-
(a) strategic intelligence for purposes of-
      (i) ensuring national security;
      (ii) assisting in the formulation of defence policy;

   (iii) assisting in the determination of defence strategy;
   (iv) assisting in the execution of defence and foreign policy;
   (v) ensuring the security of defence assets of whatever description; and
   (vi) assisting in the co-ordination of foreign military assistance; and
(b) operational intelligence for purposes of-
   (i) assisting in the execution of operations in line with defence strategy ;
   (ii) assisting in the preparation of forces in order to get them ready for combat;
   (iii) providing support for combat forces; and
   (iv) ensuring the security of the forces.

Co-operation with other intelligence services

35. The Intelligence Division must co-operate with any other intelligence service or body created by or under any other law.

Counterintelligence by Intelligence Division

36. The Intelligence Division must, in accordance with any policy, procedure or norm determined by the Minister and in consultation with the National Intelligence Agency established by section 3 of the Intelligence Services Act, 1994 (Act No. 38 of 1994), conduct and institute counterintelligence measures and activities within-
(a) the Ministry of Defence;
(b) the Department; and
(c) the Armaments Development and Production Corporation of South Africa, Limited, established in terms of section 2 of the Armaments Development and Production Act, 1968 (Act No. 57 of 1968).

Determination of security classification of members and employees

37. (1) The Minister may prescribe-
   (a) different grades of security clearance to be issued by the Intelligence Division for various
   categories of members and employees, and employees of the Armaments Development and
   Production Corporation of South Africa, Limited;
   (b) the requirements which must be met before any such grade of security clearance may be
   issued; and
   (c) any circumstance, act, conduct or behaviour which disqualifies any such member or
   employee from being accorded a specific grade of security clearance.
(2) A member or employee contemplated in subsection (1)(a) may not be enrolled, appointed or promoted, receive a commission or be retained as a member or employee, unless such member or employee has been issued with the appropriate or provisional grade of security clearance by the Intelligence Division .
(3) No member or employee contemplated in subsection (l)(a) may claim an automatic right by virtue of enrolment, appointment, promotion, receipt of commission or retention to obtain, retain or be issued with a security clearance or any grade of security clearance.
(4) The Intelligence Division must on the instruction of the Secretary for Defence determine whether any security clearance or a specific grade of security clearance should be issued to any member or employee contemplated in subsection (l)(a) .
(5) The grade of security clearance issued to a member or employee in terms of subsection (4)-
   (a) must be specified in a certificate, issued by the Secretary for Defence on the
   recommendation of the Chief of the Defence Intelligence Division or an officer authorised by
   him or her, which certificate shall be prima facie proof of the grade of security clearance so
   issued;
   (b) remains in force until the next determination is made under subsection (4) or until the
   clearance lapses or is downgraded or withdrawn in terms of this Act; and
   (c) is subject to periodic revision by the Intelligence Division at such times or intervals as the
   Secretary for Defence may determine.

Discharge of members or employees not issued with security clearances

38. Any member or employee who is deemed unfit for further membership or employment in the

Department by reason of not having been issued with a security clearance in terms of section 37(4), may be discharged from the Department by the Minister.

Notification of security clearance or refusal thereof

39. (1) The Secretary for Defence must give written notice to every member or employee in respect of whom a determination has been made in terms of section 37(4).
(2) (a) Subject to paragraph (b), the Secretary for Defence must, in writing, furnish every member or employee whose security clearance or particular grade of security clearance has been refused, downgraded or withdrawn with the grounds and reasons for such refusal, downgrading or withdrawal.
(b) No person may reveal any counterintelligence measure taken, any source of information or the identity of any person involved in the collection or giving of information with regard to a security screening, investigation and evaluation, or allude to it in a manner which will enable a person to identify it.
(3) No security clearance or specific grade of security clearance may be refused, downgraded or withdrawn without the member or employee who will be affected thereby being afforded reasonable opportunity to present information regarding such matter.
(4) (a) Within 14 days after having received the grounds and reasons contemplated in subsection (2)(a), the member or employee concerned may lodge a written objection against the refusal, downgrading or withdrawal, as the case may be, with the Secretary for Defence and furnish the Secretary for Defence with such written representations, statements and documents as the member or employee deems necessary for a review by the Review Board.
(b) The Secretary for Defence may on application to it in writing by a member or employee extend the period referred to in paragraph (a) by a further period of 14 days.
(c) The Secretary for Defence must upon receipt of any objection contemplated in paragraph (a) forthwith furnish to the Review Board-
      (i) the objection and all supporting documents and any representations;
      (ii) the grounds and reasons referred to in subsection (2)(a);
      (iii) any other document, information or particulars which it considered in making the decision in question;
      (iv) any additional reasons which it deems necessary to furnish to the Review Board.

