South Africa’s new Ministry of Defence leadership is taking over at a difficult time and will need to make some critical decisions while bringing government in to make others. Some matters demand immediate action, others are urgent and yet more can wait their turn, but not for very long.
Immediate action is required regarding the ill-considered mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The deployed force is laughably too small for its mandate – which covers countering all of the various armed groups in three provinces and protecting the people and infrastructure. Lacking air support, it is gravely under-equipped for the scale of the mission and the lack of a counter-rocket, artillery, mortar (C-RAM) capability renders its bases and logistic support through Goma airport vulnerable.
There are essentially three courses of action available:
• Muddle on as per the existing mandate – not a course any rational government should even consider as it will not produce any meaningful outcome but will cost casualties;
• Find a way to expand the deployed force and provide critical capabilities, then engage M23 to at least contain them, and thereafter declare mission completed and withdraw; or
• Accept the embarrassment and wind down the deployment and withdraw.
The first and the third will, unfortunately, most likely result in unnecessary casualties in future missions, as they will suggest to future opponents that South Africa need not be taken seriously. We already have Islamic State (IS) in Cabo Delgado claiming victory over the SADC force in Mozambique, given that it has been withdrawn without having achieved any lasting success.
That leaves the second course of action as the least damaging, but it will not be easy to implement. One extremely critical and urgent requirement will be to obtain counter-drone systems for the force deployed in the DRC, backed up by hard-kill systems. That role might be filled by the twin 35 mm of the air-defence artillery, given the success of the Gepard in Ukraine, or even something as basic as 12.7 mm or 14.5 mm machineguns or the twin 23 mm with thermal imager sights – hardly perfect but better than nothing and something that seems to work to an extent in Ukraine. At the same time we should look at deploying the artillery’s Vulture target acquisition UAV – if they are operational – to try and spot mortar teams and direct fire. There is also a clear need for a counter-rocket, artillery, mortar (C-RAM) capability or at least mortar locating radar.
Beyond that we could look at longer-range/endurance UAVs for area reconnaissance and getting a useful number of Oryx and Rooivalk back into service with their self-protection systems properly updated, and buying some laser-homing rockets for the latter, as integration of the Mokopa seems never to have been finalised. We could also look at deploying the Gripen with its thermal imaging reconnaissance pod to help build and maintain the tactical and operational picture. Deploying any of those aircraft would, however, demand counter-drone/C-RAM capabilities at the airport or require them being deployed elsewhere where they would not become targets, perhaps in a neighbouring country if an arrangement can be reached.
Cabo Delgado
Once that situation has been addressed, there is an urgent need to consider the insurgency in Cabo Delgado. Left to spread it could come to threaten Cahora Bassa and, should it spread even further south, the gas field at Temane. South Africa’s ability to pipe gas from the new Cabo Delgado field is obviously already at risk. Ideally, that insurgency should be the focus of attention, with a stronger force with air support deployed to suppress it. If the Mozambique government for whatever reasons will not permit that, an alternative to Cahora Bassa needs to be found and the border with Mozambique needs to be revisited with an eye to future security.
At the same time, the Minister will have to urgently explain to the President and Cabinet that the existing defence policy has failed, being impossible to implement on current funding. It must be impressed on them that there is an urgent need to review and decide the security role South Africa wants to play – regional, sub-regional or just local. That will determine the capabilities the Defence Force will need to maintain, regain or develop.
New defence review
Once that decision is taken, it will have to be followed equally urgently by a new defence review to consider options in respect of strategies, force mixes and strengths. Those must in turn be costed and presented to the Cabinet for a decision either to provide the requisite funding or to drop some missions, mission sets or entire roles. This will be something of a to-and-fro process until balance is achieved between government’s ambition and ability to fund defence.
One part of that review should be an economic review of the impact of defence funding, looking at the multiplier effects, technology spin offs from a rejuvenated industry and export revenues. In this regard it is worth bearing in mind the 1993 World Bank study that found in that spending up to 4% of GDP on defence does not have a negative impact on the economy and can have a positive impact. The latter will be particularly so in South Africa, as we can manufacture a proportion of defence equipment and have the potential to realize defence export revenues.
While this is in process, in order not to waste time, the 2015 Defence Review should be revisited with an eye to identifying what parts should be implemented in any event and can be implemented without major cost implications. Two would be officer and NCO education and training and career management. Another might be to finally implement the four-part defence budget as set out in the Review – operating, capital, contingency, operational employment – which would avoid nonsense such as the DRC mission being initiated without any funding provided.
One could also consider merging Armscor with the Defence Materiel Division and, with a small cost implication, finally appointing the Chief Defence Scientist. The Army is in meanwhile already bringing back brigades and both the Air Force and the Navy have taken first steps to getting aircraft and ships back into service. This will give the Defence Force a running start once the key decisions have been taken.
Once government has been brought to take the key decisions, the new defence review has been conducted and government has signed off on its recommendations, implementation should be set in motion immediately, not dragged out as after the 1998 Review and, perforce for lack of funding, the 2015 Review. The original idea of a defence review on a five-year cycle should also be brought back and set firmly in the ministerial and departmental programme.
That done, the Minister should establish a small Defence Review Monitoring Team to monitor implementation and to also monitor strategic and technological developments to identify issues to be addressed in the next review and, if necessary, recommend changes in the running process or call for an earlier review or interim partial review to take such developments into account.
Doing anything less would be a gross disservice to the country and, very particularly, to our soldiers.
