Darfur disorder likely to continue to 2025

A new book on global geopolitical trends projects that the current slow ethnic cleansing in Sudan’s western Darfur province will likely continue to at least 2015 if not 2025. 
Authors James F Dunnigan and Austin Bay forecasts a 28% chance that the current “hit-and-run warfare” will continue with black African tribes being displaced. Under this scenario, peacekeeping forces remain “utterly ineffective.”
Their A quick and dirty guide to war – 4th edition, published by Paladin Press in the US late last year projects a 27% chance of peacekeepers dampening terror, banditry and stopping ethnic cleansing and a further 25% probability of the war lapsing into combat fatigue with Khartoum deciding “the war isn`t worth the political and financial effort”. Under this scenario, war would however likely resume by 2020.
The two authors see an 11% likelihood of Darfur`s resistance movements uniting and beating Khartoum into a stalemate. Under this projection they see Darfur separating from Sudan over the period 2015-2025. A last alternative is “successful genocide”, a 9% chance of Khartoum succeeding in driving tribes refusing Arabisation into exile in Chad or oblivion.                
Dunnigan and Bay see a 29% chance through to 2015 of south Sudan gaining independence and a seat in the United Nations. However, their analysis shows a 28% likelihood of renewed civil war between north and south and a 30% probability of “armed gridlock” with the UN maintaining the buffer between south Sudan and the north. This scenario also sees the 2011 independence plebiscite either postponed or deemed “not conclusive”.
Should civil war resume, the two authors see a 75% likelihood of Uganda and Kenya, south Sudan`s main sponsors, being drawn into a wider east African war.
Elsewhere in the Sahel, Dunnigan, who runs strategypage.com, and Bay see an 80% probability of low level warfare continuing in Chad up to 2025, where a UN peacekeeping force has just deployed.     
Further south, geopolitical trends point to a 30% chance of a renewed major conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo pitting eastern Swahili people against western Lingala speakers. The probability climbs to 50% if peacekeepers withdraw before 2015.
Should the UN stay, there is a 40% chance of low-level turmoil and a gradual increase in stability. There is a 5% possibility of democracy taking root and a 25% risk of government degenerating into a kleptocracy that results the Congo splitting into separate “nations”. Under this scenario Katanga is a viable independent state.