Personnel Security Review Board

40. (1) The Minister must establish a Personnel Security Review Board consisting of-
(a) a serving or retired military law officer of the Defence Force who is a suitable person to serve on the Review Board by reason of his or her qualifications or experience;
(b) a serving or retired officer of the Defence Force who is charged with or sufficiently experienced in personnel matters of the Defence Force; and
(c) such other members as the Minister may determine.
(2) The Minister-
(a) must appoint one of the members of the Review Board as Chairperson; and
(b) may, subject to subsection (1), likewise appoint an alternate member for any member of the Review Board.
(3) A member of the Review Board and an alternate-
(a) are appointed for such period, but not exceeding three years, as the Minister may determine;
(b) who are not in the full-time service of the State, must be appointed at such remuneration and on such other conditions of service as the Minister, in consultation with the Minister of Finance, may determine;
(c) may, at the expiry of his or her term of office, be appointed again.

Review by Review Board

41. (1) The Review Board must review any objection referred to it in terms of section 39(4)(c) and may direct the Secretary for Defence to investigate any aspect under review further and to submit its findings and recommendations to the Review Board.
(2) The Review Board may-
(a) confirm the determination in question; or
(b) set aside such determination and substitute any determination which could have been made by the

Secretary for Defence.

(3) Section 39(2) and (3) applies with the necessary changes to any determination made by the Review Board in terms of this section.

(4) The Secretary for Defence must amend or cancel the certificate referred to in section 37(5)(a) so as to reflect the determination made by the Review Board in terms of subsection (2).

Inspector-General of Department to monitor Intelligence Division

42. The Inspector -General of the Department must monitor the personnel structures of, adherence to the law and procedures by and activities of the Intelligence Division.

Table 13.1: Chapter 6 of the Defence Act

Laws of general application applicable to Defence Intelligence are:

Definitions

'counter-intelligence' means measures and activities conducted, instituted or taken to impede and to neutralise the effectiveness of foreign or hostile intelligence operations, to protect intelligence and classified information, to conduct security screening investigations and to counter subversion, treason, sabotage and terrorism aimed at or against personnel, strategic installations or resources of the Republic;

'covert collection' means the acquisition of information which cannot be obtained by overt means and for which complete and continuous secrecy is a requirement;

'crime intelligence' means intelligence used in the prevention of crime or to conduct criminal investigations and to prepare evidence for the purpose of law enforcement and the prosecution of offenders;

'departmental intelligence' means intelligence about any threat or potential threat to the national security and stability of the Republic which falls within the functions of a department of State, and includes intelligence needed by such department in order to neutralise such a threat;

'domestic intelligence' means intelligence on any internal activity, factor or development which is detrimental to the national stability of the Republic, as well as threats or potential threats to the constitutional order of the Republic and the safety and the well-being of its people;

'domestic military intelligence' means intelligence required for the planning and conduct of military operations within the Republic to ensure security and stability for its people;

'foreign intelligence' means intelligence on any external threat or potential threat to the national interests of the Republic and its people, and intelligence regarding opportunities relevant to the protection and promotion of such national interests irrespective of whether or not it can be used in the formulation of the foreign policy of the Republic;

'foreign military intelligence' means intelligence regarding the war potential and military establishment of foreign countries (including their capabilities, intentions, strategies and tactics) which can be used by the Republic in the planning of its military forces in time of peace and for the conduct of military operations in time of war;

'national intelligence estimate' means the product of the process of considering and weighing the possibilities, probabilities and facts disclosed by national security intelligence with regard to any situation, and of drawing conclusions from such possibilities, probabilities and facts;

'National Intelligence Structures' means-

(a) Nicoc;

(b) the intelligence division of the National Defence Force…

(c) the intelligence division of the South African Police Service;

(d) the (National Intelligence) Agency; and

(e) the (SA Secret) Service;

'national security intelligence' means intelligence which relates to or may be relevant to the assessment of any threat or potential threat to the security of the Republic in any field;

'national strategic intelligence' means comprehensive, integrated and estimative intelligence on all the current and long-term aspects of national security which are of special concern to strategic decision-making and the formulation and implementation of policy and strategy at national level;

'subversion' means any activity intended to destroy or undermine the constitutionally established system of government in the Republic of South Africa.

Table 13.2: Intelligence definitions as contained in the National Strategic Intelligence Act

2   Functions relating to intelligence
(1) …

(2) …

(3) …

(4) The National Defence Force shall …

  (a)   gather, correlate, evaluate and use foreign military intelligence, and supply foreign military intelligence relating to national strategic intelligence to Nicoc, but the National Defence Force shall not gather intelligence of a non-military nature in a covert manner;

  (b)   gather, correlate, evaluate and use domestic military intelligence excluding covert collection, except when employed for service as contemplated in section 201 (2) *(a)* of the Constitution and under conditions set out in section 3 (2) of this Act, and supply such intelligence to Nicoc; and

[Para. *(b)* amended by s. 2 *(e)* of Act 37 of 1998.]

  (c)   institute counter-intelligence measures within the National Defence Force.

Table 13.3: National Strategic Intelligence Act provisions regarding Defence Intelligence

Section 3 of the Act further authorises the SANDF to covertly gather domestic or foreign military intelligence when employed for service as contemplated in section 201 (2) of the Constitution or when discharging those counter-intelligence responsibilities entrusted to its intelligence division. Section 4 makes the chief of DI a member of Nicoc.

4   Establishment of National Intelligence Co-ordinating Committee
(1) …

(2) The functions of Nicoc shall be-

> (a) to co-ordinate the intelligence supplied by the members of the National Intelligence Structures to Nicoc and interpret such intelligence for use by the State and the Cabinet for the purposes of-
>
>> (i) the detection and identification of any threat or potential threat to the national security of the Republic;
>>
>> (ii) the protection and promotion of the national interests of the Republic;
>
> (b) for the purposes of the functions contemplated in paragraph *(a)*-
>
>> (i) to co-ordinate and prioritise intelligence activities within the National Intelligence Structures;
>>
>> (ii) to prepare and interpret intelligence estimates;
>
> (c) to produce and disseminate intelligence which may have an influence on any state policy with regard to matters referred to in paragraph *(a)* for consideration by the Cabinet;
>
> (d) after consultation with the departments of the State entrusted with the maintenance of the security of the Republic, to co-ordinate the flow of national strategic intelligence between such departments;
>
> (e) at the request of any Department of State, to co-ordinate the gathering of intelligence and without delay to evaluate and transmit such intelligence and any other intelligence at the disposal of the National Intelligence Structures and which constitutes departmental intelligence, to the department concerned; and
>
> (f) to make recommendations to the Cabinet on intelligence priorities.

Table 13.4: National Strategic Intelligence Act provisions regarding Nicoc

What does the Defence White Paper say about Defence Intelligence?

> *Defence intelligence*
>
> 12. The principles of civil-military relations have special relevance to defence intelligence. The intelligence legislation which has been promulgated and the RSA Intelligence White Paper provide for an ethical code of conduct, parliamentary oversight and executive control in respect of all intelligence agencies.
>
> 13. Defence intelligence structures are also subject to the scrutiny of the Inspector General of the SANDF and the various mechanisms provided for in the new intelligence legislation. These mechanisms include the National Intelligence Co-ordinating Committee (NICOC), the parliamentary Joint Standing Committee on Intelligence, and an Inspector-General responsible for defence intelligence.
>
> 14. The Ministry will ensure that a fair and acceptable balance is reached between the need to protect sensitive information and the demands for freedom of information in respect of intelligence activities.
>
> 15. The main functions of the Intelligence Division of the SANDF are the conduct of military intelligence and counter-intelligence, and the gathering of external military information. The primary aim of the latter function is to provide the SANDF with advance warning of potential military threats and instability, and thereby with maximum time for defence preparation. An effective intelligence

capability is essential as a force multiplier and to ensure that force levels are kept to the lowest level in times of peace. Intelligence is also the basis of all defence planning and the conduct of all operations.

16. Intelligence liaison and the sharing of intelligence with other states will be undertaken in accordance with guidelines issued by the Minister of Defence, in consultation with the Department of Foreign Affairs, and in co-operation with NICOC.

17. The National Strategic Intelligence Act provides that where the SANDF is deployed internally, the Intelligence Division may only gather domestic military intelligence in a covert manner with the authorisation of the Chairperson of NICOC acting with the concurrence of NICOC and Cabinet. Such covert collection shall be limited to the geographical area and time-scales specified in the authorisation.

18. Defence Intelligence structures shall not initiate or participate in any operations of a non-intelligence nature.

Table 13.5: What the Defence White Paper says about Defence Intelligence. The Defence Review does not address intelligence.

How is Defence Intelligence currently macro-organised?

Table 12.1: The Defence Intelligence Office, Type and Support Formations.

Table 12.2: The Chief of Defence Intelligence's office.

Moreti Johannes Motau was born on March 10, 1953. Motau was integrated into the SANDF as a Brigadier in April 1994. Until August 1995, he was the understudy to the Director Southern Africa within Military Intelligence, succeeding to that position on September 1, 1995. he completed his Joint Staff Course at the Defence College in 1997 and had by then already completed his DIO, Systems, Advanced Intelligence and SA Army Junior and Senior Command and Staff Courses.

Motau is married to Layla (née Mohammed) (born June 8, 1965) and they have two children: Sarah Dineo born on June 8, 1990 and Lesedi Faiz, born December 20, 1992. His awards and decorations include the Unitas Medal and General Service Medal.

Prior to his integration into the SANDF, Motau was Chief of Military Intelligence at uMkhonto we Sizwe (1992 to 1994). Motau started his working life in the Education Department of the Lebowa homeland in 1975. From 1979 to 1980 he was head of the Security Intelligence Group in the Northern Transvaal. In 1980 and 1981 he was an Independent Officer at the Security Department in Tanzania. In late 1981 he was attached to the Ethiopia Intelligence Group and from 1983 to 1986 he was deputy regional chief of intelligence in Tanzania. He then became Regional Chief of Intelligence for East Africa. In 190 he became a member of the Military Task Group. At the same time, he was "attached to the youth" and responsible for intelligence. In 1991 he acted as Chief of Military Intelligence, a post he was confirmed in the next year.

Table 12.3: The Chief of Defence Intelligence's biography

nn

Table 12.4: The WO of the Defence Intelligence's biography

nn

Table 12.5: Previous chiefs of Defence Intelligence

nn

Table 12.6: Previous WO of Defence Intelligence

Expand on the role of the Defence Intelligence Office

The role of the Surgeon General's Office is to provide strategic direction to the Military Health Service Programme by the formulation, promulgation and control of strategy, policies and plans, and the provision of advice by the Surgeon General's Office in order to prepare and provide the capabilities required by the Chief of the SANDF.

<u>Chief Directorate</u>

nn

Table 12.: CD 's biography

Expand on Defence Intelligence's "capabilities"

The SAMHS capabilities lie in its formations, namely the –

Does this structure support Defence Intelligence's ability to support the services?

nn

Expand on Defence Intelligence's musterings

What is the rank, racial and gender breakdown of the SAMHS?

nn

What are Defence Intelligence's activities on any given day?

nn

Explain Defence Intelligence's educational and training system

nn

How useful is Defence Intelligence?

The DoD 2005 Annual Report paints a rosy picture, saying Defence Intelligence plays a "significant role in security management in the region. In this regard the Defence Intelligence Sub-committee of the Inter-state Defence and Security Committee signed a Protocol on Intelligence and Security. The first Defence Intelligence Sub-committee Intelligence Course was presented successfully in Zimbabwe over the period 30 August to 29 October 2004. Twenty learners from 10 Southern African Development Community (SADC) countries attended the course. Valuable lessons were learned in attending and facilitating this course. A follow-up conference by participating countries confirmed its value and paved the way for more of these courses. A communication network among Defence Intelligence Sub-committee member states is almost fully operational. Defence Intelligence personnel continue to play an important role in support of Government's efforts to facilitate a cease-fire and peace agreements in Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Notwithstanding continued instability in the Great Lakes region, Defence Intelligence members continued to render assistance with the integration of belligerent elements in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Burundi into the unified armed forces of these countries. This included assisting in the drafting of an integration framework, planning documents for a smooth and speedy integration and monitoring the integration. Defence Intelligence is also involved in assisting security management elsewhere on the continent, for example in Uganda, Côte d'Ivoire and the Sudan. During the last quarter of the period under review[3] Defence Intelligence also provided training to the Economic Community of West African States early warning centre staff. Positive feedback was received from other South African stakeholders on the role Defence Intelligence is playing. Defence Intelligence supported SANDF elements before, during and after deployment in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Burundi and supported Exercise MEDFLAG, Exercise AIRBORNE AFRICA and the

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[3] January to March 2005.

Aerospace Africa Defence Exhibition 2004. This support led to valuable operational information being obtained," the report said.

"During 2004/5 Defence Intelligence also carried through structural changes to improve both its early warning centre and the situation room in an effort to improve intelligence support to operations. Initial tests with these envisaged changes have already indicated a significant improvement. "The collection capability was extended during the report period, and a number of geospatial products and services were delivered or are being upgraded. Co-ordination of the geospatial function is continuously improving. A mobile integrated geospatial support centre is being developed that will largely eradicate the interoperability problem and allow in-time decision-making at operational and tactical levels. The initiation of a comprehensive geospatial doctrine for the SANDF was also taken into review.

"An increase in requests for intelligence products is indicative of growing confidence in the capabilities of Defence Intelligence. Defence Intelligence continues to conduct intelligence exchange conferences with specific partners and also provides intelligence exchange documents to identified foreign intelligence partners. The emphasis remains on improving intelligence liaison in the SADC region. Defence Intelligence also participated in meetings of the Joint Permanent Commission on Defence and Security with Zimbabwe and Namibia.

"Defence Intelligence played a major role in drafting the National Security Framework that was presented and endorsed by the Justice, Crime Prevention and Security Cluster. The National Security Framework will be presented to the National Security Council, the Inter-ministerial Security Council and Cabinet. Defence Intelligence participated in the defence update of the White Paper on Defence and the Defence Review. It also played a leading role in revising the policy and procedures for special defence activities in the DoD.

"Defence Intelligence continued to staff key posts during the report period. However, the need to staff more of these posts and the training of staffed members remain focus areas. In this regard Defence Intelligence conduct basic language and computer training with junior members, which has contributed significantly to the quality of intelligence products. Defence Intelligence plans to refine education, training and development programmes to be aligned with both the post profile requirements and the National Skills Development Strategy. The implementation of the Statutory Intelligence Qualifications on National Qualifications Framework
Levels 4 - 6 will be a priority during the next reporting period.

Challenges

"The availability of skilled personnel remains an area of concern. The increased need to deploy Defence Intelligence members abroad has a detrimental impact on certain directorates, especially at under-staffed structures. The loss of qualified intelligence personnel and the replacement of these losses remain the single most important challenge for Defence Intelligence. The collection capability of Defence Intelligence is being expanded continuously and needs further improvement at huge cost to stay

abreast of new technological developments. Available bandwidth remains an obstacle to the distribution of geospatial products. The SANDF also has limited strategic aerial reconnaissance capabilities, since the inflexibility of commercial satellites and bad weather limit the use of satellite reconnaissance over equatorial regions. The inability to relocate the Defence Intelligence headquarters[4] remains an area of concern. Defence Intelligence recently appointed a project officer to investigate and steer a private-public partnership. The funds needed for the feasibility study may be beyond the current budget allocation of Defence Intelligence. Limited access to training, especially SA Army courses, such as the Integrated Sub-unit Commanders and Junior Command and Staff Course, hampers the career development of junior members and is a major cause of discomfort among these members".

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[4] Defence Intelligence is located in a rickety building in the Pretoria city centre, posing both a security and an occupational health and safety risk to its denizens. Reports of out-of-order elevators, blocked fire escapes, leaky ablutions and the like have abounded in the media in recent years.